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This thesis orients around argumentative characterisations of logical
non-monotonic reasoning, focusing on the arbitration between con-
flicting claims. These characterisations are studied in terms of ar-
gumentation systems. In this context, groups of inference patterns,
composed of arguments for and against a claim, are produced and
evaluated for the purpose of testing the acceptability of that claim.
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the generalisation of ar-
gumentation systems to communicative (dialogical) interactions, in
which the reasoning process is distributed among opposing agents.
Under this scope a variety of issues arise such as the form of these
dialectics, the development of protocols concerned with different forms
of argument evaluation, strategy development for decision making,
and modelling of opponent knowledge used in strategy development.
This thesis makes two main contributions to the study of dialogues.
The first is the provision of a dialogue framework for structured ar-
gumentation. Through this framework it is shown that the structural
form of arguments needs to be taken into account when strategising,
since it may have considerable impact on the outcome of a game. It is
also shown that not accounting for the structural form of arguments
may compromise the soundness of argument evaluation results. The
second is the provision of a modelling formalism which defines how
information possibly known to an opponent can be built, updated
and maintained in the form of an opponent model. Part of the pro-
posed modelling methodology relies on statistical inference and can
find practical application both within the broad area of artificial in-
telligence and multi-agent systems as well as in other areas.
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The word logic has its origin in the Greek word ‘logike’ which refers to the ability
to reason. The formalisation of reasoning is the study of logics. As Brewka [1991]
explains, logics represent formal forms of reasoning where the study of inference
is researched from a normative perspective and not through an empirical one.
This thesis orients around argumentative characterisations of reasoning in
non-monotonic logics, formally expressed as argument systems. Such systems fo-
cus on the arbitration between conflicting conclusions in a logic, and are concerned
with certain groups of inference patterns in which arguments for and against a
claim are produced and evaluated, for the purpose of testing the tenability of that
claim (Prakken and Vreeswijk [2002]). That is, to test whether that claim can
be deemed acceptable with respect to a semantics (e.g. credulously or sceptically
acceptable). This process of justification is referred to as proof theory.
A rather seminal work in this field is the abstract formalism for argumentation-
based inference introduced by Dung [1995]. In Dung’s work, arguments, which
are typically defined with an internal structure consisting of: a set of prerequi-
sites/premises; an inference method, and; a consequent/claim; are in contrast
simply expressed as nodes in a graph which are characterised by a binary attack
relation, which is in turn expressed in the form of directed edges in this graph.
These two components form an argumentation framework (AF ) (Figure 1.1).
In this abstract setting an argument’s acceptability is evaluated under a given
semantics, based on whether that argument is a member of one or more subsets of
arguments in the framework, characterised by certain properties. These subsets
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AFigure 1.1: An abstract AF
are referred to as extensions.
Essentially, in his work, Dung was able to show that non-monotonic logics
are instantiations of his theory of argumentation. According to Prakken [2010],
Dung’s theory was a breakthrough in how it provided a general and intuitive
proof-theoretic semantics for non-monotonic logics. Arguing on the usefulness of
Dung’s framework Prakken explains that Dung’s formalism is best seen as a tool
for the analysis of argumentation systems and for the development of metatheo-
ries of them. Especially, since a consequence of the establishment of formal results
for his framework is that they are inherited by its instantiations. Such results are
offered in the work of Modgil and Caminada [2009] and Vreeswijk and Prakken
[2000] on the development of argument game proof theories for abstract argu-
mentation frameworks, through which one can best appreciate Dung’s intuitive
setting.
Argument games are procedures concerned with the evaluation of arguments
in an AF which capture the human fundamental principle of reinstatement that
characterises dialogical interactions (Caminada [2006]). An argument game is a
two person game. Provided an AF , two opposing parties respectively bearing
the roles of a proponent (Pr) and an opponent (Op), alternate turns exchanging
arguments in a game initiated with the introduction of an argument, whose partic-
ipation in a certain extension is debated. The winner of the game is decided based
on “who has the last word”. If Pr wins, then the participation of the disputed
argument in a certain extension is justified, deeming the argument accordingly
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acceptable with respect to the semantics that characterise that extension.
Different protocols regulate these games, imposing restrictions on either of the
participants in accordance to different semantics. The essence of the result of an
argument game defined on the basis of an AF which is in turn instantiated from
one’s knowledge base, is found in the fact that it reflects logical inferences derived
from that knowledge base. In other words, if an argument is acceptable under
a given semantics in the framework, then the claim supported by that argument
can also be inferred with respect to those semantics in the logic.
Due to their appealing and intuitive structure, abstract argumentation sys-
tems (AAS) serve as ideal platforms for underpinning actual dialogical interac-
tions (dialogues). The focus of this thesis is to investigate how one can generalise
argumentation to such interactions, where knowledge as well as reasoning is dis-
tributed amongst participating agents1.
In this context a variety of issues arise. We are particularly concerned with:
• the development of a framework for persuasion dialogues;
• the locutions (logical utterances) used in them, particularly in relation to
how these locutions can be used for the implicit construction of arguments;
• protocol development, for the evaluation of those arguments within the
framework;
• the investigation of the strategic considerations that should characterise an
agent’s decision making, and;
• the construction of models of opponent information intended to be used in
strategising.
1.1 Current State of the Art
In recent years, research in agent dialogues has been attracting much interest
(Prakken [2006]), especially in relation to the best response problem. Dunne and
1Agents are autonomous artificial entities that rely on logics to reason and interact in
uncertain environments, for the purpose of completing tasks delegated to them.
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McBurney [2003] and Dunne and McBurney [2004] define this problem within
the context of dialogues as one where a participant selects a locution, among
all available locutions at a certain point, to introduce in a game which by some
measure is deemed optimal. In the case of competitive contexts, “optimal” is
understood in terms of increasing a participant’s self-interested objectives (Am-
goud and Maudet [2002]; Black and Atkinson [2011]; Black and Hunter [2009];
Carmel and Markovitch [1998]; Emele et al. [2011]; Oren and Norman [2010];
Prakken [2005]; Rienstra et al. [2013]; Riveret et al. [2007, 2008]; Rovatsos et al.
[2005]; Walsh et al. [2002]). In the context of our research, moves and games are
respectively translated to arguments and dialogues. Another focus is concerned
with protocol design issues, usually related with the analysis of the strategical
concepts that characterise a participant’s choice, for the production of desirable
dialogical outcomes (Black and Atkinson [2011]; Black and Hunter [2009]; Fan
and Toni [2011]; Prakken [2006]; Rahwan and Larson [2008]).
Generally, research concerned with game-playing and the development of
search strategies in games has evolved around von Neumann’s [1928] minimax
theory. The fact that in many cases researchers tend to provide variants of the
minimax algorithm1 ( Carmel and Markovitch [1996]; Oren and Norman [2010]),
for dealing with strategising in a variety of competitive game contexts, serves as
proof of von Neumann’s impact in the field. The general idea is the instantiation
of a game tree which simulates the possible ways based on which a game may
evolve. One may then evaluate this tree by assigning utility values to its possible
outcomes, in order to choose the next move to make in the game.
However, application of the minimax algorithm is not unconditional as it only
accounts for games of perfect information. In other words, if a participant is
not aware of the possible legal actions/moves that its counterpart may employ
at all times in a game, then the application of the minimax algorithm may be
ineffective.
So as to allow for the application of von Neumann’s theory, as well as for the
use of other approaches for strategy development, in games of imperfect infor-
mation, some researchers propose that a participant’s strategical considerations
1A recursive algorithm used for choosing the next optimal move based on that move’s
expected utility.
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be based on the anticipated outcomes of a game. Outcomes, which may result
from a variety of choices and which can be evaluated in accordance to how a
dialogue may evolve. To do so participants have to rely on the modelling of their
interlocutors’ replies to each choice. This naturally reflects real world dialogues
in which we select utterances based upon what we believe are our interlocutor’s
beliefs (and goals). The act of modelling the interlocutors’ replies at each choice
point is one way of opponent modelling.
Basically, an opponent model (OM) consists of five basic components: an
opponent’s beliefs, abilities, preferences, objectives, and strategy. Numerous re-
searchers who deal with the best response problem in dialogues rely on opponent
modelling for implementing, and employing strategies, some of which are Black
and Atkinson [2011]; Carmel and Markovitch [1996, 1998]; Emele et al. [2011];
Oren and Norman [2010]; Riveret et al. [2007, 2008]; Rovatsos et al. [2005]; Walsh
et al. [2002]. Other researchers, e.g. Amgoud and Maudet [2002], rely on the di-
alectical obligations of a participant for implementing and employing a strategy.
These are, as explained by Prakken [2006], the expectancies created by commit-
ments in a dialogue, such as supporting a proposition when challenged or else
retracting it. These commitments are often assumed to be accumulated in a par-
ticipant’s commitment store. Relying on such models allows one to anticipate
what might follow in a dialogue, so as to optimally choose it next move.
Generally, the above approaches are successful in providing theoretically sound
methods for dealing with the strategy problem or for producing desirable dialog-
ical outcomes—outcomes characterised by some properties—by regulating the
protocols of such games. However, the fact that some of them (e.g. Oren and
Norman [2010]; Rahwan and Larson [2008]; Rienstra et al. [2013]; Riveret et al.
[2008]) rely on abstract argumentation framework (AAS) restricts one from ac-
counting for the logical content and structure of arguments, and their possible
effects on a dialogue game, i.e. from accounting for the underlying logic.
As Prakken [2010] explains, when actual argumentation-based inference has
to be modelled, Dung’s framework is usually too abstract. In the context of
dialogues, this limitation applies in the sense that it restricts one from accounting
for how the logical contents of the arguments introduced in a debate may interact
allowing for further inference. In simple words, the possibility of new information
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being made available as a result of the exchanged arguments in a game, eludes
abstract approaches. We consider this feature to be an inherent property of the
dynamic nature of dialogues. Thus, since AAS are limited with respect to this
necessity, the use of structured argumentation frameworks is imperative if one is
to account for this feature.
Accounting for the structure of arguments in dialogues is important in two
ways. The first relates to strategising. Since argument instantiation from the
logical constituents of other arguments introduced into a game is possible one
may wish to adapt its strategy so as to avoid revealing crucial information to the
opponent. The second relates to the development of dialogue frameworks and
protocols for the production of dialogical outcomes, which can be reflected by the
application of a proof theory on the accumulated knowledge, implicitly acquired
from the dialogue process. If such correspondence can be shown, then these sys-
tems can be characterised as sound and complete. Not accounting for the possible
instantiation of an argument in this case, may have a crucial effect on soundness
and completeness claims in frameworks that rely on abstract argumentation.
An ideal framework able to serve as a dialogue development platform is pro-
posed by Prakken [2010], who introduced an instantiation of Dung’s [1995] ab-
stract framework but for structured arguments, referred to as ASPIC+. In this
framework, arguments consist of defeasible/strict rules and premises, where de-
feat relationships resemble the notion of attacks in Dung’s framework, as the
term of attacks is used for defining the different kinds of contrariness between
these arguments in the framework. Preferences between arguments, that derive
from pre-orderings that characterise the logical constituents of arguments, are
also used in the framework and can be used for deciding defeat relationships
between contradictory arguments (arguments with symmetric attacks).
Other such frameworks have been used as platforms for the development of
dialogue frameworks (Fan and Toni [2011]). However, only with limited ex-
ceptions (Black and Hunter [2009]; Fan and Toni [2011]; Prakken [2005]), even
in approaches that rely on a structural representation of arguments, this dy-
namic aspect of dialogues is not explored (Riveret et al. [2007]). We should
also note, that there are several proposals by which “structure” not contained
within Dung’s [1995] abstraction can be added such as the work of Bench-Capon
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et al. [2007] on practical reasoning1 concerned with the use of arguments for ac-
tion. The researchers state that the acceptability of an argument for an action
not only bears on what is true in a given circumstances, but also on the values
and aspirations of the agent to whom the argument is directed. They further
argue that given that no agent can specify the relative priority of its aspirations
outside of a certain context, this prioritisation must be a product of practical
reasoning and cannot be used as an input to it. This requires that preferences
are explicitly modelled in their framework which can also handle inconsistencies
between conflicting preferences.
This is disregarded in many existing works, where only defeating arguments
are moved into a dialogue, such as in Prakken [2006]; Riveret et al. [2007, 2008].
As Amgoud and Cayrol [1997] explain, the notion of defeat can be partly derived
from the integration of preferences into an AF , allowing for choosing between
two contradictory arguments (one attacks the other and vice-versa) if the one is
preferred over the other. We note that, though some reciprocal conflicts may be
resolved this way, resorting to the notion of defeat does not suggest that all such
conflicts will be resolved2. More importantly though, in the case of dialogues, in
order to rely on preferences, one has to assume that participants share the same
preferences over the set of arguments used in a dialogue.
Assume for example, two ASPIC+-arguments A and B where A : p; p ⇒ q
(where p is the premise, p ⇒ q is a defeasible rule, and q is the claim) and
B : p; p ⇒ ¬q. Since A and B support conflicting claims they contradict each
other and thus share a symmetric attack relationship (particularly this is called
rebut attack). While the two participants may agree that A attacks B and vice-
A B
Figure 1.2: A symmetric attack relationship
versa, one may believe that B is preferred over A and so A does not defeat B,
1Reasoning about what to do.
2This is because there are weaker and strict notions of defeat (Prakken [2010]), where in
the first case it may very well be that A defeats B while B defeats A at the same time.
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while the other may believe that A is preferred over B and so A defeats B.
However, assuming that the two participants share the same beliefs is a rather
unrealistic assumption.
A useful idea would be to formalise a more expressive dialogue framework
so as to allow the participants to not only argue about the acceptability of the
arguments they utter, but to also support the rationale for why one argument
defeats another by uttering their preferences into the game as well. The game’s
protocol can then regulate the circumstances under which a certain preference
should be discarded over its conflicting preference or not, which could be based
on the game’s semantics.
A similar approach is employed in the work of Bench-Capon et al. [2007] in
which the concept of “preference” is considered in terms of the notion of “audi-
ence”: the relative importance that agents may ascribe to the (qualitative) so-
cial/ethical values associated with arguments. One original feature of this work
being that the dialogue game described allows agents to argue over value order-
ings (in Amgoud and Cayrol’s [1997] work preferences are rather static) so that
a case for acceptance can be made (or challenged) by attacking the implied value
prejudices of an opponent. The work of Amgoud and Parsons [2001] is also worth
noting here, which concerns a general framework for handling dialogues between
participants with different preferences not only with respect to formulæ of a
logical language, but also with respect to the roles that agents may have.
In relation to the use of OMs the basic assumption is that such models can
be induced from one’s accumulated experience against a certain opponent (Oren
and Norman [2010]; Riveret et al. [2007, 2008]). In other words, they can be
produced as the sum of all the information that a modeller acquires directly from
its opponent in their history of dialogues. Another way of inducing or extending
an OM is the acquisition of information possibly provided to the modeller by
a third party. Credibility is crucial when modelling opponent information, as
strategies are developed on that information and their effectiveness is affected by
it. This implies that, when modelling opponent information, different information
collection methods should be associated with different confidence levels.
More importantly though, a challenging issue concerned with opponent mod-
elling is to investigate how one can augment an OM. That is to answer the
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question: “How can I anticipate what else could an opponent know, given my
current assumptions about what he knows?”. This requires that we research
ways to augment/extend an OM with additional information, which do not rely
on direct or third party information collection methods.
Response to this question can partly be given by how humans augment their
assumptions about the possible knowledge of their interlocutors. Assume for
example that a lawyer encounters an opposing colleague in a trial for the first
time ever. One would expect that both lawyers are aware of the laws related
to the case or that both know the reports provided to the court in relation to
the crime, e.g. concerned with a murder case. Factors like the context of the
debate, or access to shared information can assist in this case. More importantly
though, each of the lawyer’s general experience in murder cases could assist in
anticipating the opposing part’s strategy and possible arguments that could be
employed. This could be based on whether arguments that appear in the trial
process, relate to arguments which appeared in past murder cases. This makes
a modeller’s general experience an important source of information which could
somehow be exploited for opponent modelling purposes.
Nevertheless, in most cases where opponent modelling is employed, the method-
ologies and formal procedures with which such a model may be built and updated
are often either left implicit (Oren and Norman [2010]; Riveret et al. [2007, 2008]),
or are only concerned with modelling some particular components of an OM
(Black and Atkinson [2011]; Carmel and Markovitch [1996, 1998]; Walsh et al.
[2002]). Furthermore, the basic assumption with respect to the origin of the op-
ponent beliefs encapsulated in an OM, is that these beliefs are the collection of
the distinct utterances that an opponent has put forth in dialogues with the mod-
eller. Relying on this assumption implies that an agent’s experience is exploited
in a somewhat monolithic way, since an agent’s accumulated dialogue experience
may encode additional information which could also be used for modelling, and
which could lead to an increase of the effectiveness of strategies that rely on OMs.
Let us now attempt a more thorough review of the literature with respect to
the highlighted issues.
Rahwan and Larson [2008] examine the notion of strategy within argumenta-
tion focusing on showing how dialogues may be designed so as to prevent agents
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from hiding information or lying. Specifically, their research concerns the devel-
opment of an argument mechanism that would be ‘strategy proof’, under specific
circumstances (related to topological restrictions on an argument graph). How-
ever, they rely on an AAS and thus the impact of the underlying logic is not
explored in their work.
Amgoud and Maudet [2002] explore aspects concerned with the strategy prob-
lem in the context of persuasion dialogues. Their approach relies on choosing be-
tween two kinds of strategies in a game, a ‘destroy’ and a ‘build’ strategy based
on information found in a participant’s commitment store. A ‘build’ strategy con-
sists of moving in and defending some arguments in a player’s own commitment
store, while the ‘destroy’ strategy consists of attacking some commitments (argu-
ments) in the opponent’s commitment store. Though they do rely on a structural
representation of arguments, information about the opponent is only limited to
an on-the-fly acquisition of knowledge provided by opponent arguments moved
in the game. Therefore, the information acquired during a game is not exploited
in later dialogues. In addition, they assume only simple protocols ignoring, for
example, features like backtracking (a feature in dialogues which allows one to
use alternative responses).
Riveret et al. [2007] is concerned with the integration of a probabilistic ap-
proach into an AF in an effort to deal with issues related to uncertainty and
to how probabilities can be used for utility evaluation purposes. In essence, for
the purpose of their work they assume dialogues where the arguments introduced
into a game are evaluated as successful or not by an adjudicator. This success is
decided on the basis of whether an argument can be constructed (based on the
chance of each of its constituents to be accepted by the adjudicator) and the exis-
tence of an accepted counter-argument. They rely on structured representations
of arguments where their constituents are associated with success probabilities
(the chance of these constituents to be accepted by the adjudicator). The con-
struction chance of an argument is calculated as the propagated probability of
its constituents. However, construction chance of an argument composed of in-
formation provided by both participants in the dialogue is not explored.
Riveret et al. [2008] deal with determining optimal strategies in argument-
based dialogue games, similarly relating probabilities with arguments. In their
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work, a strategy qualifies as optimal with respect to the probability of the partic-
ipant’s arguments to be accepted and the cost/benefit of those arguments. They
also assume the context of adjudication debates, though in contrast to Riveret
et al. [2007], their work relies on an AAS and thus the possible impact of the
structural elements of arguments is not explored in their work.
As far as opponent modelling is concerned, both Riveret et al. [2007] and
Riveret et al. [2008] model the possible knowledge of their opponents in the
form of arguments, assuming that arguers are perfectly informed about all the
arguments previously advanced by all other players, i.e., based on their interaction
history. Their investigation as well concerns games of perfect information, and
assumes that the participants’ goals always comply with the dialogical objectives
of the game; an assumption which, as McBurney and Parsons [2002] argue, is
not always valid. Furthermore, no formal methodology is provided with respect
to how such a model may be obtained. In addition, both approaches as well as
the approach by Prakken [2006] rely on the notion of defeat, which requires that
the participants in dialogues share the same preferences over the arguments they
utter and which, as it has been stressed is a rather unrealistic assumption.
Oren and Norman [2010] are concerned with strategy development with re-
spect to the best response problem based on OMs. They present a generally
complete approach through modelling both an agent’s knowledge in the form of
arguments as well as their goals, while they allow for nested opponent models.
The latter is a recursive modelling structure1 that allows one to model the possi-
bility that the opponent could also have a model of the modeller in his knowledge
base, allowing for multiple levels of nesting (Carmel and Markovitch [1996]).
However, once again, no information is provided with respect to how this model
may be built and updated. In addition, they also rely on an AAS and thus they
also do not account for the impact of the logic in strategising.
Rienstra et al. [2013] also rely on OMs, and extend the work of Oren and
Norman [2010] through proposing a categorisation of three kinds of OMs. A sim-
ple OM, an uncertain OM and an extended OM differentiating between levels of
1i.e.: A zero level nested model is one that only accommodates one’s opponent evaluation
function, while a first level nested model additionally accommodates the opponent’s opponent
model of the first.
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uncertainty of the modelled information between the tree models. They propose
a rather interesting notion of modelled knowledge to which they refer as virtual
arguments. These are arguments that a modeller thinks the opponent could be
aware of but does not exactly know what they support or their exact structure.
They also show how OMs can be updated in their framework while they test their
work, with respect to anticipating opponent knowledge, using a random abstract
argumentation theory (as big as 10 arguments). Their results focus on abstract
argument, though they state that they intend to adjust their heuristics so as to
account for structured argumentation.
In some cases, the fact that the formalisation of OMs is left implicit can be
attributed to the boundaries of one’s research scope. For example it could be that
the proposed heuristics of a particular work are concerned with explicit research
contexts where modelling additional information would be redundant or where
various aspects of the concerned problems are purposely simplified, so as to make
analysing them feasible. For instance, Carmel and Markovitch [1998] are simply
concerned with modelling an opponent’s strategy, expressed as a deterministic
finite automaton, which essentially models a finite set of actions concerned with
the iterative version of the prisoner’s dilemma game. They are thus indifferent to
a participant’s possible beliefs. Similarly, Walsh et al. [2002] assume a finite set of
predefined strategies that an agent may employ for analysing complex strategic
interactions with respect to stability and game theoretic equilibria.
In another work Carmel and Markovitch [1996], again, are concerned with
providing a variant of the minimax algorithm based again on modelling an op-
ponent’s strategy, this time as an evaluation function, though the provision of a
recursive model that is able to define complex levels of nested opponent models.
However, they provide no means based on which such a model may be acquired,
while additionally one could argue that the generalised approach they propose
can be applied only in contexts where the set of the possible actions that may
follow from a certain game state is finite and known to all participants.
Some interesting exceptions are offered in the literature with respect to mod-
elling. One such is proposed by Black and Atkinson [2011] and concerns a mech-
anism that enables agents to particularly model preference information about
others—what is important to another agent—and then rely on it for making
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proposals that are more likely to be agreeable. In this case the mechanism re-
sponsible for modelling an agent’s preferences is explicitly provided. Also the
work of Rovatsos et al. [2005] is worth mentioning, which explores how an agent
can learn stereotypical sequences of utterances in dialogues for deducing an op-
ponent’s strategy, though they do not rely on OMs. We finally note the work
of Emele et al. [2011] who explore the development of an OM based on what
norms or expectations an opponent might have, which, however, is not concerned
with an opponent’s general beliefs.
1.2 Research Questions & Contributions
Through this introduction we have identified a number of issues related to the
study of argument-based dialogues. With respect to these issues the aim of this
thesis is to research the following questions:
• In relation to accounting for the underlying logic:
1. What is the impact of the underlying logic in an agent’s strategising,
and to what extent should it be accounted for strategy development
purposes?
2. If its impact is crucial, then can we define a dialogue framework on
the basis of an argumentative system able to account for the structural
form of arguments?
3. How will the employment of a structured argumentation system add
to the expressiveness of dialogues produced in this framework, allow-
ing for the introduction of a participant’s preferences as a means of
justifying their rational with respect to a defeat relationship?
As a result of researching these questions we further investigate:
4. How can we evaluate the dialogue outcomes produced by our frame-
work with respect to the acceptability of a disputed argument?
5. With what restrictions should protocols developed for our dialogue
framework be characterised with, so as to guarantee the soundness of
a dialogue’s result with respect to certain semantics?
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• In relation to the issue of opponent modelling:
6. What are the main mechanisms based on which one may build, update
and maintain an OM?
7. What factors affect the credibility of acquired opponent information?
8. Can we formalise an opponent modelling process based on which one
could account for these factors in a way that could possibly increase
the effectiveness of a strategy?
9. Can we develop a modelling mechanism for inducing and augmenting
an OM based on a modeller’s general experience in dialogues?
As a result of researching these questions we further investigate:
10. If the proposed modelling process is computationally demanding then
can approximative approaches be used instead?
11. How can we evaluate the effectiveness of an opponent modelling mech-
anism in increasing a model’s validity and consequently its credibility?
Through responding to these questions we make two main contributions to the
study of dialogue games. The first is the provision of an ASPIC+-based dialogue
framework, which focusses on persuasion dialogues. We chose ASPIC+ for three
reasons. Firstly, because it is an expressive framework which explicitly models
the logical content and structure of arguments, an essential requirement for the
objective of our research. Secondly, because it accommodates many existing log-
ical approaches to argumentation (Modgil and Prakken [2011]). Finally, because
ASPIC+ has been shown to satisfy Caminada’s [2007] rationality postulates1.
We add to the framework’s expressiveness by allowing participants to utter
preferences and not just arguments in dialogues, enabling participants to ‘argue’
about the defeat relations of arguments they use. Relying on it, we research
logical, modelling and strategic aspects, while we particularly investigate the
importance of accounting for the underling logic when strategising. We show that
strategies that don’t account for the structural form of arguments are strategically
sound only at an abstract level. In addition, we provide 2 protocols with respect to
1Closeness and consistency conditions.
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a credulous and a sceptical semantics and prove the soundness and completeness
of dialogues produced in our framework.
The second is the provision of a modelling framework for building, updating
and maintaining an OM. The framework allows the modeller to differentiate
between 3 ways of opponent information acquisition. Namely these are, direct
collection of information from dialogues, third party provided information, and
information acquired through the method of augmentation. The model assumes
a structured representation of knowledge in the form of logical constituents for
argument instantiation. Depending on the information acquisition method, these
constituents are associated with a confidence value which can be used for the
purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the modeller’s strategy. Focussing on
the augmentation process we also develop a mechanism which allows a modeller
to incorporate additional information (external to the model) from its general
experience into an OM, after relating it with information already in the model,
i.e. to augment it, utilising its experience in a multifaceted way.
To give the reader an indication of the utility of the work in this thesis, we
note that in its most general sense this work deals with logics for reasoning in the
presence of uncertainty and conflict. Our interest is to enable agents to reason
using these logics, but in a distributed manner. Examples of applications where
distributed reasoning is important are described by Modgil et al. [2013] and con-
cern the fields of philosophy, communication studies, linguistics, psychology and
artificial intelligence. The work of Morge et al. [2013] is also worth mentioning,
which is concerned with an argumentation-based agent model able to support
service and partner selection in service-oriented computing settings. We should
also note the work of Fan et al. [2013] who propose a decision making model
which is applied to clinical trial selection, where given properties of a patient
relevant papers are selected from a given set, that best match the patient’s pref-
erences/properties. A specific example is presented in the work of Tolchinsky
et al. [2012], on deliberation dialogues about safety, where agents need to debate
whether a diagnosis is correct. We note that in any kind of dialogue there may
be points at which agents have to resolve disagreements and thus need to turn to
persuasion.
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As to the broader contribution of our work, especially in relation to the pro-
posed modelling framework, we note that in essence what we present is a pre-
diction mechanism. One that relies on an agent’s experience for anticipating its
opponents possible moves in a dialogue game. Apart from the application of the
proposed approach in the context of dialogues, this mechanism could easily be
generalised through appropriate modifications and applied in other A.I. contexts.
S this will become clearer in Chapter 4, all that is necessary is that one identi-
fies links between potentially associated information which can be quantified in
accordance to how various factors of a concerned system affect these links.
Such contexts may concern the field of recommender systems, where this mech-
anism could find potential use in predicting items of interest to a system user such
as contacts, music, books, purchase items, or even news based on their preferences
and on the preferences of their peers. Other fields could be bio-informatics, for
predicting whether certain amino-acids could interact to form a new protein. In
this sense the impact of our contribution extends beyond the A.I. field as practical
applications can be developed and applied for the solution of problems outside
the scope of the A.I. field.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The thesis is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2—provides the necessary theoretical background on which we
build our work.
• Chapter 3—presents the general dialogue framework developed in this the-
sis, and discusses the impact of the underlying logic in strategising. It also
provides a formal proof of the soundness and completeness of our approach
in producing dialogue outcomes that reflect certain acceptability semantics.
• Chapter 4—discusses the notion of opponent modelling, and proposes a
modelling framework for building and updating an OM, as well as for aug-
menting it with additional content based on the relationship of information
contained in it with information external to the model.
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We show how confidence values may be associated with the structural logical
information contained in an OM to be used for strategising purposes. At
the same time, we focus on the augmentation mechanism showing how it
accounts for additional knowledge likely to be known to one’s opponent. We
discuss the tractability of the mechanism, in relation to which we propose
an approximative approach for the computation of this likelihood which
relies on Monte-Carlo simulations, and test our approach.
• Chapter 5—extends the opponent modelling framework presented in the
previous chapter, focussing on accounting for a number of shortcomings of
the proposed augmentation process through a number of extensions, while
possible modelling variations also concerned with augmentation purposes
are discussed and proposed.
• Chapter 6—provides a general mechanism for strategising which utilises
confidence values through a utility evaluation function (UEF) and the ap-
plication of the minimax algorithm on a game tree which sums all the pos-
sible terminal states of a simulated dialogue game, illustrating how these
confidence values can be utilised.
• Chapter 7—presents a methodology towards evaluating our augmentation
approach in relation to whether it can positively affect the credibility of an
OM, given the absence of argument-based benchmarks for agent discourse.
• Lastly, Chapter 8—offers a short summary of our research, listing our con-
tributions, while it poses our future research objectives on issues which arise
from our work.
1.4 Publications
We note that some contents of this thesis also appear in the following publications:
• Hadjinikolis et al. [2012a]
Christos Hadjinikolis, Sanjay Modgil, Elizabeth Black, Peter McBurney,
Michael Luck. Investigating Strategic Considerations in Persuasion Dia-
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logue Games, Proceedings of the Sixth Starting AI Researchers’ Symposium
(STAIRS), 2012, IOS Press.
• Hadjinikolis et al. [2012b]
Christos Hadjinikolis, Sanjay Modgil, Elizabeth Black, Peter McBurney.
Mechanisms for Opponent Modelling, Imperial College Computing Stu-
dent Workshop (ICCSW), 2012, OpenAccess Series in Informatics, Schloss
Dagstuhl.
• Hadjinikolis et al. [2013]
Christos Hadjinikolis, Yiannis Siantos, Sanjay Modgil, Elizabeth Black, Pe-
ter McBurney. Opponent Modelling in Persuasion Dialogues, In: F. Rossi
(Editor): Proceeedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Arti-
ficial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2013, Beijing, China.
The first publication relates to the content presented in Chapter 3. A frame-
work for argumentation-based persuasion dialogues is presented which allows the
implementation of strategies based on a participant’s modelling of its interlocu-
tors knowledge. The framework is defined on the basis of ASPIC+ . Existing
works on persuasion is extended (Prakken [2006]), by accounting for both ad-
missible and grounded semantics, and also by allowing participants to not only
move arguments that attack those of their interlocutor, but also preferences which
undermine the success of these attacks as defeats. Formal results for these dia-
logues are stated, while it is also illustrated through an example that appropriate
mechanisms for strategising need to account for the logical content of arguments,
rather than just rely on their abstract specification.
The following two relate to Chapter 4. The first is a preliminary paper work-
shop paper, which introduces the ideas that follow in the second one. Main as-
sumptions and approaches to opponent modelling are introduced and discussed.
We focus on the fact that an agents experience may encode additional informa-
tion which if appropriately used could increase a strategys efficiency. Rely on a
modeller’s experience formally expressed as its history of dialogue interactions,
we define a mechanism for augmenting an OM with information likely to be di-
alectally related to information already contained in it. Precise computation of
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this likelihood is exponential in the volume of related information. Thus, we
describe and evaluate an approximate approach for computing these likelihoods




In this chapter we provide the necessary theoretical background for our research.
The chapter is structured as follows: in Section 2.1 we present Dung’s [1995]
work on argumentation theory; in Section 2.1.1 issues related to the problem of
argument evaluation are presented, focussing on an evaluation approach referred
to as argument games; in Section 2.2 we discuss the added value of argumentation
theory; in Section 2.3 we present Prakken’s [2010] instantiation of Dung’s [1995]
framework for structured argumentation on which we base the development of the
dialogue framework presented in Chapter 3; in Section 2.4 we present the types
of dialogues between agents researched in the literature, as well as the necessary
components of a dialogue framework, and discuss the generalisation of argument
games. A brief summary of this chapter is offered in Section 2.5.
2.1 Argumentation Theory
Dung [1995] builds his theory of argumentation based on the notion of an ar-
gumentation framework (AF ). Essentially, a Dung argumentation framework
(DAF ) is a directed graph (A, attacks) where A is the set of arguments and
attacks is a binary relation on A. Assume for example two arguments A,B ∈ A
then if (A,B) ∈ attacks then we say that A attacks B.
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Definition 1 (Argumentation Framework (Dung [1995])) An argumenta-
tion framework is a pair:
AF = 〈A, attacks〉
where A is the set of arguments, and attacks is a binary relation on A, i.e.
attacks ⊆ A×A.
Given a logic L, in order to instantiate a AF from it, one needs to express
both the notion of an argument as well as the notion of attack with respect to this
logic. That is to define what is an argument in L and what constitutes an attack
between two arguments. In this respect, given a set of well formed formulæ (wff)
in a knowledge base ∆ in L, one can instantiate all the arguments from ∆ and
relate them with attack relationships.
2.1.1 Argument Evaluation
Given an AF one can attempt an evaluation of an argument’s acceptability sta-
tus. That is to justify whether one should or should not accept an argument. For
this purpose, Dung [1995] proposes a number of acceptability semantics for his
framework, concerned with different levels or forms of acceptability, whose pur-
pose is to specify the conditions under which an argument is acceptable. These
conditions, focus on a number of properties that characterise certain subsets of
arguments in an AF referred to as extensions of the framework. The acceptabil-
ity status of an argument can then be evaluated with respect to whether that
argument participates in one or more of these extensions.
One of the most essential of properties that characterises all of the extensions
of an AF is that of conflict-freeness.
Definition 2 (Conflict-freeness (Dung [1995])) A set of arguments S ⊆ A
is said to be conflict-free if there are no arguments A and B in S, such that:
(A,B) ∈ attacks
Based on this property Dung defines a basic extension referred to as the
admissible extension.
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Definition 3 (Admissible Extension (Dung [1995]))
1. An argument A ∈ A is acceptable with respect to a set S of arguments iff
for each argument B ∈ A: if ∃(B,A) ∈ attacks then B is attacked by S1.
2. A conflict-free set of arguments S is admissible iff each argument in S is
acceptable with respect to S.
A number of extensions are then defined in Dung’s paper, which are essentially
special forms of the admissible extension. These are the complete, preferred,
stable and the grounded extensions. The preferred and the grounded extensions
are special forms of the complete extension. Other forms of semantics, with
corresponding extensions, are offered in the literature such as the semi-stable
semantics or the stage semantics (Baroni and Giacomin [2009]). As in this thesis
we are concerned with notions of credulous and sceptical acceptability in the way
that these are reflected by the preferred and the grounded semantics respectively2,
we only present these two semantics, as well as the complete semantics which
relate to them, in the way they are defined in Dung’s [1995] paper. Respectively,
these semantics represent the cases where an agent either chooses to credulously
accept the validity of an argument, or accept it beyond any doubt (grounded).
Definition 4 (Complete Extension (Dung [1995])) An admissible set S of
arguments is called a complete extension iff each argument, which is acceptable
with respect to S, belongs to S.
Definition 5 (Preferred Extension (Dung [1995])) A preferred extension of
an AF is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion) complete extension of an AF 3.
Definition 6 (Grounded Extension (Dung [1995])) The grounded extension
of an AF is the smallest complete extension in AF .
1Specifically this means that ∃C ∈ S such that ∃(C,B) ∈ attacks.
2Apart from the the grounded extension, sceptical justification of an argument can be based
on its membership in all the preferred extensions of an AF (Vreeswijk and Prakken [2000]).
3There may be more than one maximal complete extensions in an AF .
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2.1.2 Argument Game Proof Theories
Though in his work Dung [1995] defined the properties that argument extensions
should have in order to correspond to a semantics, the heuristics for their iden-
tification and construction were not provided1. Modgil and Caminada’s [2009]
argument game proof theories address this problem.
Generally, argument games are particularly concerned with the justification
of a single argument in a AF with respect to a certain semantics. These games
build on the reinstatement principle since an argument is deemed acceptable if it
can adequately defend itself against attacking arguments or be supported against
them by other arguments in the framework.
Similar approaches related to the development of proof theories for argumen-
tation can be found in the literature concerned with a number of semantics,
such as Caminada’s [2006; 2007] labelling, and the argument games proposed
by Vreeswijk and Prakken [2000]. However, we focus on the work of Modgil and
Caminada [2009], as it mostly relates to the research of this thesis.
Intuitively, as Modgil and Caminada [2009] explain, the idea of argument
games assumes the moving of arguments as in two-person dialogue games, pro-
viding a natural way in which to lay out and understand the heuristics for these
proof theories. The game consists of two participants, a proponent (Pr) and an
opponent (Op) who move arguments against each other in turns. This process
is called dispute. A dispute is won by the one who has the last move and thus
reflects the reinstatement principle.
Take for example the AF in Figure 2.1a and assume an argument game for
the acceptability of argument A. A1 would be moved first by Pr to be countered
by Op with B2. At this point Pr is presented with a choice of moves: C and D
(Figure 2.1b). This implies that from this point and on two distinct disputes can
evolve. This can be expressed in the form of branching in a tree referred to as
dispute tree, which is defined as follows:
Definition 7 (Dispute Tree (Modgil and Caminada [2009])) Let AF be an
argumentation framework AF = 〈A, attacks〉 , and let A ∈ A. The dispute tree
1Excluding the constructive method for forming the grounded extension as the fixed-point
































Figure 2.1: Grounded semantics: a) The AF , b) Part of the dispute tree T, c)
The winning strategy T′ ∈ T (Figures taken from Modgil and Caminada [2009])
induced by A in A is a tree T of arguments, such that T’s root node is A, and
∀X, Y ∈ A : X is a child of Y in T iff (X, Y ) ∈ attacks.
Let us continue the interaction by assuming that Pr opts for C3 which can only
be countered by Op with D4. At this point Pr is again presented with a choice,
that is to either repeat C, or counter D with the use of E. Here we encounter
one of the main problems that needs to be regulated in argument games, since if
repetition is available to both participants at all times then this would result in
an infinite dispute.
Let us further extend the dispute and assume that Pr opts for C5 again, to
which Op responds with repeating the same move, which is D6. At this point
though Pr is presented again with a choice between 2 moves—C or E—she is
more flexible with where to introduce them in the dispute tree. For example, she
can directly counter D6 with either of them, or counter D4 with introducing E7.
The latter choice is called backtracking. Notice that given backtracking, D is also
available to Pr as a backtrack move against B2—that is D8 in Figure 2.1b. Also
notice that even though D is an argument that has already appeared in the game
by Op (D4) it is now used by Pr.
In summary, the aspects regulated by the protocol rules of a game are:
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• the repetition of arguments;
• when to allow backtracking; and
• whether Pr should reuse arguments introduced by Op and vice-versa;
Different sets of rules for these games can capture the different semantics under
which an argument can be justified. In the following sections we present the
rules developed by Modgil and Caminada [2009], particularly in relation to the
credulous preferred semantics and the sceptical grounded semantics.
Finally, notice that, in contrast to a case where a game would consist of a
single dispute, in the case of a tree structure deciding on the winner of the game
is a more complex issue, since it is not necessary that a participant wins all
disputes in order to win a game. For this reason, Modgil and Caminada [2009]
turn to the notion of winning strategy :
Definition 8 (Winning Strategy) Given an AF and a tree induced by an
argument A then a winning strategy for A is a non-empty finite sub-tree T ′ which
satisfies the following criteria:
1. All its paths must be finite and they must end with a Pr’s move, and;
2. For every sub-path d′ of its paths that ends with a Pr’s move X, if there
exists an argument Y such that Y attacks X, then there exists another
sub-path d′′ such that the path created by d′ and Y is contained in d′′.
Specifically, in the case of the argument game of our example, a winning strategy
is identified in the dispute A1 −B2 − C3 −D4 − E7 (Figure 2.1c).
2.1.2.1 An Argument Game for Credulous Semantics
For their argument games Modgil and Caminada [2009] define a legal move func-
tion ø for distinguishing between legal and illegal moves in order to encode the
rule restrictions of different argument games for a semantics S. In general, as-
suming that one wishes to show that X is a member of an extension E under the
semantics S, the associated legal move function ø for S, prunes the dispute-tree

























Figure 2.2: a) An AF with an even-loop between two arguments, b) An argument
game for A, c) An argument game for B, d) An AF with an odd-loop between
three arguments, e) An argument game for A, and f) An argument game for B
the play-field of the argument game. X can be deemed accepted in this setting,
iff, there exists a ø-winning strategy T′′ which is a sub-tree of T′ such that the
arguments moved by Pr do not attack each other while Pr wins all disputes in
T′′. For convenience, we refer to the play-field sub-tree as T and to a winning
strategy in T as T′.
For dealing with issues related to the appearance of infinite disputes, resulting
from possible loops in an AF , Modgil and Caminada [2009] simply prevent one
of the two participants from repeating a move in a dispute. For the credulous
preferred semantics that participant is Op. Intuitively, this is because credulous
acceptability is a more lenient form of acceptability where Pr, in effect, need
only present an admissible set of arguments whereas Op has to eliminate all
possibilities1.
In a trivial case, assume an AF composed of only two arguments A and B
which both attack each other (Figure 2.2a). In this case we identify two preferred
extensions one containing A and one containing B. The respective argument
games where Pr would try to justify either of them should end with the repetition
of A and B deeming Pr the winner in each case (Figures 2.2b & 2.2b). Of course,
in a case of an odd-loop, e.g. Figure 2.2d, Pr must be restricted from using
arguments that attack (or are attacked by) arguments she previously introduced
1That this elimination process can genuinely result in infeasible computational demands is
one of the consequences of the analysis of Dunne and Bench-Capon [2003].
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into the game, i.e. using C or A respectively in Figures 2.2e & 2.2f.
In relation to backtracking, Modgil and Caminada [2009] explain, that it
should be allowed to both participants in a justification procedure, since either
bearing the burden of fully proving the acceptance of an argument or bearing
that of proving it wrong, both sides should be allowed to exhaustively use all
possible alternatives in order to counter their opponent. In this respect, back-
tracking is implicitly captured through the construction of all possible disputes
that can be deduced for an argument A, through a dispute tree. Hence the legal
move functions ø they provide are concerned with restrictions imposed on a single
dispute.
Specifically, in relation to the credulous preferred games, the legal move func-
tion øPC1 they defined is as follows:
Definition 9 (Legal move function øPC1 (Modgil and Caminada [2009]))
Given an AF = 〈A,ℜ〉 and a dispute d such that X is the last argument in d,
and Op(d) the arguments moved by Op in d, then øPC1 is a legal move function
such that:
• if d is of odd length (next move is by Op) then: øPC1(d)={Y |
– Y ℜX
– Y /∈ Op(d)
• if d is of even length (next move is by Pr) then: øPC1(d)={Y |
– Y ℜX
– Y ∈ POSS(d)}
where POSS(d) = {Y | ¬(Y ℜY ) and ∀Z ∈ Pr(d),¬(ZℜY ) and ¬(Y ℜZ)}
Notice that Op is restricted from repeating a move she previously used while Pr
is not. The use of Y ∈ POSS(d) imposes a couple of restrictions on Pr for the
purpose of devising a more efficient game. Since the arguments moved by Pr in a
winning strategy are required to be conict free (essentially Pr attempts to build
an admissible extension which is by definition conflict-free), shorter proofs can
be obtained by preventing Pr from moving arguments in a dispute that either
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attack themselves or attack or are attacked by arguments that Pr has already
introduced in d.
Through this set of rules—the legal move function øPC1)—Modgil and Cami-
nada [2009] show that given a finite AF , there exists a øPC1-winning strategy T
′
for X such that the set Pr(T′) of arguments moved by Pr in T′ is conflict-free,
iff X is in an admissible extension of the AF .
2.1.2.2 An Argument Game for Grounded Semantics
The ø-legal move function for the grounded semantics proof game defined by Mod-
gil and Caminada [2009] is very similar to øPC1 with the main difference that in
this case, instead of Op, Pr is the one restricted from repeating her moves in a
dispute. Intuitively, this is because sceptical acceptance adds a heavier burden
to the proponent (in the trivial example of FIgure 2.2a, Pr should be prevented
from repeating either A or B since the grounded extension for that AF is empty).
The legal move function for the grounded semantics is as follows:
Definition 10 (Legal move function øG1 (Modgil and Caminada [2009]))
Given an AF , a dispute d such that X is the last argument of d, and Pr(d) the
arguments moved by Pr in d, then øG1 is a legal move function such that:
• if d is of odd length (next move is by Op) then:
øG1(d) = {Y | Y ℜX}
• if d is of even length (next move is by Pr) then:
øG1(d) = {Y |
– Y ℜX
– Y /∈ Pr(d)}
In similar sense to the credulous preferred semantics, Modgil and Caminada [2009]
show that assuming that AF is finite, then there exists a øG1-winning strategy T
′
for X such that the set Pr(T′) of arguments moved by Pr in T′ is conflict-free,
iff X is in the grounded extension of AF .
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2.2 The Added Value of Argumentation Theory
The essential contribution of Dung’s [1995] work was that he showed that his
argumentation theory is an abstraction of non-monotonic logics. Non-monotonic
logics, such as logic programming or default logic theory, are formal logics where
the addition of a formula to a theory may produce a reduction of its set of
consequences (Brewka [1991]). In contrast to monotonic logics, non-monotonic
logics are closer to our common-sense reasoning since we rely on assumptions for
inferring a conclusion which we may retract in the face of new information. Such
an assumption is negation as failure employed in Prolog—a logic programming
language—where a negative conclusion is inferred upon the absence of information
based on which an affirmative conclusion would be derived, e.g.:
NOT P is true whenever P cannot be derived
In these logics the justification of a formula is based on whether that formula
can be entailed from a proof theory, e.g.:
∆NML ⊢ α
That is, given a ∆ in a non-monotonic logic entail α by applying a proof theory.
Specifically in relation to default logics, these theories are called default theories
and they are related with the notion of extensions. Each extension is interpreted
as an acceptable set of beliefs, and choosing among these possible extensions
assumes the employment of techniques associated with different acceptability
semantics (Reiter [1980]).
Dung was able to show that given a ∆ one can instantiate an AF and apply
a proof theory on the framework, instead of ∆, in order to entail/justify α, i.e.:
AF ⊢ α
At the same time he defined a number of extensions of arguments in his framework
which correspond to extensions of beliefs in a non-monotonic logic.











Figure 2.3: Distributed reasoning between two agents Ag1 (grey) and Ag2 in logic
programming.
way that it provided a general semantics for the consequence notions of argumen-
tation logics, while it allowed for different systems to be categorically compared
after being translated into his high level format. In consequence, his work has
been rather influential and resulted in giving an enormous boost to research in
computational argumentation. However, Modgil et al. [2013] argue that its suc-
cess is mostly attributed to the fact that his framework is able to serve as a basis
for the definition of proof theories for distributed non-monotonic reasoning, sim-
ply based on the reinstatement principle. A principle which very much appeals
to our human intuition.
For example, imagine an argument X in logic programming where:
X = [q :− NOT p]
is ‘uttered’ by an agent Ag1 within the context of a dialectical interaction with
another agent Ag2 (Figure 2.3a). So far we can assume that the consequent q is
justified. Further assume that Ag2 utters an argument:
Y : [p :− NOT s]
(Figure 2.3b). Now, given that p is produced as the consequent of Y , then NOT p
can no longer hold and thus q is no longer justified. However, it is possible for
Ag1 to reinstate the acceptability of X, consequently justifying q, by uttering an
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argument:
Z : [s :− NOT w]
(Figure 2.3c). Since the employment of an AF allows the modularisation of
knowledge in the form of arguments then this example suggests that rather than
applying a proof theory directly in logic programming, one can reason about
the justified formulæ through the implicit and incremental construction of a ∆
through the exchange of arguments between two opposing agents.
As Modgil and Caminada [2009] state, the argument game approach, places
an emphasis on the dialectical nature of argumentation as it appeals more to an
inter-subjective notion of truth:
“Truth becomes that which can be defended in a rational exchange and
evaluation of interacting arguments.”
In this sense, dialectical semantics allow one to easily relate formal entailment to
discussions and debates. Since this approach is akin to human models of reason-
ing, it allows for the integration of human reasoning in dialogues, enabling human
to human interactions, human to computational interactions and computational
to computational interactions. Therefore, apart from these argument games serv-
ing as guidelines and principles for the design of algorithms, they also assist in
bridging the gap between human and computational reasoning.
2.3 The ASPIC+ Framework
Prakken [2010] argues that Dung’s [1995] work has been very successful, espe-
cially if seen as a tool for analysing particular argumentation systems and for the
development of a meta-theory for them. However, it has been criticised for be-
ing too abstract when actual argumentation-based inference has to be modelled
(Prakken [2010]), which highlights the need for a structural instantiation of his
approach.
In his work Prakken [2010] instantiates Dung’s abstract setting, accounting
for the structure of arguments and their defeat relation. Arguments are presented
in the form of inference trees, relying on strict and defeasible rules, while three
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ways of attacks1 are defined.
In essence, Prakken builds his ASPIC+ framework by extending the European
ASPIC project (Amgoud et al. [2006]), which added expressiveness to Dung’s ab-
stract formalism, and which gave rise to further work by Caminada and Amgoud
[2007] who defined a number of rationality postulates criticising some specific
rule-based argumentations systems for not satisfying them. Prakken explains
that for this purpose only a simplified version of ASPIC was needed. As a result,
notions like preferences and the concept of a knowledge-base were not considered.
In his work the ASPIC framework is extended in 4 basic ways:
1. A third notion of attack between arguments is introduced, inspired by the
work of Vreeswijk [1993] (the other two are undercut and rebut attacks);
2. Drawing from the work of Bondarenko et al. [1997], and Verheij [2003], a
contrariness relation is defined to characterise the three notions of attack;
3. Premises are distinguished in 4 kinds, inspired by Gordon et al. [2007];
4. Attack relations are resolved through defining preference orderings on argu-
ments, derived from orderings on their structural elements, and shows how
ASPIC+ satisfies Caminada’s [2007] postulates2.
We briefly present ASPIC+ in the next section, on which we rely for the
development of the general dialogue framework presented in Chapter 3.
2.3.1 Basic Definitions
Prakken’s 2010 ASPIC+ instantiates Dung’s abstract approach by assuming an
unspecified logical language L, and by defining arguments as inference trees
formed by applying strict or defeasible inference rules of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ϕ
and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ϕ, interpreted as:
1In Prakken’s framework, ‘defeats’ rather than ‘attacks’ resemble the notion of attacks in
a Dung-AF . Attacks in ASPIC+ are reserved for defining the contrary/contradictory relation-
ships between the arguments in an AF .
2Though ASPIC also accommodates preferences satisfaction of the rationality postulates
was not shown for them.
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“if the antecedents ϕ1, . . . , ϕn hold, then without exception, respec-
tively presumably, the consequent ϕ holds.”
To define attacks, minimal assumptions on L are made; namely that certain
well formed fomulæ(wff) are a contrary or contradictory of certain other wff.
Apart from this the framework is still abstract: it applies to any set of strict and
defeasible inference rules, and to any logical language with a defined contrary
relation.
The basic notion of ASPIC+ is an argumentation system.
Definition 11 (Argumentation system) Let AS = (L, −,R,≤) be an argu-
mentation system where:
• L is a logical language.
• − is a contrariness function from L to 2L, such that:
– ϕ is a contrary of ψ if ϕ ∈ ψ, ψ 6∈ ϕ
– ϕ is a contradictory of ψ (denoted by ‘ϕ=−ψ’), if ϕ∈ψ, ψ∈ϕ
• R = Rs ∪Rd is a set of strict (Rs) and defeasible (Rd) inference rules such
that Rs ∩ Rd = ∅.
• ≤ is a pre-ordering on Rd.
Arguments are then constructed with respect to a knowledge base that is
assumed to contain three kinds of formulæ.
Definition 12 (Knowledge-base) A knowledge base in an argumentation sys-
tem (L, −,R,≤) is a pair (K,≤′) where K ⊆ L and ≤′ is a pre-ordering on the
non-axiom premises K \Kn. Here, K = Kn ∪Kp ∪Ka where these subsets of K
are disjoint: Kn is the (necessary) axioms (which cannot be attacked); Kp is the
ordinary premises (on which attacks succeed contingent upon preferences), and;
Ka is the assumptions (on which attacks are always successful).
We refer the reader to the work of Bondarenko et al. [1997] in relation to the
employment of assumptions as premises and their vulnerability against attacks.
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Arguments are now defined, where for any argument A, Prem returns all the
formulæ ofK (premises) used to build A; Conc returns A’s conclusion; Sub returns
all of A’s sub-arguments; and Rules returns all rules in A.
Definition 13 (Argument) An argument A on the basis of a knowledge base
(K,≤′) in an argumentation system (L, −,R,≤) is:





2. A1, . . . An →/⇒ ψ if A1, . . . , An are arguments such that there exists a
strict/defeasible rule Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)→/⇒ ψ in Rs/Rd.
Prem(A) = Prem(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Prem(An)
Conc(A) = ψ
Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A}
Rules(A) = Rules(A1)∪. . .∪Rules(An)∪{Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)→/⇒ψ}
In Modgil and Prakken [2011], the notion of c-consistent arguments is also
introduced, so that classical logic approaches to argumentation (e.g., Besnard
and Hunter [2008]), including those that accommodate preferences (Amgoud and
Cayrol [2002a]), can be captured as instances of ASPIC+. These approaches
require that the premises of arguments are consistent. Hence, Modgil and Prakken
[2011]’s c-consistent arguments are defined as those whose premise sets cannot
be extended by strict rules to obtain arguments with contradictory conclusions.
Three kinds of attack are defined for ASPIC+ arguments. B can attack A
by attacking a premise or conclusion of A, or an inference step in A. For the
latter undercutting attacks, it is assumed that applications of inference rules can
be expressed in the object language; the precise nature of this naming convention
will be left implicit. Some kinds of attack succeed as defeats independently of
preferences over arguments, whereas others succeed only if the attacked argument
is not stronger than the attacking argument. In this sense, attacks can be dis-
tinguished as either preference-dependent or preference-independent, where the
51
former’s success as defeats is determined by a preference ordering on the con-
structed arguments.
So as to not compromise the generality of our framework we make no assump-
tions on the properties of ≤. Nevertheless, for the purpose of our work we will
utilise the two pre-orderings, on defeasible rules and on the non-axiom premises
(we assume their usual strict counterparts, i.e. l < l′ iff l ≤ l′ and l′  l), for
defining an ordering  on the constructed arguments. Unlike Prakken [2010] we
explicitly define a function p that takes as input a knowledge base in an argumen-
tation system (and so the defined arguments and orderings on rules and premises)
and returns an ordering on the constructed arguments. Henceforth, we assume
the strict counterpart ≺ of . We however note, that the definition of defeat
does not rely on these particular pre-orderings.
Definition 14 (Attacks: C) An argument A attacks an argument B iff A un-
dercuts, rebuts or undermines B, where:
• A undercuts argument B (on B′) iff Conc(A) ∈ B′ for some B′ ∈ Sub(B) of
the form B′′1 , . . . , B
′′
n ⇒ ψ
• A rebuts argument B (on B′) iff Conc(A) ∈ ϕ for some B′ ∈ Sub(B) of the
form B′′1 , . . . , B
′′
n ⇒ ϕ. In such a case A contrary-rebuts B iff Conc(A) is
a contrary of ϕ
• A undermines B (on B′) iff Conc(A) ∈ ϕ for some B′ = ϕ, ϕ ∈ Prem(B)\Kn.
In such a case A contrary-undermines B iff Conc(A) is a contrary of ϕ or
if ϕ ∈ Ka
An undercut, contrary-rebut, or contrary-undermine attack is said to be preference-
independent, otherwise an attack is preference-dependent.
Definition 15 (Defeats) An argument A defeats an argument B (denoted A→
B) iff A attacks B (denoted A ⇀ B) on B′, and either: A ⇀ B is preference-
independent, or; A ⇀ B is preference-dependent and A ⊀ B′.
52
Definition 16 (Argumentation Theory) An argumentation theory is a triple
AT = (AS,KB, p) where AS is an argumentation system, KB is a knowledge
base in AS and:
p : AS ×KB −→ (2.1)
such that  is an ordering on the set of all arguments that can be constructed
from KB in AS.
We refer the reader to the work presented by Prakken [2010] for ways in which
such a function (p), to which we will be referring as preference function, would
define  according to the weakest or last link principles.
The justified arguments under the full range of Dung [1995] semantics can
then be defined. To recap:
• A Dung framework consists of a set of arguments A and a binary relation
attacks over A.
• S ⊆ A is conflict-free iff ∀X, Y ∈ S, (X, Y ) /∈ attacks. X ∈ A is acceptable
with respect to some S ⊆ A iff ∀Y such that (Y,X) ∈ attacks implies
∃Z ∈ S such that (Z, Y ) ∈ attacks.
• A conflict-free set S is an admissible extension iff X ∈ S implies X is
acceptable with respect to S.
• A conflict-free set S is complete extension iff X ∈ S iff X is acceptable with
respect to S.
• A conflict-free set S is preferred extension iff it is a set inclusion maximal
complete extension.
• A conflict-free set S is the grounded extension iff it is the set inclusion
minimal complete extension.
• For s ∈ {complete, preferred, grounded}, X is sceptically or credulously
justified under the s semantics if X belongs to all, respectively at least one,
s extension.
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Thus, if A is the set of (c-consistent) arguments on the basis of an ASPIC+
argumentation theory AT , C the attack relation over these arguments, and D the
defeat relation obtained from C and the preference ordering , then letting D
be the binary relation attacks, the justified arguments of AT are the justified
arguments of the Dung framework (A,D). Prakken [2010] shows that under some
intuitive assumptions on the strict knowledge and the preference relation , AS-
PIC+ satisfies all of Caminada’s [2007] rationality postulates for argumentation.
Modgil and Prakken [2011] argue that unlike Prakken [2010], and other works
that derive defeat relations from attack relations, conflict free-ness should be
defined with respect to attacks (B = C in the above definition of conflict-free), and
the defeat relation should only be used to define the acceptability of arguments
(B = D in the above definition of acceptability). They then show that under
the above assumptions on strict knowledge and preferences, the key results for
Dung’s theory are preserved, and Caminada’s [2007] rationality postulates are
satisfied. Henceforth we will assume evaluation of justified arguments as defined
by Modgil and Prakken [2011].
In summary Prakken [2010] and subsequently Modgil and Prakken’s [2011]
ASPIC+ provides a general framework that accommodates a number of possible
logical approaches to argumentation1 and satisfies Caminada’s [2007] rationality
postulates.
2.4 Agent Dialogues
While argument games may resemble the form of a two-person debate or discus-
sion, one needs to keep in mind that these proof procedures are actually mono-
logues where an agent is actually opposing itself, by simulating a dialogue between
two imaginary sides. An interesting question to explore is: “How can argument
games be generalised to actual two-person dialogues?”. Interest in responding
to this question mainly arises from the fact that in dialogues knowledge is dis-
tributed amongst the participants. Thus properties that characterise a partici-
pant’s arguments within a framework instantiated from its own knowledge-base
1E.g. Modgil and Prakken [2011] and Prakken [2010] show that assumption based (Bon-
darenko et al. [1997]) and classical logic argumentation are instances of ASPIC+.
54
(e.g. extension membership), may not hold in a framework incrementally built
through sequential introduction of arguments by both sides in a dialogue. In
addition, it is not possible to impose to the participants of a certain kind of a
dialogue game to comply to their dialogical roles—for example in the case of
a persuasion dialogue, to convince their opponents of their own view—or to be
truthful. Thus, it becomes essential that criteria under which an argument can
be deemed acceptable with respect to information collected through a dialogue
are formally defined, so as to account for these differences.
However, prior to responding to this question one needs to account for the
different types of dialogues studied in the literature as well as for the necessary
components for the development of dialogue frameworks. For doing so we pro-
vide a general overview on dialogue games, based on the work of McBurney and
Parsons [2009].
2.4.1 Types of Dialogues
Relying on the work of Walton and Krabbe [1995], “a model of human dia-
logues”, McBurney and Parsons [2009] present a summarise the dialogue cate-
gories in six different types, based on the different objectives that characterise
them.
1. Information-Seeking Dialogues: One of the participants seeks the an-
swer to some question(s) from the other based on the belief of the first that
the latter has it.
2. Inquiry Dialogues: Both participants engage in a dialogue in order try
to jointly answer a question whose answer is not known to both.
3. Persuasion Dialogues: A participant tries to convince another to accept
a proposition that the last does not currently endorse.
4. Negotiation Dialogues: Both participants bargain over the division of
some scarce resource.
5. Deliberation Dialogues: The participants collaborate in order to decide
the action or the course of actions that they should adopt in order to bring
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about some goal.
6. Eristic Dialogues: The participants quarrel verbally in order to vent
perceived grievances.
We should also mention here a class of dialogues not mentioned in the Wal-
ton and Krabbe [1995] taxonomy, referred to as examination dialogues (Dunne
et al. [2005]; Walton [2006]). The concept of examination dialogue is one in which
one participant (the Examiner) questions the other (the Examinee) not in order
to discover new information (as is the case in inquiry dialogues), or to make a
persuasive case, but rather to asses the extent to which information known to
the former is understood by the latter. Here, dependent on the exact context,
the Examinee may cooperate (e.g. viva voce environment) or try to evade re-
vealing information (e.g. Detective/Suspect interrogation). Thus in examination
dialogues the goal of one player may vary.
It must be noted, that even though dialogues are differentiated based on the
objectives they ‘impose’ to their participants, as McBurney and Parsons [2009]
explain, it makes little sense to talk about the goals of a dialogue since the ones
who actually have goals are the participants. As a result, it is reasonable to
expect that a dialogue is more likely to be a combination of these different types,
instead of a specific one. For example, a participant may enter a dialogue in order
to negotiate over some resources, while the other could simply be interested in
stalling the first, in which case we would have a combination of a negotiation and
an eristic dialogue. A similar case is discussed in the work of Gabbay and Woods
[2001], which reviews the so-called notion of “stone-walling1” by an agent in a
persuasion dialogue.
Additionally, McBurney and Parsons [2009] explain that a dialogue can also
have phases, and thus transitions between them. For example, participants may
enter in a deliberation or in a negotiation dialogue, and change to a persuasion
dialogue in the face of some conflict (such an example is given in Section 2.4.4).
Furthermore, and especially in relation to persuasion dialogues which are
found at the core of this thesis, we note that it is not always the case that
1A stance by which an agent attempts to delay or obstruct (a request, process, or person)
by refusing to answer questions or by being evasive.
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such dialogues are conducted in an impartial, neutral environment in which both
players wish only to objectively reach an agreement on some question at issue.
There are a number of contexts in which this view is unrealistic. For example,
one may have so-called “hidden agenda” motives (Dunne [2006]; Silverman [2005])
underpinning why for example a proponent wishes to convince its opponent of
some proposition p, while at the same time the proponent is uninterested in the
truth of p. Furthermore, as Dunne [2003] explains in his work, participants may
even act in a ‘non-cooperative’ way (possibly even malicious), contesting dialogue
policies or decisions accepted by others, so as to improve some notional individual
utility. Such issues bear considerable impact in modelling opponent knowledge
and consequently in anticipating one’s strategy and thus need to be taken into
account. As it will be discussed in Chapter 3, we account for these possibilities
through explicitly modelling a participant’s individual objectives.
2.4.2 Syntax
The form of the utterances as well as well as the rules concerned with the or-
der in which utterances can be introduced into dialogues are issues covered by
the syntax of a dialogue game. In order to provide a syntax for these types of
dialogues, McBurney and Parsons [2009] present a generic framework adapted
from McBurney and Parsons [2002]. In this framework they identify seven basic
components:
1. Commencement Rules: These define when a dialogue can begin.
2. Locutions: These define the legal utterances. For example: questions,
propositions, contest of an assertion or request of justification.
3. Rules for combination of locutions: These define the dialogical con-
texts under which particular locutions are permitted and/or are obligatory
or not.
4. Commitments: These rules define the circumstances under which partici-
pants incur dialogical commitments by their utterances altering the contents
of the participants associated commitment stores.
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5. Rules for combination of commitments: These define how commit-
ments are combined or manipulated when conflicting or complementary
utterances occur.
6. Rules for speaker order: These define the order which the speakers can
make utterances.
7. Termination rules: Rules that define when the dialogue ends.
This set of rules represents the backbone of any dialectical interaction protocol.
However, as McBurney and Parsons [2009] explain, one may use different inter-
pretations of them. For example, the notion of commitments can have many
meanings; it can refer to commitment to consistency, where each part is obliged
to have a consistent set of arguments, or commitment to execution where an agent
must execute an action or maintain a course of action, or even as the obligation
to publicly express your beliefs. It may even refer to commitment to the topic in
discussion as is the case in Bench-Capon et al. [2008] concerned with examination
dialogues, where the objective is to design dialogues between an interviewer and
an interviewee must not have the possibility to evade the issue in concern. In
this thesis we are more concerned with commitment to consistency with respect
to the utterances employed by a participant in a dialogue.
We note that prior to McBurney and Parsons [2002], there has been work in
formulating games using executable specification based on computational logic
by Stathis [2000]. All the components discussed in by McBurney and Parsons
[2002] are also discussed in this line of work, which however abstracts away from
commitments; since these can be formulated as domain specific knowledge.
2.4.3 Dialogue Game Semantics
Semantics concerned with dialogue games provide a shared understanding, to
both participants, of the meaning of a single utterance or of a combination of
them, and consequently they define the meaning of a dialogue. This shared un-
derstanding is also provided to the designers of dialogue protocols as a context
for studying and comparing the properties of individual protocols, as well as im-
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plementing them, while ensuring that their implementation, in open, distributed
agent systems, will be undertaken uniformly.
Drawing from the work of Eijk [2000], McBurney and Parsons [2009] distin-
guish between different types of semantics for dialogue protocols, as follows:
• Axiomatic Semantics: Defines each locution of a communication lan-
guage in terms of the pre-conditions that must be present before a locution
can be uttered, and the postconditions which apply following its utterance.
They can be further distinguished as public and private dictating that all
respectively at least some of the preconditions and postconditions which
describe states or conditions of the dialogue can be observed by both re-
spectively just one participants/participant.
• Operational Semantics: Locutions in combination with agent decision-
mechanisms are seen as transition operators, operating successively on the
states of some abstract machine, and are used to identify which dialogue
states are reachable and which are not.
• Denotational Semantics: Each element of the language syntax is as-
signed a relationship to an abstract mathematical entity (its denotation).
The purpose is to derive a semantic mapping of a compound statement in
the language from the semantic mapping of its elements; a process referred
to as compositionality.
In relation to the third type of semantics McBurney and Parsons [2009] re-
fer to the possible worlds semantics provided by Kripke [1959] in an attempt
to illustrate its application. Nevertheless, as they explain the presence of com-
positionality is not always guaranteed1, and thus they draw on game-theoretic
semantics. Similarly, in these semantics each statement in the language is asso-
ciated with a conceptual game between two players, and the statement can be
deemed true if, for example, a winning strategy2 exists for the proponent in that
game. Research in this thesis orients around this last type of semantics.
1A compound statement can have infinite combinations.
2The notion of the winning strategy is used here in similar sense to how it is used by Modgil
and Caminada [2009]; Vreeswijk and Prakken [2000].
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2.4.4 Generalising Argument Games to Dialogue Games
Dialogue games can be understood as generalisations of argument games in two
ways. The first concerns the fact that in contrast to argument games which are
concerned with a single objective—that of proving/disproving the acceptability
of an argument currently in dispute—dialogues may have many different objec-
tives. For example, dialogues can be cooperative, e.g. deliberation dialogues,
or competitive, e.g. persuasion dialogues. The second concerns how in both ar-
gument games as well as in dialogues, a knowledge-base (∆) is implicitly and
incrementally constructed through the exchange of utterances. However, though
in argument games these utterances concern the introduction of complete argu-
ments, in dialogues utterances are more expressive and are able to encapsulate
the logical constituents of arguments instead of complete arguments. Therefore,
as well as ∆, arguments in dialogue games are also implicitly constructed through
the exchange of these utterances.
Assume a case of a persuasion dialogue, where you are a lawyer and you have
to support that your client is innocent of a crime. You could argue for example
that:
• Argue: The defended is innocent (i), since he was not present at the scene
of the crime (¬p) and not being at scene of the crime implies his innocence
(¬p⇒ i).
In a dialogue however, instead of uttering a complete argument, you could start
your position simply by claiming:
• Claim: i.
which could be countered by:
• Why : i?
to which you can then respond with:
• Argue: i since ¬p, and ¬p⇒ i
which can then be Challenged and so on.
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In this sense, a persuasion dialogue can be seen as more expressive form of
an argument game. However, not all dialogues are persuasion dialogues, so why
should someone focus on persuasion dialogues alone? The motivation behind
focussing on persuasion dialogues derives from the fact that persuasion can be
embedded in all other kinds of dialogues, through the integration of utterances like
“why” or “challenge”. Therefore, results from researching persuasion dialogues
can impact the study of other kinds of dialogues.
Assume for example a negotiation dialogue where the two participants ne-
gotiate over the price of a car. Further assume that the seller’s maximum and
minimum prices are respectively:
max(Seller) = £30, 000 and min(Seller) = £25, 000
while the buyer’s are:
max(Buyer) = £20, 000 and min(Buyer) = £15, 000
Since the maximum price threshold of the buyer is lower than the minimum
price threshold of the seller it is evident that the two participants will not reach
an agreement. It seems more reasonable for them to engage in a persuasion
dialogue in an effort to first define an agreeable range of prices in which they
could negotiate.
2.4.4.1 Motivation
Under the scope of denotational/game-theoretic semantics and provided a frame-
work able to support this generalisation, one may then research and identify the
required properties of a dialogue protocol, necessary to guarantee the production
of sound and complete dialogues with respect to notions of acceptability used
in argument games. In essence, this process concerns proving a correspondence
between the two kinds of games with respect to the results they produce.
In simple words, let ∆ be the incrementally constructed knowledge that re-
sulted from a dialogue game for an argument A and for a semantics E, then
the soundness of this dialogue game can be justified if A is deemed acceptable
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through an argument game with arguments instantiated from that ∆.
As we have already noted at the beginning of Section 2.4, the challenge in
guaranteeing this soundness lies in the fact that knowledge in dialogues in con-
trast to argument games is actually distributed. This means that imposing on
participants that they should or should not introduce a legal possible move in the
game is at least challenging, since from the outset, awareness of this possibility
becomes available only after a move is introduced into the game and not prior to
its introduction. This is one of the issues we investigate in this thesis.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented Dung’s [1995] work on developing a highly abstract
but simple theory of argumentation, having as central notions those of attack and
acceptability. The first notion is understood as a binary relation between argu-
ments in an AF , while the second is expressed through a variety of acceptability
semantics that he defines through his framework. Since these acceptability se-
mantics resemble those developed for non-monotonic logics, Dung’s work consists
a proof of the claim that most major approaches to non-monotonic reasoning in
artificial intelligence (AI) and logic programming are special forms of his theory
of argumentation.
Furthermore, focussing on the work of Modgil and Caminada [2009] we pre-
sented two procedures for testing the acceptability of an argument with respect
to a credulous and a grounded semantics, referred to as argument games. The
work of these researchers is based on the natural expression of argumentation
through dialogue games, though these argument games are actually monologues
between two imaginary participants.
We briefly presented Prakken’s [2010] work on the development of an abstract
framework for argumentation with structured arguments, referred to as ASPIC+.
ASPIC+ distinguishes between different kinds of argument premises, while it
accommodates preferences that characterise the logical constituents of arguments
from which a defeat relation between arguments can be derived. In addition
it captures a number of well known logical approaches to argumentation and
satisfies Caminada’s [2007] rationality postulates.
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Finally, we reviewed the work of McBurney and Parsons [2009] who focus on
dialogue game protocols for agent interaction and argument, through analysing
these protocols from both a syntactical as well as a semantical perspective.
Through their work they provide an analytic framework for the development of
different kinds of dialectical protocols. The development of one such framework
is one of the concerns of this thesis, specifically related to argumentative systems
for persuasion dialogues which is presented in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Strategising in Agent Dialogues
In recent years there has been much interest in researching the notion of strat-
egy within argumentation based dialogues.That is, given a choice of locutions to
put forth during the course of a dialogue, which should an agent choose, and
under what circumstances. Most approaches either concern the heuristics based
on which a strategy may be implemented in a dialogue game, or the analysis of
the strategic aspects that characterise argument interactions based on a game
theoretic perspective. However, much of the work in this field assumes an ab-
stract form of arguments, which fails to take into account the logical content and
structure of arguments.
In this chapter we provide a general framework for dialogue games in Sec-
tion 3.1, in which rational agents can strategise, based on their own beliefs, and
their assumptions about their interlocutor’s beliefs, environment and goals. We
then formalise a specific persuasion dialogue as an instance of the framework, and
show how agents can strategise. Since strategic considerations require that the
content and structure of arguments is explicitly modelled, we build on the recent
ASPIC+ model of argumentation presented in Chapter 2. The latter explicitly
models the logical content and structure of arguments, while at the same time
accommodating many existing logics for argumentation allowing us to not com-
promise the generality of our framework. Relying on this general framework we
instantiate a persuasion dialogue instance of it that we present in section 3.2. In
contrast with existing work on persuasion dialogues (e.g., Prakken [2006]; Riveret
et al. [2007, 2008]), we allow the participants to not only move arguments that
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attack those of their interlocutor, but also (possibly contradictory) preferences
that undermine the success of these attacks as defeats.
We define two persuasion dialogue protocols that conform to the grounded
and credulous (admissible/preferred) semantics, and prove soundness and fair-
ness (a form of completeness) results for these dialogues in Section 3.3.2. Finally,
Section 3.4 concerns an investigation of strategic considerations in persuasion
dialogue instances of our framework. We show how participants may strategise
based on their beliefs about their interlocutor’s knowledge, and how such consid-
erations need to account for the logical content of arguments. Particularly, we
focus on showing how the abstract approach fails to accommodate the dynamics
of dialogue, whereby new arguments may be constructed during the course of the
dialogue process.
3.1 A General System for Dialogue
In this section we focus on providing a general system for dialogue, based on
ASPIC+, and adapting the system proposed in the ASPIC project, Amgoud
et al. [2006]. In general, a dialogue system usually consists of three basic elements.
Namely, these are: the reasoning model employed by the participating agents; the
set of rules responsible for regulating a dialogue game and; the basic elements that
allow for the implementation and employment of strategies by the participants.
The first characterises an agent’s reasoning, necessary for inferring and justify-
ing conclusions, explaining facts and making decisions. With respect to dialogues,
decision making concerns defining one’s objectives in relation to its main goals;
choosing the appropriate type of dialogue to initiate, for resolving a certain prob-
lem and; choosing the content of a move at a given step. Then, given a certain
dialogue type, we rely on different sets of rules—protocols—for regulating the
course of a dialogue game. That is, for defining the participants’ turn-taking;
the set of possible moves allowed to be deployed in a participant’s turn and; the
game’s termination rules. Finally, it is also necessary that we provide the means
through which a participant will be able to implement and employ a strategy, so
as to increase its chances of satisfying its self-interested objectives. These concern
the heuristics and information upon which a strategy can be based.
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3.1.1 Agent Theories
We begin by assuming an environment of multiple agents Ag1, . . . , Agν , where
each Agi can engage in dialogues in which its strategic selection of locutions may
be based on what Agi believes its interlocutor (in the set Agj 6=i) knows
1. Accord-
ingly, and in similar sense to the approach employed by Oren and Norman [2010],
each Agi maintains a model of its possible opponent agents, though in contrast
with Oren and Norman [2010], the model consists of the goals and knowledge
other agents may use to construct arguments and preferences, rather than just
the abstract arguments and their relations. We assume that all agents share the
same contrary relation, the same language L, and the same way of defining pref-
erences over arguments (not that they necessarily share the same preferences)
based on the pre-orderings over non-axiom premises and defeasible rules, i.e. all
agents share the same function p.
Definition 17 (Agent Theory) Let Ags = {Ag1, . . . , Agν} be a set of agents.
For i = 1 . . . ν, the theory of Agi is a tuple AgTi =< S(i,1), . . . , S(i,ν) > such
that or j = 1 . . . ν, each sub-theory S(i,j) = 〈AT(i,j),G(i,j)〉 where AT(i,j) is what
Agi believes is the argumentation theory (AS(i,j), KB(i,j), p(i,j)) of Agj and G(i,j)
is what Agi believes are the goals of Agj, and:
• in the case that j = i, AT(i,j) and G(i,j) are respectively Agi’s own argumen-
tation theory and goals.
• for i, j, k,m = 1 . . . n, let S(i,j), S(k,m) be any two distinct sub-theories of the
form 〈AT(i,j),G(i,j)〉, 〈AT(k,m),G(k,m)〉, where AT(i,j) = (AS(i,j), KB(i,j), p(i,j)),
AT(k,m) = (AS(k,m), KB(k,m), p(k,m)). We then assume that:
– p(i,j) = p(k,m)
– L(i,j) = L(k,m),
−(i, j) = −(k,m), where L(i,j) (
−(i, j)) and L(k,m)
(−(k,m)) are the languages (contrary relations) in S(i,j) and S(k,m)
respectively.
1We clarify that “believe” and “know” should be understood informally here, and are not
related to some modal epistemic logic.
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1 2 . i . ν
Ag1 Ag2 . . . Agi . . . Agν
1 AgT1 S(1,1) S(1,2) . . . S(1,i) . . . S(1,ν)
2 AgT2 S(2,1) S(2,2) . . . S(2,i) . . . S(2,ν)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i AgTi . . . . . . . . . S(i,i) . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ν AgTν S(ν,1) S(ν,2) . . . S(ν,i) . . . S(ν,ν)
(a)
1 2 3 4 5
K ≤′ R ≤ G
1 S(i,1) K(i,1) ≤
′
(i,1) R(i,1) ≤(i,1) G(i,1)
2 S(i,2) K(i,2) ≤
′
(i,2) R(i,2) ≤(i,2) G(i,2)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i S(i,i) K(i,i) ≤
′
(i,i) R(i,i) ≤(i,i) G(i,i)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ν S(i,ν) K(i,ν) ≤
′
(i,ν) R(i,ν) ≤(i,ν) Giν
(b)
Table 3.1: a) A matrix Mν,ν , where each row i represents a distinct agent theory,
b) the distinct sets of logical elements found in each sub-theory of a AgTi
One can understand a tuple S(i,j) as the formal representation of an OM,
which we illustrate for presentation convenience as a row in a two dimensional
matrix that represents one’s agent theory AgTi, as depicted in Table 3.1b. The set
elements of a sub-theory represent a modeller’s assumptions about the beliefs of
its opponent, whether these are, inference rules (R), premises (K) or preferences.
This is also the case with the modelled goals (G) of an opponent, which are not
open and as with everything else are also subject to belief.
One may represent the set of all the distinct agent-theories of a number of
agents equal to ν operating in a multi-agent environment, through a two dimen-
sional matrix Mν,ν of the form presented in Table 3.1a (note that henceforth we
may omit subscripts identifying pre-orderings and rules specific to a given agent).
We refer to this matrix as Multi-Agent Omni-base (MAOB).
Since we are dealing with the concept of strategising in dialogues, it makes
sense that the effectiveness of the proposed approach is evaluated with respect
to the level of correspondence of the assumed information (the OM), in relation
to the beliefs of a participant’s interlocutor. In this sense, the cases where an
agent’s (Agi’s) beliefs about its interlocutor’s beliefs (Agj 6=i’s) match exactly the
latter’s actual beliefs and vice-versa, appear in the cases where S(i,j) = S(j,j) and
S(j,i) = S(i,i) respectively. These cases explicitly represent the optimal opponent-
modelling cases for each of the participating agents, where their assumptions
about the beliefs of their interlocutors are both valid and encapsulate all the
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information know to an opponent.
In general, we differentiate between the following possible cases for i 6= j:
• False: iff S(i,j) ∩ S(j,j) = ∅
• Partial: iff S(i,j) ∩ S(j,j) 6= ∅
• Contained: iff S(i,j) ⊂ S(j,j)
• Identical: iff S(i,j) = S(j,j)
• Excessive: iff S(i,j) ⊃ S(j,j).
These typifications may also be used to characterise the level of correspondence
of each of the assumed logical set elements K,≤′,R,≤,G of a sub-theory S(i,j),
with the elements representing the actual beliefs of an agent’s interlocutor S(j,j),
so as to provide a more thorough description.
Furthermore, we should note that we do not assume any of the logical elements
of the components of each sub-theory S \ {Kn,Rs} of an AgTi to be necessarily
consistent. For example, it may be the case that both ¬q and q are elements ofKp.
Nonetheless, we do assume that the elements of both Kn and Rs are consistent,
since those refer to an agent’s axiomatic beliefs. However, the latter assumption
does not prevent the inference of inconsistent conclusions. For example, it may
very well be that an agent believes the axiom premises p and s, while also believing
the defeasible inference rules p⇒ q and s⇒ ¬q.
3.1.2 Contexts
It is often the case that a dialogue takes place in a context with reference, for
example, to a legal system, a set of conformities, a domain or maybe a system de-
scription. Formally, that is to engage in a dialogue game where both participants
share a set of dogmatic beliefs. In these cases one may assume that the logical
elements describing these dogmatic beliefs are integrated into the participating
agents’ own sub-theories, as elements of their axiomatic beliefs (Kn and Rs). In
this sense, we define a context as follows:
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Definition 18 A context C ⊆ L is a tuple < KCn ,R
C
s >, the elements of which
respectively represent both the axiom premises and the strict rules shared by the
participating agents Ag1, . . . , Agν, such that:
KCn ⊆ Kn(i,i) and R
C
s ⊆ Rs(i,i), for i = 1 . . . ν.
3.1.3 The System
Though there is a number of dialogue types (DT) worth researching through this
strategical perceptive, we mainly focus on a particular class of dialogues as the
latter is expressed by the Walton and Krabbe [1995] dialogue typology. According
to this typology different dialogues can be distinguished based on the commit-
ments, the type of starting point, and the type of dialogical goal that characterises
them. Namely, these different types are: DT = {Persuasion, Negotiation,
Inquiry, Deliberation, Information-seeking, Eristics}. Out of these six
classes we will be accounting for the first five, given that ‘Eristic’ dialogues
represent a formalisation for dialectical quarrelling, which suggests that rational
analysis and strategy determination is problematic for them.
As Austin [1962] explains, one can capture these different dialogue types
through a set of speech-acts (SA), which are assumed to cover the full range of
dialectical interactions found in different dialogue types. Examples of speech acts
commonly employed in dialogues include Accept, Argue, Challenge, Disinform,
Inform, Offer, Question, Reject, and Request.
In a similar sense to Amgoud et al. [2006], we also assume that locutions
exchanged between participants in dialogues are conjoinings of speech-acts aug-
mented with content. In the proposed approach, we define content with respect
to the elements of an ASPIC+ argumentation theory and its defined arguments
and preferences. Of course, for any given dialogue type, not all combinations of
speech-acts and content are valid.
In the following definition which describes the form of locutions used in our
research context, we also define a function that validates combinations for given
dialogue types.
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Definition 19 (Locution) Let SA be a set of speech-acts and AT the argumen-
tation theories of an agent Ag. Let A and  be the arguments and preferences
defined by AT as in Section 2.3.1. Then:
• a locution M is of the form f : x, where:
– f ∈ SA
– x ∈ DT or x ∈ Content where Content ∈ {L,≤′,≤,,R,A}
• we may write Act(M) = f to denote the speech-act f and Content(M) = x
to denote the content x
• the set of all possible locutions which may be extracted from an AT is ex-
pressed as Mall
• for each t ∈ DT, let V t : M −→ {Success, Failure}. Then, a locution
M ∈Mall is valid iff:
V t(M) = Success.
All valid locutions for a specified t ∈ DT is denoted as Mt.
A dialogue is then defined as a sequence of dialogue moves. Borrowing again
from Amgoud et al. [2006], we define a dialogue move DM as a 4-tuple as follows:
Definition 20 (Dialogue Move) For a dialogue type t ∈ DT, a dialogue move
DM is a tuple < Agi, Agj, ΣM
′, ΣM >, such that:
• Agi and Agj are the interlocutors where i 6= j, while we say that:
– Speaker(DM) = Agi
– Hearer(DM) = Agj
• Locution(DM) = ΣM ⊆ M t where:
– ΣM = {M1, . . . ,Mµ}
– where µ is the number of all legal locutions allowed in a given turn
70
• Target(DM) = ΣM′ where:
– ΣM′ = {τM′1, . . . , τM
′
µ} such that each τM
′
k, is a set of the target
locutions of the corresponding Mk ∈ ΣM, for 1 ≤ k ≤ µ.
The set of all possible dialogue moves that may be constructed based on a set M t,
is denoted as DMallt .
It is worth noting that the sets of target locutions in ΣM′ might not be
disjoint, since there might exist more than one locution in ΣM with the same
target locution.
Definition 21 (Dialogue) A dialogue D is a finite sequence < DM0, . . ., DMn >
where:
• DM0, . . . ,DMn ∈ DM
all
t
• Target(DM0) = θ where θ is a locution
• ∀i ≥ 1, ∃ j < i such that:
– Target(DMi) = ΣM
′, where ΣM′ = Locution(DMj), and
– Speaker(DMi) = Hearer(DMj)
• any sub-sequence < DM0, . . . ,DMk<n > is denoted as dk, while the exten-
sion of dk with a dialogue move DMi will be denoted by the juxtaposition:
dk.DMi
• The set of all moves employed in a D is denoted as:
ΣD = {DM0, . . . ,DMn}.
3.1.4 The Protocol
Every dialogue game is characterised by a protocol. Its purpose is to define a
dialogue in three aspects. The first concerns the participants’ turn-taking, which
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defines how the participating agents may exchange turns in a game, as well as the
number of locutions that a participant can assert in a single turn. The second
concerns the legality of a locution. It basically refers to the set of rules based on
which the set of the available choices that can serve as response options for an
agent in its next turn is defined.
This set of rules is responsible for regulating the participants’ consistency,
as well as the dialogical coherence of a game as well (Prakken [2006]). The
first concerns the application of restrictions with respect to the introduction of
locutions that compromise the consistency of a speaker’s commitments, in relation
to previously introduced locutions. This aspect is can be regulated by means of
a legal-move function as is the case in the work of Jakobovits and Vermeir [1999]
where a self-consistency dialogue type is introduced in which the set of arguments
uttered by any player has to be consistent.
Dialogical coherence concerns whether a move is allowed to serve as a reply,
and it is defined either only in relation to the last move asserted in the game, or
with respect to any previously asserted moves (backtracking). Lastly, the third
aspect concerns the termination rules of the game, after the termination of which
success or failure for each participant with respect to the dialogue game’s result
must be defined. This can only be done based on the participants’ roles in a
dialogue. In fact, it is often the case that the legality and turn-taking aspects
of a protocol are subjectively defined with respect these roles. Given the impact
of a participant’s role in defining a protocol, we begin with providing a formal
defintion of the notion of roles in dialogue games.
3.1.4.1 Roles
The participants of a dialogue are usually characterised by different roles with
respect to the dialogue’s type. For instance, in a persuasion dialogue these roles
can be those of the proponent whose aim is to persuade its interlocutor of the
truth of a claim ϕ, and the opponent who tries to disprove ϕ. In a negotiation
dialogue the participating agents can simply be understood as negotiators, sharing
the dynamic roles of the proposer and the recipient during the course of the
game. Depending on the type of the dialogue, these roles can either be static,
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characterising a participant throughout the whole dialogue process, or dynamic,
meaning that during the course of the game the roles might change between the
participants.
These roles are characterised by a dialogical goal which defines the objective
of a dialogue. In the case where a dialogical goal complies with an agent’s self-
interested goals, we can then assume this goal to be integrated into the agent’s
goals set G. Nonetheless, regardless of whether such compliance applies or not—
regardless of whether an agent will choose to commit to its roles ‘obligations’—
each participant of a dialogue is still characterised by a role, and thus correspond-
ingly by different sets of turn-taking rules and legality restrictions.
A participant is assigned a role in a dialogue game based on the following
definition:
Definition 22 (Roles) Let P = {Ag1, . . . Agp} ⊆ Ags be the participating agents
in a dialogue D characterised by a dialogue type t ∈ DT and is thus associated
with a set of roles R = {r1, . . . , rk}. Then a function Roles is applied on P , t
and R such that:
Roles(P, t,R) −→ r (3.1)
3.1.4.2 Commitments
Another important role of the protocol is to regulate a participant’s consistency.
This, relates to its commitment store. Prakken [2006] refers to the expectancies
created by commitments in a dialogue game, as dialectical obligations. For in-
stance, in many systems the interlocutor is assumed to be committed to a propo-
sition bearing the burden of supporting it when challenged, while additionally it
is further assumed that she cannot go against that proposition later in the dia-
logue, since this would imply an inconsistency about one’s beliefs. McBurney and
Parsons [2002] argue that given that dialogical interactions are intended to lead
to the achievement of some wider objective, they implicitly define commitments
in terms of future actions or propositions external to the dialogue procedure.
Thus, they support that one should view commitments as semantic mappings
between locutions and subsets of some set of utterances that may express actions
or beliefs that are, again, external to the dialogue. However, in a much more
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simplified approach, Prakken [2006] argues that:
“Strictly speaking, the only dialectical obligation that a participant has,
is making an allowed move when it is one’s turn.”
For the purpose of the proposed model, we assume that the dialogue takes
place using commitment stores in a similar sense that these are employed by Ham-
blin [1970] and Mackenzie [1979], the purpose of which is to maintain all state-
ments to which each interlocutor has committed during the course of the game.
We assume a distinct commitment store for each participant in the set {Ag1, . . . ,
Agν}, which we assume to be empty at the beginning, and their content being
constantly updated in each turn according to function UCS, based on the ef-
fects of the last dialogue move introduced into the game on the content of the
commitment store.
One may then rely on these commitment stores for partially determining the
legality of moves, for defining the contents of future dialogue moves, as well as
for strategising (as will be discussed in Section 3.4).
Definition 23 (Commitment stores) Given a set of agents:
P = {Ag1, . . . Agp} ⊆ Ags
participating in a dialogue D = < DM0, . . . ,DMn >, for any agent Agi ∈ P we
define the evolution of its commitment store CSi as follows:
1. CSi0 = ∅
2. For j = 0 . . . n, CSij+1 is obtained by updating CSij with the effects of the
dialogue move DMj, through the use of a function update such that:
update(CSij,DMj) −→ CSij+1. (3.2)
We should clarify that every participant has full knowledge of the commitments
stores of its opponents as those evolve while in a dialogue.
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3.1.4.3 Turn-taking & Backtracking
As Prakken [2005] explains, many current dialogue systems impose a rather rigid
control structure on dialogues with respect to turn-taking. For instance, they are
mostly characterised by protocols that are restrictive in relation to the number of
legal locutions allowed to be moved into the game in a single turn. Alternatively,
other protocols allow for both single- and multi- locutions to be asserted in the
dialogue. In the proposed framework we account for the employment of both
kinds of protocols, given that we allow for the content of each dialogue move to
be either a single locution (M) or a set of locutions (ΣM).
We assume the number of elements µ ≤ |ΣM| for a set ΣM of legal locutions
(we discuss legality in Section 3.1.4.4) that are allowed to be introduced in a
single turn, to rely on a game’s turn-taking rules, imposed through a turn-taking
function. Particularly, this function is responsible for defining both µ, as well as
the participant to speak next. In single-locution protocols it holds that µ = 1
while for multi-locutions protocols 1 ≤ µ ≤ |ΣM|.
In addition, whether the target of an introduced move will be related to the
last asserted move in the game or to any of the possible moves asserted by one’s
interlocutor during a game’s course is another issue that needs to be regulated.
The latter refers to the notion of backtracking. Protocols that allow for back-
tracking are often referred to as multi-reply protocols. If backtracking is allowed
in a dialogue game then the number of legal locutions allowed at a turn is also
defined in terms of the available replies to previous moves, that might have been
postponed for later use, rather than just on the replies that can counter the last
move of the dialogue.
We will in the following section show how the definition of a set of protocol
rules for specific dialogue games implicitly define both turn-taking and back-
tracking aspects of a game, as well as the legality of moves. We however define a
general turn-taking function, for the sake of completeness, as follows:
Definition 24 (Turn-taking) P = {Ag1, . . . Agp} ⊆ Ags be the participating
agents in a dialogue D . A turn-taking function is a function turn, that takes as
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input the current state of a dialogue d and returns a tuple, such that:
turn(D , P ) −→< Ag ∈ P, µ > . (3.3)
A more specific form of this function could also take as input whether backtracking
is allowed (in the form of a Boolean value) as well as the result applied by a
function that regulates the legality of moves which we define in the next section.
3.1.4.4 Legality
Given a language L, we assume a protocol function P to be responsible for
specifying the legal locutions at each stage of the dialogue. P can be formally
expressed as a function applied on the set of all the valid locutions (M t) with
respect to a dialogue D in a turn k, that produces a subset of M t such that
ΣM ⊆ M t. As discussed in Section 3.1.4.2, this subset must comply to consis-
tency restrictions with respect to a participants commitment store, as well as to
additional property requirements in relation to a dialogical objective.
Given the numerous dialogical objectives that follow from the different di-
alogue types, we assume the application of this function to be subjective with
respect to a set of protocol rules, which we further assume to be described in a
narrative way, so as to allow for a high level of expressiveness. An example set of
these rules is provided in Section 3.2.
Definition 25 (Protocol Function) For a dialogue D , and with respect to a
set of rules, P is a function applied in each turn of D , such that:
P(M t) −→ ΣM ⊆M t. (3.4)
3.1.4.5 Termination rules & Result
We generally assume without committing to this, that a dialogue terminates if
for a turn k a participant has no possible response. Formally expressed this is
when:
P(M tk) −→ ∅.
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The reason behind only providing a loose termination definition, is the possibility
of a dialogue ending at any time by one of the participants simply fleeing the
dialogue. In this sense one may wish to allow for termination to be decided by
the agents themselves.
Regarding the result of a dialogue, noting the observation by McBurney and
Parsons’s [2002] that agents have goals and not dialogues, we provide a subjective
definition with respect to each participant, so as to define one’s success or failure
in a dialogue game, in relation to one’s goals (G). Assume for instance, a case
of a participant whose best interest is to lose a game, then winning it would
mean failure with respect to its self-interested objective. In this sense we define
a dialogue’s result as follows:
Definition 26 (Result) For an agent Ag in the set of participants:
P = {Ag1, . . . , Agp} ⊆ Ags
in a dialogue D , function result associates a dialogue D with either Success or
Failure, with respect to Ag’s set of goals G.
result : D × G −→ {Success, Failure}. (3.5)
3.1.5 Strategy Function
We provide a general definition of a strategy function that is used to select a
locution from amongst the legal locutions (defined by the protocol) available to
a participant Ag at any stage in the course of a dialogue. The function makes
use of Ag’s beliefs about the knowledge of other participants, as well as their
commitment stores.
Definition 27 (Strategy function) Let P = {Ag1, . . . , Agp} ⊆ Ags be the
agents participating in a dialogue D of type t ∈ DT, whose current form is ex-
pressed as dk−1. Let:
turn(dk−1) −→< Agi, µ >
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such that Speaker(DMk)= Agi, and:
P(M tk) −→ ΣMk
such that Locution(DMk)= ΣMk are the legal locutions for DMk. Then Stri is a
function applied on Agi’s agent theory, the commitment stores of all participants,
the current state of the dialogue, and the set of legal locutions, such that:
Stri(AgTi, CS1 . . . CSp, dk−1, ΣMk) −→ σM ⊆ ΣMk. (3.6)
3.2 Formalising Persuasion Dialogues
We take a similar approach to Prakken [2006] with the following differences and
extensions. Firstly, we consider only Argue speech-acts, and leave for future
work the implicit construction of arguments1 through the use of other speech-
acts. Secondly, persuasion dialogues in our framework are explicitly linked to the
ASPIC+ framework. Thirdly, we not only define a game for grounded seman-
tics, but also a game for credulous (preferred) semantics. Furthermore, we also
state soundness and fairness results for both games. Fourthly, we accommodate
the possibility of conflicting preferences by allowing agents to move arguments
that attack rather than defeat, and then separately move possibly conflicting
preferences (specifically the premise and rule pre-orderings on which argument
preferences are based).
In what follows we assume agents Pr and Op with theories as defined in Def-
inition 17, and use subscripts Pr and Op to identify their argumentation theories
and commitment stores. Valid locutions are of the form:
argue : X
where X is an ASPIC+ argument or X is a tuple (a, b) where a ⊆ ≤′, b ⊆
≤; that is, a tuple of pre-orderings on non-axiom premises and defeasible rules
1In Prakken [2006], an argument X = ‘p since q and q implies p, and q since r and s implies
r’, can be constructed by first arguing X ′ = ‘p since q and q implies p’ and then in response to
‘why q’, moving X ′′ = ‘q since r and r implies q’. We assume X is moved in a single locution.
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respectively.
Intuitively, a locution with content (a, b) provides the basis for defining a
preference over arguments moved earlier in the dialogue, via the shared function1
p described in Section 2.3.1. Thus, if X has been moved (in DMi+1) as an
argument attacking Y (in DMi), then (a, b) may be moved (in DMi+2) as a reply
to X, where (a, b)’s orderings over X and Y ’s contained elements determine (via
p) that X ≺ Y . Henceforth, we may as an abuse of notation reference content of
the form (a, b) in terms of the argument ordering it defines (e.g. X ≺ Y ).
The commitment update function can then be defined so that if the locution’s
content in a move DM is an argument A or a tuple (a, b), then the commitment
store of the move’s speaker is updated with Rules(A) ∪ Prem(A), respectively
a,b; the commitment stores of all other dialogue participants remain the same.
Henceforth we will assume that Pr (Op) can move locutions whose content is
obtained from their own argumentation theory ATPr (ATOp) and the knowledge
in the commitment store CSOp (CSPr) of its interlocutor.
In relation to the moving of preferences as the content of moves in a dialogues,
we note that the proposed approach draws from the work of Bench-Capon et al.
[2007] who similarly propose a framework that allows arguing with preferences
over values. In their work, which orients around practical reasoning2 they support
that the acceptability of an argument turns not only on what is true, but also on
the values and aspirations of the agent to whom the argument is directed. Since
agents have different aspirations there is no right/acceptable answer for all of
them, and thus rational disagreement is always possible. Thus, since agents can-
not specify the relative priority of their aspirations outside of a particular context,
this prioritisation has to be part of the practical reasoning process. Similarly, in
the case of our context, since we expect agents to not share the same preferences
over the arguments they use in dialogues, we allow these preferences to be defined
with respect to each of the participants ability to introduce orderings over the
constituents of arguments uttered to support their views.
1According to which agents are assumed to share the same way of defining preferences over
arguments.
2Reasoning about what to do in a given situation.
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3.2.1 Protocol Rules for Persuasion Dialogue Games
We define core protocol rules for persuasion protocols, conducted according to
the credulous (preferred) and the grounded semantics.
The following set of rules simply define what constitutes a legal dialogue.
Note that since Pr and Op share the same contrary relations, there is agreement
as to whether a given argument attacks another. Henceforth, we will refer to
‘DMcon’ as an abuse of notation for Content(Locution(DM)), and may omit the
Argue speech-act, referring only to its content. Furthermore, we will refer to, and
differentiate between, the interlocutors of a dialogue through I ∈ {Pr,Op}, such
that I = Pr if I = Op, while I = Op if I = Pr.
Definition 28 (Legal Persuasion Dialogues) A dialogue sequence D = <
DM0, . . . ,DMn > is a legal persuasion dialogue if:
1. The dialogue begins with Pr proposing an argument X for an initialising




0 = Argue : X
2. Pr and Op exchange turns such that:
for i = 0 . . . n− 1, if Speaker(DMi) = I then Speaker(DMi+1) = I
3. For i = 1 . . . n, the protocol function PCP is characterised by the following
conditions:
3.1. if Speaker(DMi) = Pr then:
a) DMi is a reply to some DMj, j < i (i.e., backtracking is allowed),
where either:
i) DMconj = X, DM
con
i = Y where Y attacks X, or;
ii) DMconj = X, DM
con
i = X ≺ Y and DMj is a reply to some
DMk, k < j and DM
con
k = Y , or;
iii) DMconj = X ≺ Y , DM
con
i = Y ≺ X;
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b) else DMconi = Argue : Y such that Y 6= X and Conc(Y ) = cinit
3.2. if Speaker(DMi) = Op then:
a) DMi is a reply to some DMj, j < i (i.e., backtracking is allowed),
where either:
i) DMconj = X, DM
con
i = Y where Y attacks X, or;
ii) DMconj = X, DM
con
i = X ≺ Y and DMj is a reply to some
DMk, k < j and DM
con
k = Y , or;
iii) DMconj = X ≺ Y , DM
con
i = Y ≺ X,
The purpose of these rules is simply to give a basic structure to the dialogue
game. Notice that participants are not restricted from repeating either their own
or their opponent’s move in the game. Thus additional rules must be introduced.
3.2.1.1 The Employment of Preference-orderings
Notice that conditions 3.1.a.ii and 3.2.a.ii in Definition 28 allow the moving of
a preference over arguments, to invalidate the success of an attack as a defeat,
and 3.1.a.iii and 3.2.a.iii allow the moving of a conflicting preference ordering.
In essence the employment of preference orderings as contents of dialogue moves
is contingent upon the existence of a preference-depended attack relationship
between two arguments X and Y .
We assume that participants are able to introduce pre-orderings against ar-
guments, through either preference attacking and preference-rebut attacking each
other:
Let AI and AI be respectively the arguments currently introduced into a
dialogue game by each of the participants, we define these attacks as follows:
Definition 29 (Preference attack) A dialogue move DMi preference attacks
another dialogue move DMj, where i 6= j and j < i, if there exists another
dialogue move DMk, where k 6= j, i and k < j, such that:
DMconk = X ∈ A
I and DMconj = Y ∈ A
I
where Y preference-dependent attacks X, if DMconi = {X ≻ Y }.
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Definition 30 (Preference-rebut attack) A dialogue move DMi preference-
rebut attacks another dialogue move DMj, where i 6= j and j < i, if:
DMconi = {X ≻ Y } and DM
con
j = {Y ≻ X}
We note that since through the exchange of moves participants will likely come
across new information, with respect to the logical constituents of the arguments
exchanged, it may be necessary that they accordingly update their pre-orderings
concerned with K and R. However, in this thesis we do not formally model the
mechanism an agent uses to update its priority ordering over rules and premises.
We will assume agents use generic principles to do so, e.g. the well know specificity
principle, and the temporal principle (which orders newly acquired knowledge
over older knowledge).
3.2.1.2 Dialogue Trees & Forests
In a similar sense to Modgil and Caminada [2009], we also resort to representing
dialogues in the form of dialogue trees since we allow for backtracking. A per-
suasion dialogue D can be represented as a tree with n leaf nodes, consisting of
n paths from the root node to each of the leaf nodes, where every child node is
a dialogue move introduced as a reply to its parent node. Essentially, each new
path results from a backtracking move by Pr or Op. We assume these trees to
be implicitly instantiated during the dialogue process.
Definition 31 (Dialogue Tree) A dialogue tree T is a tuple of the form:
T =< ΣD ,E >
where the elements of the set ΣD of a dialogue sequence D appear as nodes, and
E is a binary relationship between pairs of ΣD expressed in the form of directed
edges, such that E ⊆ ΣD × ΣD , where:
Root: The root move is referred to as DMr and:
DMconr = X ∈ A









Figure 3.1: A forest of dialogue trees for a dialogue sequence D =< DM0,DM1,
DM2, DM3,DM4,DM5 >
Leaf-moves: There exists a set of leaf-moves LM = {DM1,DM2, . . . ,DMl, . . . ,
DML} every member of which has no children.
Father/Child-moves: We say that a pair of dialogue moves (DMi,DMj),
where i < j, is an element of E, (DMi,DMj) ∈ E, iff there exists an attack
relationship between their encapsulated arguments such that DMconj = Y attacks
DMconj = X ∈. In this case, the two moves are assumed to be linked in T with a
directed edge ending at DMi and starting at DMj, sharing a father respectively
child relationship. Every dialogue move in T can have at most one father-move.
Another issue concerns the fact that we allow for Pr not only to introduce a
legal move into the game that constitutes an attack on one of Op’s moves, but
also to provide a different argument able to support the initial claim cinit of the
dialogue in a different way, through the introduction of a different dialogue move
that concludes the same thing (Definition 28, 3.1.b). This implies that a single
dialogue tree might not be enough to capture a dialogue. Thus it is necessary
that we express a dialogue sequence through a number of dialogue trees. This is
illustrated in Figure 3.1, where we assume a dialogue D to be expressed through
two dialogue trees T0 and T4 indexed in accordance to their corresponding root
moves DM0 and DM4.
We call the set of these distinct dialogue trees as dialogue forest represented as
F , while the total number of dialogue trees found in F is expressed as f = |F |.
It is worth noting that a dialogue forest may represent a number of dialogue
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sequences but not vice-versa.
Given a dialogue tree, one may then refer to the logically coherent sub-
sequences expressed by the tree’s distinct paths as disputes. In our work logical
coherence is understood as a concept concerned with the structure of a dialogue,
in a similar sense to how this notion is used by Prakken [2005]. As Prakken ex-
plains, dialogue systems can vary in their structural properties through imposing
strict or lenient rules in relation to the possible replies that may follow after a
move. For example, imposing that every move must target the opponent’s last
move in the game, or that it can target any other opponent move in the game.
One can characterise a dialogue as coherent in the first case, where a line of rea-
soning1 can be followed. Similarly in our case, each new dispute that results from
a backtracking move by either of the participants satisfies this property.
Definition 32 (Disputes) For a dialogue D , a dispute d(r→l) is a sub-sequence
of D of logically coherent moves, that represents a path of T that extends from
T’s root node DMr to a leaf DMl ∈ LM , in which each participant moves against
its counterpart’s last move.
For example, in Figure 3.1 these are:
d(0→2) =< DM0,DM1,DM2 >
d(0→3) =< DM0,DM3 >
d(4→5) =< DM4,DM5 > .
However for convenience, in reference to a single dialogue tree we will refer to its
disputes only with respect to their leaf indexes, i.e: T = {d1, . . . , dL}.
3.2.1.3 Defining the Winner
For defining the winner of the game we turn to Prakken [2005]’s work, who em-
ploys a labelling technique applied on a similar tree of locutions, instantiated from
the dialogue process. The basic idea, is to assign a status to each of the tree’s
locutions, in order to eventually define the status of the claim in dispute. Intu-
itively, in order for Pr to fulfil its game role then for all the ‘counter’ moves moved
1Reasoning here is used in its informal form.
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Figure 3.2: a) A dialogue sequence, b) The corresponding dialogue tree T0 (Grey
moves by Pr), c) A labelled dialogue tree, d) A winning-strategy for X, where
DMcon0 = X
into the game by Op, then Pr has to respond by attacking each one of them back.
The latter captures the ‘reinstatement principle’ as it is expressed by Baroni and
Giacomin [2009], while it also relates to the legal labellings proposed by Modgil
and Caminada [2009] for their argument games.
Accordingly, in the context of a dialogue game this principle can be captured
through the employment of the following definition:
Definition 33 (Labelling) Assuming a legal persuasion dialogue D and a cor-
responding dialogue forest F , then a node of a tree T ∈ F is:
• labelled in iff all of its children-nodes are labelled out
• labelled out iff it has at least one child labelled in
In the example depicted in Figure 3.2c we represent the in labelled nodes with a
double-lined circle and the out labelled nodes with a single-dim-lined circle. This
convention is followed throughout the thesis.
The proposed labelling-definition effectively reflects any game’s semantics. In
other words, since it is the case that a dialogue tree is implicitly instantiated
through the dialogue process, it reflects the rules of the dialogue game. These
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rules encode restrictions on the moves that a participant can legally introduce
in order to attack its interlocutor’s moves, which in turn vary according to the
semantics of interest. In this sense, one could provide an any time winning defini-
tion that would be based on the labelling status of the argument in dispute—the
root argument in a dialogue tree—deciding on the winner according to whether
DMr is in or out, i.e. if DMr is in then Pr is the winner, otherwise Op is.
Nevertheless, this definition cannot adequately reflect the soundness and com-
pleteness properties that should characterise the proposed dialogue system. As
this will be further explained in Section 3.2.2, if a dialogue game is to be a proof
of acceptance, then Pr has to attempt to build an admissible set of arguments. In
other words, Pr’s winning must be reflected by the existence of such a set amongst
the branches of a dialogue tree. The latter cannot be captured by Prakken’s la-
belling technique in the sense that even though one could decide on Pr currently
being the winner of the game based on the labelling status of a root argument A,
it is still possible that A may not be a member of an admissible extension in the
implicitly instantiated AF .
We will, therefore, rely on this labelling technique only for relevance reasons,
and resort to the notion of winning-strategy, as the latter is defined in Cayrol et al.
[2003]; Modgil and Caminada [2009] but modified with respect to our framework,
for providing an any-time winner definition.
Definition 34 (Winning-strategy) Given a dialogue tree T then T′ is a winning-
strategy for X, iff:
1. T′ is a finite sub-tree of T, where X is the content of its root dialogue move;
2. Each dispute d ∈ T′ ends with a move introduced by Pr;
3. ∀d ∈ T′, given a sub-dispute d′ of d whose last move is a move DMPr played
by Pr, then for any DMOp ∈ T which extends a d
′ there exists a d′′ ∈ T′
such that d′–DMOp is a sub-dispute of d
′′, and;
4. No two arguments X, Y moved by Pr in T ′ attack each other (i.e., the
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Figure 3.3: a) Tree T1 (Grey moves by Pr), b) The AF for T1, c) Tree T2, d) The
AF for T2
The added value of this definition is that it imposes additional restrictions that
can better reflect the acceptability status of Pr’s arguments in the implicitly
instantiated AF . That is whether they do or do not belong in a certain extension
of AF , defined by the semantics of interest, according to whether Pr is currently
winning respectively losing.
• Condition 1 defines the form of a winning strategy (T′) as a finite sub-tree
of a dialogue tree.
• Condition 2, reflects the reinstatement principle as it requires that all dis-
putes that belong in a T′ end with a Pr move. It is easy to see that it is
otherwise possible for the labelling status of the root argument in T′ to be
labelled out.
• Condition 3, partly guarantees that all arguments that belong in T′ moved
by Pr form an admissible extension in the concurrently instantiated AF .
So as to better understand the importance of this condition let us illustrate
with an example.
In Figures 3.3a, 3.3b and 3.3c, 3.3d we respectively see two dialogue trees and
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their corresponding AF s. The disputes in the two trees are:
T1 = {d11, d12, d13}
= {< A,B,C >,< A,B,D,E >,< A,B,D, F,G >}
T2 = {d21, d22, d23}
= {< A,B,C >,< A,B,D,E, F, (E > F ) >< A,B,D,E, F,H, I >}
Note that the induced AF s are produced based on the defeat relations between
the arguments and not based on their attack relations (we will further discuss
how the defeat relation between the introduced arguments can be decided in
the next section). If we only relied on the first two conditions then in the first
case, illustrated in Figure 3.3a, we would decide that disputes d11 and d13 form
a T′1 since they both end with a Pr move. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that
in the corresponding AF (Figure 3.3b) argument D is not supported against E
and thus cannot be part of what should be an admissible extension {A,C,D,G}.
Similarly, in the second case depicted in Figure 3.3c, we would decide that since
d21 and d23 end with a Pr move, they thus form a winning strategy. However, in
the corresponding AF (Figure 3.3d) one can observe that F ’s attack on E does
not succeed as defeat, as it is undermined by the preference move E ≻ F , thus
deeming argument D again not part of an admissible extension. In both cases,
based on condition 3, since disputes d12 and d22 are not sub-disputes of some
dispute d ∈ T′, then d13 and d23 are discarded from T
′.
However, even with the addition of condition 3, the winning strategy definition
alone cannot guarantee the soundness of the proposed framework with respect to
any time termination, since, as it will be further discussed in the following section,
it fails to account for an important aspect related with whether a particular move
in a game could have been repeated but has not. The later refers to a considerable
difference between the instantiated dialogue tree and the implicitly constructed
AF , and is related with whether the winning status of the first can adequately
reflect the acceptability properties of the other. We will however engage in further
explaining this in the following sections.
Finally, the last condition reflects a basic property of any admissible set,
which by definition is required to be conflict-free. We will henceforth refer to this
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property as the conflict free-ness property. In Figure 3.2d we can see the winning-
strategy T′0 for T0 depicted in 3.2b. The existence of conflicting relationships
between the moves employed by Pr is not apparent in the tree structure and is
something that must be separately investigated. Moreover, it should be noted
that the conflict free-ness property is limited to conflicts between the arguments
employed by Pr since the preference-orderings of a participant are by definition
consistent, and thus the appearance of a pre-orderings conflict between the moves
of Pr is not possible.
Thus, at any point of a dialogue game we can decide on the winner of the
game based on identifying a winning strategy in a T ∈ F .
Definition 35 Let D be a persuasion dialogue and F = {T0, . . . ,Tf−1} the in-
duced dialogue forest, then at any point of the dialogue Pr is said to be the winner
iff there exists at least one winning-strategy for a Tr ∈ F , for 1 ≤ r ≤ f − 1,
else Op is the winner.
The correlation between the labelling status of a dialogue tree and the exis-
tence of a winning strategy can be captured through the following propositions:
Proposition 1 Let T be a dialogue tree and DM0 be T’s root move, if there exists
a T′ ∈ T then DM0 must be labelled in.
Proof We prove this by contradiction. As an abuse of notation, let us write
< I,DM > for a dialogue move introduced by I ∈ {Pr,Op}, while the extension
of a dispute di with a dialogue move DM is denoted by the juxtaposition di. <
I,DM >.
Let there be a dialogue tree T and a winning strategy T′ ∈ T, while the root
move < Pr,DM0 > is labelled out, then:
1. Based on Definition 33, if < Pr,DM0 > is out then at least one of its
attackers (Op,DMj) must be labelled in.
2. As < Pr,DM0 > is T’s root move, we can assume that d0 = DM0 is a
sub-dispute of some dispute d ∈ T′.
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3. According to condition 3 of Definition 34, d0. < Op,DMj > must then be
a sub-dispute of some d′′ ∈ T′.
4. Let us then assume a set of moves {DMi1 ,DMi2 , . . . ,DMik} which are
moved into the game by Pr against < Op,DMj >.
5. Since < Op,DMj > is in, it must be that all of its attackers are labelled
out.
6. Accordingly, every such Pr move should at least have one attacker—an
Op’s move, e.g. DMj′—labelled in.
7. As we assume d0. < Op,DMj > to be a sub-dispute of some d
′′ ∈ T′,
inductively this must also be the case for when d0. < Op,DMj > is extended
to:
d0. < Op,DMj > . < Pr,DMik > . < Op,DMj′ >
8. Assuming that one extends the current dispute through repeating steps
3,4,5,6 and 7, substituting DMj for DMj′ the result will simply be the
construction of a longer dispute whose last argument will still be an Op’s
move labelled in.
9. Evidently, as we assume T to be finite, the construction of a dispute that
ends with a Pr’s move which will thus be part of T’s winning strategy T′
is impossible, which contradicts with condition 2 of the winning strategy
definition (Definition 34).
Note at the same time, that it is not necessarily the case that when a root dialogue
move is labelled in then there exists a winning-strategy in T. This is formally
expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Let T be a dialogue tree and DM0 be T’s root move, if DM0 is
labelled in then it is not necessary that ∃T′ ∈ T.
The proof of this proposition relies on the use of a counter-example borrowed from
the work of Modgil and Caminada [2009] used for a similar issue in their work.
The example is presented in the Appendix A.1. It however requires that the reader
is first aware of the protocol rules related to the credulous game (Section 3.2.2.1).
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3.2.1.4 A More Strict Set of Protocol Rules
A drawback of the core protocol rules (PCP ) is that they allow for redundant
moves to be introduced into the game, i.e. they allow the introduction of moves
that do not affect the winning status of the game. This obviously affects the
game’s efficiency. Additionally, since both participants introduce dialogue moves
which belong to their distinct knowledge base and are not part of a pre-existing
AF (as is the case with argument games Modgil and Caminada [2009]) but im-
plicitly and incrementally form a ’shared’ AF , we cannot know whether either
Pr or Op will fully respond to the dialogical objectives of their roles. In other
words, it is impossible to know whether either Pr or Op have actually introduced
into the game all moves that they could in order to counter their interlocutor.
Though it is not possible to impose restrictions that will result in the partic-
ipants complying fully to their dialogical objectives (a player may prefer to flee
the dispute rather than be truthful), one may employ a more rigid approach so
as to increase a game’s efficiency. This can be achieved through dictating that in
every turn both Pr and Op introduce dialogue moves that can alter the winning
status of the game. This can be achieved through the employment of a more
strict set of rules, that concurrently prevent the introduction of ‘surplus’ moves,
in the sense that such moves are unable to change the winning status of the game
(Prakken [2006]). However, the latter does not imply that such moves should
generally be forbidden from being introduced in a dialogue, since a participant’s
motive may simply be to stall its counterpart.
It is enough that we reform the core protocol rules 3.1.a) and 3.2.a), as follows:
Strict Rules:
• if Speaker(DMi) = Pr then:
3.1.a)iv) DMi is a reply to some DMj, j < i, subject to 3.1.a)i,ii,iii), that
results in changing the winning status of the game.
• if Speaker(DMi) = Op then:
3.2.a)iv) DMi is a reply to some DMj, j < i, subject to 3.2.a)i,ii,iii), that
results in changing the the winning status of the game.
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The incorporation of these rules in the core protocol rules, will be denoted as PS.
Note that it is not necessary to impose this restriction in case 3.1.b) as that case
the refers to the instantiation of a new dialogue tree which by default changes
the winning status of the game.
3.2.2 Credulous & Grounded Semantics
In order to provide the rules for the credulous and the grounded persuasion dia-
logue games, we draw from the work of Modgil and Caminada [2009]. We must
stress once more, that an important difference between argument and dialogue
games is that argument games rely on predefined argumentation frameworks.
In a sense, the outcome of an argument game simply reflects the image of a
pre-existing AF instantiated from that knowledge-base, whereas dialogue games
define the form of an implicitly and incrementally constructed AF from informa-
tion accumulated from the exchanged locutions during a dialogue. Thus in other
words, while the acceptability of an argument in a monologue game is predefined
by a corresponding, pre-existing AF , in a dialogue game it depends on the final
form of the incrementally constructed AF . That is to say that an argument game
is a reasoning procedure that simply and strictly reflects the structure of an AF .
Nevertheless, for the purpose of our work, we can still employ the same set
of protocol rules for both the credulous and the grounded semantics, regardless
of this difference. This is because all we are concerned with, is whether these
rules can adequately reflect the objective of a persuasion game. Essentially, if
one disregards this essential difference between argument and dialogue games, in
both games the participants assume exactly the same roles, those of Pr and Op.
In this sense the protocol rules of argument games conform to the objective of a
persuasion dialogue game.
3.2.2.1 Legal Persuasion dialogues
In relation to the credulous semantics, which reflect a rather lenient level of ac-
ceptability, Pr is characterised by a more flexible set of conditions compared to
Op. As in argument games (Modgil and Caminada [2009]), the basic differences
between the credulous and the grounded dialogue games concern Pr’s and Op’s
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ability to repeat any of the previous moves that have already been moved in a
T. The grounded semantics places additional difficulty to Pr’s efforts of justifi-
cation, since it essentially demands the introduction of indisputable information
(un-attacked argument). The latter is reflected by corresponding protocol rules,
according to which Pr is forbidden from repeating any of its previous dialogue
moves in contrast to Op. At the same time Op is allowed to repeat both its own
as well as Pr’s moves. Of course, this is not the case with the credulous semantics
where a symmetric attack may be both employed and repeated by Pr, in order
to justify the credulous acceptance of its thesis.
At this point it is necessary that we introduce some additional notation, with
respect to the distinct sets of moves that may be introduced in a dialogue game
by each of the participants:
• I(D): the dialogue moves introduced into the game by I ∈ {Pr,Op}
• I(T): the dialogue moves found in T introduced by I ∈ {Pr,Op}
• I(T′): the dialogue moves found in T′ introduced by I ∈ {Pr,Op}
• For a set of moves S:
– R+(S): a set of dialogue moves that attack S
– R−(S): a set of dialogue moves that are attacked by S
• R	: a set of self-attacking moves
Given these, as far as efficiency issues are concerned1, it makes sense to restrict
Pr from introducing self-attacking moves as this would immediately violate the
properties of the admissible set which Pr is trying to construct in the game.
As [Dunne and Bench-Capon, 2003, Defn. 6, Thm. 4] explain, if a credulous
game is to be a proof of acceptance, then Pr essentially attempts an admissible
set of arguments. We also note that in their work Dunne and Bench-Capon [2003]
also establish tight bounds on the number of moves Pr has to advance: the size
1This is a matter of efficiency as a redundant move in the case where Pr achieves to construct
a winning strategy will simply not be included in Pr(T′).
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of the smallest (number of arguments) admissible set containing the disputed
argument.
Additionally, in relation to the grounded game, one could also restrict Pr from
introducing a move the content of which shares a symmetric attack relationship
with the contents of any other dialogue move that is already part of D . This is
because allowing Pr to do so makes no difference, since, as it will latter become
evident, under the grounded game’s rules Op can always reply through employing
the same dialogue move which we allow Pr to attack, in order to counter Pr.
Similar restrictions were originally employed in the work of Amgoud and
Cayrol [2002a]; Dunne and Bench-Capon [2003]; Modgil and Caminada [2009];






Nevertheless, as it is further explained in Modgil and Caminada [2009], in the
credulous game, even with imposing this restriction, it is still necessary to ad-
ditionally check whether the moves introduced by Pr in a winning-strategy are
conflict-free. This is because the restriction only concerns Pr’s moves in each
distinct line of dispute of a dialogue tree, and not Pr’s moves in the whole tree,
i.e. consistency across branches is not guaranteed.
While the latter is not possible in the grounded game1, in the credulous game
it is possible that a dialogue tree is produced T for which there might seemingly
exist a winning-strategy T′ for Pr, while though Pr(T′) is not conflict-free2.
This is suggested by proposition 2 introduced earlier with respect to the winning
strategy.
This is therefore the reason why the winning definition provided in Sec-
tion 3.2.1.3 is additionally characterised by the last condition, i.e. so as to avoid
the appearance of a possible Pr victory that would falsely result in deciding that
the argument in dispute is part of an admissible extension of the framework in-
stantiated from the dialogue process. In other words, as is the case with the
1Refer to Modgil and Caminada [2009] for a justification of this claim.
2Refer to [Modgil and Caminada, 2009, p. 20] for an example.
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grounded game, imposing the POSS(dr→l) protocol restriction in the credulous
set of rules, will simply increase the game’s efficiency but it will not guarantee
the creation of a conflict-free set on behalf of Pr.
We also note that one could also restrict Op from introducing moves that
can be attacked by any move found in Pr(D), since, according to the credulous
game rules, such a move cannot essentially change the final outcome of the game.
For the purpose of our work, we disregard efficiency issues, and focus only on
applying two sets of basic restrictions for differentiating between the credulous
and the grounded semantics. We do so by augmenting the strict rules PS with
rules that place restrictions on Op’s, respectively Pr’s moves, as follows:
Credulous Rules: Let TD be a dialogue induced for a dialogue D then:
• if Speaker(DMi) = Pr then:
3.1.a)v) ∀d ∈ TD , ∄DMj ∈ d where:





(i.e., Pr cannot repeat locutions in any given dispute).
Grounded Rules: Let TD be a dialogue induced for a dialogue D then:
• if Speaker(DMi) = Op then:
3.2.a)v) ∀d ∈ TD , ∄DMj ∈ d where:





(i.e., Op cannot repeat locutions in any given dispute).
Henceforth, PGS will denote the protocol defined by the credulous rules, and
PCS the protocol defined by the grounded rules. Furthermore, we will refer to
dialogues that comply with the credulous or the grounded protocol rules as legal
credulous or grounded persuasion dialogues respectively.
A trivial example on both types of games that relies on a symmetric attack
relationship between two dialogue moves is shown in Figure 3.4. For convenience,
we don’t alter the move indexes in order to stress repetition. It is easy to no-













Figure 3.4: a) The credulous games (Pr is grey ), b) and the grounded games for
the moves DM0 and DM1
attack relationship between the dialogue moves DM0 and DM1, the conclusions
of the containing arguments of these moves that serve as the claims in dispute
respectively, are both deemed acceptable under the credulous semantics. On the
contrary in the grounded dialogue games (Figure 3.4b) none of these claims are
be justified.
Based on these sets of protocol restrictions with respect to a semantics:
S = {PCS,PGS}
respectively representing the Credulous and the Grounded semantics, we are able
to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1 At any state of a finite legal S-persuasion dialogue D , there can only
exist at most one dialogue tree TDMk , where the dialectical status of its root move
is labelled in.
Proof Let us represent the state of a dialogue game in a turn k as two sets,
(IN , OUT )k, where IN contains the trees with a root move labelled in, and
OUT contains the trees with a root move labelled out. Additionally, let the total
number of trees instantiated in a dialogue game at a given state be expressed as
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|FD | = N , for which it also holds that N = |IN |+ |OUT |, while it is also evident
that at any point of the game if |IN | = n, then |OUT | = N − n. Moreover, let
(|IN |, |OUT |)k represent the number of trees in each set in a given turn.
Following on, we remind the reader that the PS protocol, that characterises
both the PGS and the PCS protocols, dictates that either of the participants
can introduce a new dialogue move only if it changes the dialectical status of
a root move. Moreover, in the course of a dialogue game, based on rule 3.1.b),
only Pr is capable of instantiating a new dialogue tree through introducing a new
dialogue move, comprising a different argument for cinit, which can be perceived
as the trivial case where the labelling status of a root move is ‘changed’ to in.
In this sense legal transitions between the different states of a dialogue game can
be expressed as follows, with respect to whether it is Pr’s or Op’s turn to move:
1. (n,N − n)
Pr
−→ (n+ 1, N − n− 1)
• Pr introduces a move into the current dialogue tree against Op’s last move
• Pr introduces a move through backtracking to a previous point into the
current dialogue tree
• Pr introduces a move through backtracking to a previous point into a
different dialogue tree
• Pr introduces a new root move, and instantiates a new dialogue tree
2. (n,N − n)
Op
−→ (n− 1, N − n+ 1)
• Op introduces a move into the current dialogue tree against Pr’s last move
• Op introduces a move through backtracking to a previous point into the
current dialogue tree
• Op introduces a move through backtracking to a previous point into a
different dialogue tree
Given these, it can be trivially shown that since Pr makes the first move, for
turn k = 0, the state of the dialogue game is ({TDM0}, {∅})k=0, thus (1, 0)k=0.
Let us now assume that in a turn k there exist |IN | = n > 1 dialogue trees. We
then differentiate between the following two cases:
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• Pr moves in k: This implies that in turn k−1, |IN | = n−1, based on legal
transition 2 since it was Op’s turn to move. In turn, the latter implies that
in k − 2, |IN | = (n − 1) + 1 = n, based on legal transition 1. Progressing
accordingly, given that the dialogue is finite, and given that, based on the
protocol rules, P makes the first move, then for k = 0 it is definitely the
case that |IN | = n, thus (n, 0)k=0. Nevertheless, as we have already shown
for k = 0, it holds that (1, 0)k=0, which contradicts with the assumption
that n > 1.
• Op moves in k: This implies that in turn k − 1, |IN | = n + 1, based
on legal transition 1 since it was Pr’s turn to move. In turn, the latter
implies that in k − 2, |IN | = (n + 1) − 1 = n, based on legal transition 2.
Progressing accordingly, given that the dialogue is finite, and given that,
based on the protocol rules, P makes the first move, then for k = 0 it is
definitely the case that |IN | = n + 1, thus (n + 1, 0)k=0. Nevertheless, as
we have already shown for k = 0, it holds that (1, 0)k=0, which contradicts
with the assumption that n > 1.
Generally, we have shown that given a protocol characterised by the PS protocol,
at any state of the dialogue game it is impossible for |IN | > 1.
3.3 Soundness & Fairness
In this Section we focus on evaluating the proposed dialogue system for persuasion
dialogues with respect to its soundness and its fairness. As explained by Prakken
[2005], the notion of soundness serves as a characterisation that concerns the level
of correspondence between the any-time winning definition of a dialogue, and the
underlying logic that concerns the accumulated information gathered from the
dialogue process. In our case, based on the any-time winning definition provided
in Section 3.2.1.3, at any point of the dialogue we can decide that either Pr or
Op wins, based on the existence of a winning-strategy. Then, in order for the
outcome of the game to be sound one has to prove that:
• in the case where Pr currently wins then the claim in dispute is justified
under the game’s semantics and with respect to the logical content accu-
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mulated from the dialogue process, or;
• in the case where Op currently wins then the claim in dispute is not jus-
tified under the game’s semantics and with respect to the logical content
accumulated from the dialogue process.
In other words, proving the soundness of the proposed system relies on proving
that the any-time winning definition, which essentially decides the current ac-
ceptability status of the claim in dispute, can be reflected by the construction of
a justified argument from the logical content obtained from the dialogue moves
that were introduced into the dialogue game. The notion of fairness concerns
proving the same thing, but in reverse. That is to prove that assuming that a
justified argument for the claim in dispute can be constructed from the currently
agreed upon information, then there exists a winning strategy for that argument.
3.3.1 Conflicts between Preference-orderings
The basic idea is to prove a relation between the any-time winning definition and
the underlying logic. To recap, both Pr and Op can move arguments and pref-
erences constructed from their own argumentation theories and the commitment
stores of their interlocutor. The latter contains all the content exchanged through
locutions. Our aim is to prove soundness and fairness with respect to the Dung
framework AFD = (A
D ,D) of arguments (AD) and defeats (D) that is defined by
the accumulated knowledge in the commitment stores. We assume this AFD to
be implicitly instantiated from the dialogue process. The defeat relation between
the introduced arguments can be defined with respect to the type of attacks that
characterise the attack relationships between the employed arguments, and the
preference-orderings moved into the game according to Definition 15.
However, we first need to account for the possibly conflicting preference infor-
mation introduced into the game by the participants. In other words, to decide
in cases were conflicting preferences information is introduced by the two partic-
ipants, which should be discarded.
Let us suppose that the following preferences on two arguments X and Y ,
i.e. the preference-orderings on rules and premises defining these preferences, are
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moved into a game (and thus included in each of the participants’ commitment
stores) as follows: Pr moves X ≺ Y followed by a counter preference-ordering
Y ≺ X moved by Op. Relying on the rules of the grounded game, it can be easily
seen that Op’s preference will win out over Pr’s preference, while respectively in
the case of the credulous game, Pr’s preference will win out over Op’s preference.
Intuitively, consider these conflicting preferences as mutually attacking arguments
with no other incoming attacks. Then Pr’s argument (preference) will be justified
under the credulous, but not grounded semantics.
We begin by providing the auxiliary components of the implicitly instantiated
AFD framework, expressed as components of a preference-based argumentation
framework (PAF ). For doing so we first provide a more detailed version of defini-
tion 23 which encompasses four distinct update mechanisms with respect to each
of the logical components K,≤′,R,≤ found in a sub-theory S of a participant’s
AgT .
Definition 36 (ASPIC+ Commitment Stores) Given a set of agents {Ag1,
. . . , Agν} participating in a dialogue D = < DM0, . . ., DMn >, for any agent
Agi a commitment store is a tuple CSi =< Ki,≤
′i,Ri,≤i > whose evolution we
define as follows:
1. CSi0 = < ∅,∅,∅,∅ >
2. For k = 0 . . . n, CSik+1 is obtained by updating CSik with the contents





CSik+1 =< Kik ∪ Prem(X),≤′ik,Rik ∪ Rules(X),≤ ik > (a)
CSik+1 =< Kik,≤′ik ∪X,Rik,≤ ik > (b)
CSik+1 =< Kik,≤′ik,Rik,≤ ik ∪X > (c)
if X ∈ A (a)
if X ∈≤′ i (b)
if X ∈≤ i (c)
Note that we will henceforth refer to the credulous and the grounded semantics
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through S = {Credulous, Grounded}. Based on the contents of the commitment
stores of the participants, we define the components of the implicitly instantiated
AFD as follows:
Definition 37 (PAF ) Assume a legal S-persuasion dialogue D , where CSPr and
CSOp are respectively Pr’s and Op’s commitment stores. Let S be a tuple of the
form < K,≤′,R,≤ >, and Args(S), Prefs(S), and Attacks(S) be three func-
tions that respectively return: the arguments that may be constructed from S;
the preference-orderings on those arguments, and; the attacks between those ar-
guments, then one may express its logical contents as a triple < AD ,CD ,PD >
where:
• AD = Args(CSPr ∪ CSOp)
• CD = Attacks(AD)
• PD = PPr ⊛POp, where PPr = Prefs(CSPr) and P
Op = Prefs(CSOp) such
that:
– PPr ⊛ POp = PPr ∪ {(X > Y )|(X > Y ) ∈ POp, (Y > X) /∈ PPr} if
S = PCS (Credulous)
– PPr ⊛ POp = POp ∪ {(X > Y )|(X > Y ) ∈ PPr, (Y > X) /∈ POp} if
S = PGS (Grounded)
where PPr and POp represent the preference-orderings moved into the game
by Pr respectively Op, while we assume transitive closure for PD .
In relation to the Attacks function, we note that it relies on a contrariness
function − applied on L for inducing the binary attack relations between the
elements of AD . However, for convenience as an abuse of notation we will assume
that Attacks is simply applied on AD . Furthermore in relation to set AD , we
note that it does not necessarily represent the set of all arguments introduced
into a dialogue game. To differentiate between these two sets we will hence refer
to the set of arguments employed in a dialogue game as A′, where A′ ⊆ AD . This
is due to the fact that additional arguments, not employed in the game, could
be instantiated from the logical contents accumulated in both CSPr and CSOp.
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Similarly, we differentiate between the attack relationships in AD and A′ with CD
and C′ respectively where C′ ⊆ CD , as well as between the preference-orderings
employed in the dialogue game and the actual set of preference-orderings with P′
and PD .
As far as PD is concerned, the possible conflicts between the distinct preference
sets of the two participants, PPr and POp are simply resolved according to the
game’s semantics. Essentially, in the case where S =Credulous then:
• PD consists of the preference-orderings moved by Pr, maximally consis-
tently extended with the preference-orderings moved by Op;
whereas in the case of S =Grounded:
• PD consists of the preference-orderings moved by Op, maximally consis-
tently extended with the those moved by Pr.
In essence, what is actually discarded is the conflicting preference-orderings over
non-axiom premises and defeasible rules, and not preference-orderings over ar-
guments. However for convenience, we express the conflict resolution definition
with respect to the preference-orderings over the arguments which result from
the preference-orderings over the logical components that compose them.
3.3.2 Conditional Soundness
Having resolved the conflicts between preference-orderings introduced in a D ,
we can instantiate an AFD with respect to the decided defeat relation over A
D .
That is to induce an AFD from a PAF . At this point it is worth reminding
the reader that, based on Definition 15, in the special case where there exists an
unresolved preference-dependent attack relationship between two arguments X
and Y , (X, Y ) ∈ CD , for which no preference information is introduced into the
game, then it is implicitly suggested that X  Y ′ (as well as Y  X ′), which in
turn implies that (X, Y ) ∈ D. As explained in Section 2.3.1, the extensions of
AFD can then be defined in a similar way to the extensions of a Dung framework.
In order to prove the soundness of the proposed framework, all we need to do
is to compare all the possible winning outcomes of all the intermediate states of
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a dialogue process—including the initiating and the final state—with the corre-
sponding AFD frameworks instantiated for each of those states, and prove that
given a semantics S, whenever Pr(Op) is the winner, then correspondingly there
exists(does not exist) an argument contained in an in labelled root dialogue move
DMr, which is(is not) part of the S-extension in AFD .
As trivial as this may seem, basic differences between a dialogue and the con-
currently instantiated AFD make this process complicated, while if one accounts
for the underlying logic then more things need to be considered in order to guar-
antee the soundness of a dialogue’s outcome. This is because, as it has already
been stressed, a dialogue system which relies on an abstract analysis cannot take
into account the possibility of a new argument being instantiated from the log-
ical content accumulated from the dialogue process which could possibly alter
the winning status of the game if introduced. In this sense, and as it is also
discussed in Prakken [2001, 2005], a currently terminated dialogue might not yet
be ‘logically’ terminated. Simply put, this possibility eludes an abstract analysis.
Essentially, the distinction between a “currently terminated” and “logically
terminated” dialogue is one feature differentiating “argumentation” from “mathe-
matical proof”. As [Bench-Capon and Dunne, 2007, point (c), p. 620] explain, let
us assume P to be a formal proof that T holds, then in mathematical reasoning:
Conclusions are final and definite: if P is a correct proof that T ,
then T is, ipso facto valid and this status does not admit subsequent
qualification or amendment, let alone retraction.
However, as they further explain, in argument and discussion as encountered in
everyday contexts, it is rare this feature applies—assuming that one perceives for
example P as a persuasive argument for accepting T .
Consider the example depicted in Figure 3.5 which concerns a grounded di-
alogue game between two participants. In Figure 3.5a, there obviously exists a
winning strategy for f, f ⇒ ¬r thus making Pr is the current winner. Particu-
larly, the game concerns the acceptability of ¬r—the conclusion of the argument
comprised by the tree’s root move DM0. DM1 constitutes a rebut attack on DM0
since it infers r, which is a contradicting claim to ¬r. Pr then responds with
another attack on the contents of DM1 with DM2, since the conclusion of its
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f, f ⇒ ¬r
p, p⇒ s






f, f ⇒ ¬r






Figure 3.5: a) A logically-incomplete dialogue, b) A logically-complete dialogue
comprised argument contradicts with the premise of the sub-argument employed
as a premise in DM1, in order to conclude r.
Nevertheless, as it is shown in Figure 3.5b, with the introduction of DM2 we
can now assume that the p premise, inferred as a conclusion of the sub-argument
∼ s⇒ p in DM1, no longer needs to be supported by ∼ s⇒ p since it is now part
of Pr’s commitments after using it to infer s inDM2, i.e. by uttering p, p⇒ s, Pr
commits to believing p, and making Op aware p. Thus a new argument can now
be instantiated on behalf of Op through the combination of p, and p⇒ r already
introduced by Op, which can then be moved into the game as the content of a new
move DM3, altering the dialectical status of the claim in dispute (Figure 3.5b).
Notice that in contrast with DM1, DM3 is not susceptible to an assumption
attack (an attack on ∼ s), since now the necessary premise for inferring r is
directly provided through Pr’s commitment store.
3.3.2.1 Logical & Protocol Completeness
As explained in Prakken [2005], accounting for logical completeness means that
additional conditions must be satisfied with respect to whether at a current state
of a dialogue game the players have moved all arguments that they were allowed to
move, according to the game’s protocol. Particularly, this restriction refers to two
categories of arguments. The first concerns arguments which may be instantiated
from the logical contents found in the commitment stores of both participants
(as illustrated in Figure 3.5b), while the second concerns arguments which are
already part of the dialogue (arguments that were previously introduced) and
could possibly be repeated.
The necessity of imposing restrictions concerned with the first category of
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arguments is self-evident, as it is essential that the participants account for the
possibility that new arguments could be instantiated and deployed in a game.
However, additionally imposing conditions concerned with the second category
of arguments has to be further analysed. In essence the latter results from the
fact that in a dialogue game the instantiated dialogue forest and the concurrently
instantiated AFD are different in one considerable aspect. Given either the PCS
or the PGS protocol, the winning status of the initiating move of a dialogue
game changes with each consequent move introduced into the game (as imposed
by the strict set of protocol rules PS). This is not reflected in the corresponding
< AD ,D > framework with an analogous participation or non-participation of
X in the S-extension. Essentially, this is due to the fact that an argument can
appear only once in an (AD ,D) framework. Thus while the repetition of a move
is immediately reflected in a dialogue tree with the addition of a new move as
a leaf—which, according to the game’s rules, affects the winning status of the
game—in contrast, the corresponding AFD framework remains intact as do its
extensions.
The latter implies that in some intermediate states of the dialogue game, the
dialogue’s winning status might not comply with a corresponding participation
of X in the S-extension. Thus, in general, guaranteeing an any time soundness
for our framework is not possible based on the winning strategy definition alone,
as the result for such states could be both not sound and unfair. Therefore, the
soundness of the proposed system is additionally subjected to conditions related
to the possible dialogue moves that have already been introduced and can be
repeated in the game.
For example, in the trivial case of the credulous dialogue game depicted in
Figure 3.6a, if the game is interrupted after the introduction of DM0—where in
this case it is the second move introduced into the game—then we can decide that
there does not exist a winning strategy for DM1 and accordingly decide that the
argument comprised by DM1 is not acceptable under the credulous semantics.
However, if we assume a symmetric attack relationship between the arguments
comprised in moves DMcon0 = A and DM
con
1 = B then under the credulous game
protocol rules, Pr should be allowed to repeat DM1 while Op is not allowed








Figure 3.6: a) A trivial case of a credulous game (Pr is grey), b) The correspond-
ing AF .
dialogue tree there doesn’t exist a winning strategy for the argument comprised
by DM1, while it is easy to see that based on the form of the instantiated AFD
both arguments comprised by the dialogue moves in respect, should be acceptable
under the credulous semantics (Figure 3.6b). In such a case, we say that the game
is not protocol complete.
These two limitations of the winning strategy definition with respect to guar-
anteeing the soundness of the proposed framework, make necessary that we in-
troduce two distinct sets of conditions concerned with the arguments and the
preferences that may be repeated in a game.
Definition 38 (Protocol Completeness) Given a legal S-persuasion dialogue
D , let T be D ’s dialogue tree such that d1 ∈ T and d2 ∈ T, we then say that D is
protocol complete if:
1. ∃X ∈ d1 and Y ∈ d2, where X, Y ∈ A
′ then if Y can legally be moved
against X in d1 then it has been.
2. ∃(X > Y ) ∈ d1 and (Y > X) ∈ d2, where (X > Y ), (Y > X) ∈ P
′ then if
(Y > X) can legally be moved against (X > Y ) in d1 then it has been.
Definition 39 (Logical Completeness) Given a legal S-persuasion dialogue
D , we say that D is logically complete if:
1. ∃X ∈ AD then if X can legally be moved in D then it has been.
2. ∃(X > Y ) ∈ PD then if (X > Y ) can legally be moved in D then it has
been.
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Essentially, protocol completeness accounts for the possible legal repetitions
of moves that have to be repeated into the game for it to be deemed sound, while
logical completeness generally accounts for all possible arguments or preference-
orderings that can be instantiated from the dialogue’s accumulated logical con-
tent, that should also be moved into the game for the same reason. In this respect,
logical completeness subsumes protocol completeness. Notice however that, in the
case of preferences this does not hold. This is because the set of preference rela-
tions moved in an actual game are a superset of the preference relations defined by
the commitment stores of the participants, as conflicting preference information
is discarded according to Definition 37 and with respect to either PCS or PGS.
Nevertheless, it is still the case that if Pr wins/loses a logically complete dialogue
then it is implied that Pr would also win/lose a protocol complete game. The
only difference is simply that in the case of the logically complete game, we lose
some information in relation to whether a preference-ordering in PD was actually
countered with a preference-rebut attack in the protocol complete game, which
could then be discarded. However, this has little meaning as the outcome in both
cases with respect to the success of a certain attack as defeat is the same.
3.3.3 Soundness & Fairness Results
Having provided a definition for a logically-complete dialogue, we can now provide
a number of theorems in relation to the soundness and fairness of any dialogue
produced by the proposed system.
We first introduce some basic notation for the following proofs. We assume
a persuasion dialogue D , for a claim cinit, for which F and AFD = (A
D ,D)
are the dialogue forest respectively the argumentation framework defined by D .
Let AFD be induced by a PAF =< A
D ,PD ,CD > as the latter is described in
Definition 37. Let T ∈ F be a tree in F , the content of the root move of which
is an argument X for cinit, with a winning strategy T
′ ∈ T for Pr, where each
di(d
′
i) is of the form < DMr, . . . ,DMτ > for a root dialogue move DMr and for a
terminal move (leaf node) DMτ , while we assume {d1, . . . , dn} and {d
′
1, . . . , d
′
m}
are the disputes in T respectively T′.
As an abuse of notation, we write I −DMconupslopeI −DM for a dialogue move
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DM introduced by I ∈ {Pr,Op}, i.e. Pr − XupslopePr − DM, while the extension
of a dispute d with a dialogue move DM is denoted by the juxtaposition di, I −
DMconupslopedi, I −DM. For example disputes will appear in the following forms:
di′ : Pr −DMi, Op−DMj, P r −DMi′
di′ : Pr −X,Op− Y, Pr − Z
while extended disputes will appear as follows:
dk′ : di′ , P r −DMk, Op−DMl, P r −DMk′
dk′ : di′ , P r − A,Op− B,Pr − C
In addition, if applicable, the dispute’s index will be consistent with the index of
its last move.
The set of all arguments moved in a tree T or in a winning strategy T′ by I will
be denoted as I(T) respectively I(T′). Furthermore, though a preference-ordering
between two arguments X and Y is expressed as a pair (X, Y ) ∈ PD which
implies that X is preferred over Y , for convenience we will express this preference
relationship as X > Y , though, strictly following the ASPIC+ notation, X > Y
implies that X is strictly preferred over Y .
Theorem 1 (Credulous Soundness) Let AFD = (A
D ,D) be the argumenta-
tion framework defined by a finite legal logically-complete credulous persuasion
dialogue D for a claim cinit. Then if Pr is winning, there exists an argument X
for cinit such that X is in the admissible extension of AFD .
Proof Assume a finite legal logically-complete credulous persuasion dialogue D
for a claim cinit where Pr is currently winning. Then based on Definition 35 and
Lemma 1 there must exist a T ∈ F , the content of the root move of which is an
argument X for cinit, with a winning strategy T
′ ∈ T for Pr.
Then X’s membership in an admissible extension of AFD can be shown if
Pr(T′) is admissible. That is to prove that:
1. Pr(T′) is conflict free and;
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2. ∀A ∈ Pr(T′) if ∃B ∈ AD such that (B,A) ∈ D then ∃C ∈ Pr(T′) such that
(C,B) ∈ D.
The property of conflict free-ness is accounted by means of condition 4 of Defini-
tion 34. We prove that the second property holds, by contradiction.
Assume that Pr(T ′) is not admissible. This implies that for some A ∈ Pr(T′)
introduced by a move < Pr,DMi > there must exist an argument B ∈ A
D such
that the following conditions hold:
1. (B,A) ∈ CD
2. (B,A) ∈ D
3. ∄C ∈ Pr(T′) such that (C,B) ∈ D
Suppose DMi ∈ d
′
l of a T
′ such that d′l : Pr − DMr, . . . , P r − DMi. Since
A ∈ Pr(T′) and (B,A) ∈ CD , then by completeness conditions B must have
been introduced into D as the content of an Op move (DMj), appearing: either
directly after Pr −DMi in d
′
l as illustrated in Figure 3.7, or; if this violates the
repetition conditions imposed by the protocol rules for the credulous game (PCG)
then it must be that Op−DMj appears before Pr −DMi in d
′
l as illustrated in
Figure 3.8 (we remind the reader that, based on PCG, Op cannot repeat a move
in the same dispute, while Pr can). Suppose that I) is the case. Then:
DMr DM
con
i = A DM
con
j = B. . .d
′
l :





j = B. . . . . .d
′
l :
Figure 3.8: Case II
a) By definition of the winning strategy, d′l cannot end with an Op move, which
suggests that at least one of the following cases must hold:
i) either DMj is replied to by DMi′ : Pr − C where C ∈ Pr(T
′) (given
PCG, it may also be that C = A), which falls under the line of thinking
employed in case II) steps c), d), e) and f), or;
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ii) if i) is not the case, then (B,A) ∈ CD must be a preference-dependent
attack, which particularly implies that (B,A) ∈ CD must be a preference-
dependent attack on A′, while additionally Pr must be able to undermine
the success of B’s attack on A as defeat.
b) a)ii) implies that Pr must have moved a preference-ordering A′ > B by means
of a move:
DMi′ : Pr − (A
′ > B)
against DMj.
c) Given b) we then differentiate between the following cases:
i) either Op was unable to introduce a counter preference-ordering B > A′
thus the dispute would have ended with DMi′ , or;
ii) Op was able to introduce a counter preference-ordering B > A′ by means
of a move:
DMj′ : Op− (B > A
′)
againstDMi′ , in which case, due toPCG and based on logical-completeness,
Pr would have repeatedDMi′ againstDMj′ thus again ending the dispute
with a Pr move.
d) If c)i) holds, then it must be that (A′ > B) ∈ PD , which by logical-completeness
implies that B ⊀ A′ does not hold and thus, according to Definition 15, it must
hold that (B,A) /∈ D, which in turn contradicts with condition 2.
DMr DM
con
i = A DM
con
i′ = A
′ > BDMconj = B DM
con
j′ = B > A
′ DMi′...d′l :
Figure 3.9: Cases I)e)i) & I)e)ii)
e) If c)ii) holds, then out of the two contradictory preference-orderings moved
into the game, A′ > B and B > A′, only the first would be included in
PD (based on 37 for PCS), given that it was moved by Pr. Thus similarly,
by logical-completeness B ⊀ A′ does not hold, and thus (B,A) /∈ D, which
contradicts with condition 2.
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Suppose that II) is the case. Then:
a) Given that the content of DMi is an argument, there cannot exist dialogue
moves in d′l between DMj and DMi with preference-orderings as contents,
since otherwise DMi cannot follow.
b) a) implies that there must exist an argument C ∈ d′l, and thus by condition of
the winning strategy C ∈ Pr(T′), such that (C,B) ∈ CD introduced against
DMj by Pr by means of a move:
DMi′ : Pr − C
(where it may also be that C = A).
c) Suppose (C,B) ∈ CD is preference-independent. This immediately implies
that (C,B) ∈ D, which contradicts with condition 3.
d) Suppose (C,B) ∈ CD is preference-dependent and C attacks B on a sub-
argument B′. Given that C ∈ Pr(T′), then by condition of the winning
strategy:
i) either no preference-orderings related to B and C were introduced into
the game by either Pr or Op, or;
ii) if DMi′ was replied to by a move:
DMj′ : Op− (B
′ > C)
thenDMj′ must have also been replied to by a counter preference-ordering
C > B′ by means of a move:
DMi′′ : Pr − (C > B
′)
Note that otherwise, argument C cannot be part of d′l and consequently of the




i = A DM
con
i′ = A > B
′DMconj = B DM
con
j′ = B
′ > A. . .d′l :











i = A. . . . . .d
′
m :
Figure 3.11: Case II)d)ii) for C 6= A
e) In case d)i), based on logical completeness it must hold that there exist no
preference-orderings in PD with respect to C and B′, which in turn according
to Definition 15 implies that C ⊀ B′. The latter implies that (C,B) ∈ D
which leads to a contradiction with condition 3.
f) If d)ii) holds, then out of the two contradictory preference-orderings intro-
duced into the game C > B′ and B′ > C, only the first would be included
in PD based on Definition 37 for PCS, given that it was moved by Pr. Thus
similarly, by logical-completeness it holds that C ⊀ B′, and thus (C,B) ∈ D
which contradicts with condition 3.
In general, we have shown that the existence of an argument B ∈ AD able to
invalidate the admissibility of Pr(T′) through defeating an argument A ∈ Pr(T′),
leads to one of two possible contradictions; namely that either condition 2 or 3
does not hold.
Theorem 2 (Grounded Soundness) Let AFD = (A
D ,D) be the argumenta-
tion framework defined by a finite legal logically-complete grounded persuasion
dialogue D for a claim cinit. Then if Pr is winning, there exists an argument X
for cinit such that X is in the grounded extension of AFD .
Proof Assume a finite legal logically-complete grounded persuasion dialogue D
for a claim cinit where Pr is currently winning. Then based on Definition 35 and
Lemma 1 there must exist a T ∈ F , the content of the root move of which is an
argument X for cinit, with a winning strategy T
′ ∈ T for Pr.
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Let GE be the grounded extension in AFD . Then proving X’s membership
in GE can then be shown if Pr(T′) is a particular subset of GE where:
• let FAFD be the characteristic function of AFD , as defined in Dung [1995],
such that:
– FAFD : 2
AD → 2A
D
– FAFD(S) = {A|A is acceptable with respect to S}, for S a subset of
AD
where FAFD is monotonic with respect to set inclusion. Furthermore:
• let σ = S0 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Sn ⊆ . . . be an increasing sequence of sets of arguments
such that:
– S0 = ∅
– each Si = FAFD(Si−1)
while, as we always refer to an arbitrary but fixed AF , for convenience, we
henceforth write F i(∅) instead of F iAFD(∅), where the exponent, i, expresses
the number of the iterative applications of F on ∅ for the production of





We prove that Pr(T′) ⊆ GE, by induction.
We assume that a terminal move in a T (a leaf node) is referred to with an
index τ , i.e. as DMτ . Correspondingly, we will also refer to the level of a terminal
node as τ , while we will refer to preceding levels as τ − i, where 0 < i < τ .
Let {d′1, . . . , d
′
m} be the disputes in T
′, where each d′i is of the form
d′i = {DMr, . . . ,DMτ−2,DMτ−1,DMτ}
and where by condition of the winning strategy DMτ is a proponent move. We






















Figure 3.12: a) A terminal node DMτ in d
′ of a winning strategy T′ and the
moves that precede it in d′, b) A winning strategy T′ where the nodes marked
with A and P contain arguments and preferences respectively, c) T′ converted
to T′∗ through pruning off the preference nodes as well as the arguments they
attack.
two distinct sets, dP and dA, where dP contains those that end with a preference-
ordering, and dA those that end with an argument, such that:
T′ = dP ∪ dA
For building our inductive hypothesis, we rely on the following observations:
Observation 1 There do not exist any preference-orderings moved by Op in a T′.
Observation 2 Every argument moved by Pr in a T′ is a defeating argument.
Observation 3 All preference-orderings moved in T′ appear only in leaf nodes.
The first observation results from the fact that if Op introduces a preference-
ordering X > Y against a Pr attack in d′ ∈ T′ then, based on the PGG protocol
rules, if Pr is aware of a counter preference-ordering Y > X, its introduction is
useless as Op is able to repeat X > Y . The latter means that d′ will end with an
Op move which contradicts with the winning strategy definition.
Observation 2 essentially follows form the first observation, as, sinceOp cannot
introduce any preference-orderings in a d′, it is evident that every argument moved
by Pr will only be attacked by other Op arguments, which implies that all Pr
attacks succeed as defeats.
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Finally, the third observation is a combination of the fact that preference-
orderings can only be attacked by counter preference-orderings, and of the win-
ning strategy definition. Suppose for example that Pr moves a preference-
ordering X > Y in a non-leaf node of a d′, then Op’s only possible response
would be the introduction of a counter preference-ordering Y > X which, by
condition of PGG, implies that the dispute will end with an Op move. The latter
obviously contradicts with the winning strategy definition. Therefore, in the case
of a T′ preference-orderings only appear in leaf nodes and are only moved by Pr.
From the above observations one may conclude that, in contrast with Pr,
some of Op’s attacks in a T′ are unsuccessful, i.e. those found in τ − 1 nodes
which are attacked by preference-orderings moved by Pr. In this respect, if we
prune off all the leaf nodes in a T′ that contain Pr preferences, as well as the
τ − 1 nodes they attack, we end up with a sub-tree T∗ = {d∗1, d
∗




which only contains defeats (see Figure 3.12c). In essence, let Da and Db be two
persuasion dialogues on the acceptability of a claim x, and Ta and Tb respectively
the corresponding dialogue trees, where the participants exchange:
a) arguments and preferences based on their attack relation, resulting in the
instantiation of a PAF =< AD ,CD ,PD > as defined in Definition 37, where
the conflicts between preferences are resolved for S = Grounded and;
b) just arguments based on their defeat relation, relying on a framework AFD =<
AD ,D > instantiated from the induced PAF in case a)
Then it must hold that:
∃T′a ∈ T ⇔ ∃T
∗
b ∈ Tb
in which case T′a = T
∗
b . In this sense, proving that Pr(T
′) ⊆ GE is equivalent
with proving that Pr(T∗) ⊆ GE.
• Basis: Based on observations 1,2 & 3, it is evident that all the Pr argu-
ments found in the leaf nodes of a T∗ are undefeated. In this respect, let
term(d∗i ) be a function such that:

















Figure 3.13: An argument C in a T∗ whose acceptability is contingent upon




3, . . . , d
∗
i , . . . , d
∗
µ}
it participates, for µ ≤ m.
Hence, since by definition of the fixed point function, the application of





term(d∗i ) ⊆ F
1(∅) (3.9)
• Step: Based on equations 3.8 & 3.9 it is evident that, since W is a subset




F i(W ) ⊆ GE (3.10)
Let:
σW = W ⊆ F
1(W ) ⊆ F 2(W ) ⊆ . . . ⊆ F i(W ) ⊆ . . .
then, for proving that Pr(T′) ⊆ GE it is enough that we prove that every
element of Pr(T′) is an element of some F i(W ).
A naive approach would be to assume that since W contains all the un-
defeated arguments found in the leaf nodes of a T∗, then F 1(W ) can be
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produced by the union product of W and of all the τ − 2 level arguments
in T∗, as, intuitively, those should be supported by the elements of W (un-
defeated arguments). Nevertheless, this does not hold as it might be the
case that a τ − 2 level argument in a certain dispute d∗i , is also a τ − k
level argument in another dispute d∗j in T
∗, where k ∈ 2N and k > 2. For
example, argument C in Figure 3.13 participates in µ disputes where it is a
τ − 2 level argument in d∗1, a τ − 4 in d
∗
2, τ − 6 in d
∗
3 etc. As C participates
in more than one disputes with varying depths, it is not possible for it to
be deemed acceptable with respect to just W (particularly with respect to
just argument A1 ∈ W the latter being an element of d
∗
1) and therefore be
an element of F 1(W ), as not all the attacks on C are accounted by the
elements of W .
Hence, C ∈ Pr(T∗) can only be an element of some F i(W ) if it is distinctly
acceptable in all the disputes it participates. For proving C’s acceptability
we define a fixed point function fd∗i which is similar to F but which is
distinctly applied on each of the set of arguments Ad∗i ⊆ A
D found on each
of the disputes in a T∗, defined as follows:
Let T∗ be a pruned winning strategy such that T∗ = {d∗1, d
∗
2, . . . , d
∗
m}, then
fd∗i is the characteristic function of AFd∗i ⊆ AFD , where AFd∗i = {Ad∗i ⊆
AD ,Dd∗i ⊆ D}, such that:





– fd∗i (S) = {A|A is acceptable with respect to S}, for S a subset of Ad∗i
where fd∗i is monotonic with respect to set inclusion. In a similar sense to
F , assuming an fkd∗i , the exponent k expresses the number of the iterative
applications of f on ∅.
In essence, the acceptable set of arguments produced by the iterative ap-












Let depth() be a function that takes as input a tree and returns its depth.
Then the number of times that the characteristic function F can be applied
on a set of arguments found in a dialogue tree T, which essentially represent




This is the number of times, at least necessary, for accounting for all the
defeats against the root argument of T∗, and which is equal to the depth
of the longest dispute d∗i of T
∗, divided by two—as every argument in a d∗i
can only be acceptable with respect to an argument 2 levels after it in d∗i .
Thus, the fixed point of F applied on W is reached after nT∗ steps.
Equivalently, construction of F nT∗ (W ) can be achieved through the union


















(∅), . . . , fd∗m(∅) of all the disputes (m) of a pruned winning strategy T
∗.
This holds, as each defeat on the root argument of T∗ is accounted by the
fixed point of f applied on that defeat’s corresponding dispute, i.e. since
the root argument is acceptable with respect to the fixed points of f applied
on the arguments found on each of the disputes of T∗. Essentially, since due
to logical completeness if there exists an argument that could have been put
forth against another argument in Pr(T′) it has been put forth, then the
existence of a winning strategy T∗ captures all possible defeats against an
argument in Pr(T∗) each of which are accounted by the iterative application
of f on each of the disputes of T∗.
We can therefore construct the fixed point of F applied on W , as follows:
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it then holds that:









Given that each dCi is a sub-dispute of some d
∗
j in T
∗, and since F nTC (WC),
based on Equation 3.15 and due to logical completeness, accounts for all
the defeats on C, it is then evident that:
F nTC (WC) ⊆ F
nTC (W )
Since C is an element of F nTC (W ) it is also an element of GE.
Theorem 3 (Credulous Fairness) Given a finite AFD = (A
D ,D), where S
is in a admissible extension of AFD , then for any X ∈ S there exists a finite
logically-complete legal credulous persuasion dialogue D , such that Pr is winning.
Proof Let AFD = (A
D ,D) be an argumentation framework induced by a PAF =
< AD ,PD ,CD >, where S ⊆ AD is an admissible extension in AFD , |S| the
number of elements in S, and Q = AD − S. Assume then that for an argument
X ∈ S a legal, logically complete, credulous persuasion dialogue game will take
place.
Let us assume that the game is initiated by Pr’s move such that d0 : Pr −
DMi=0, where DM
con
i=0 = X. Given that S is an admissible set where |S| = n,
then ∀X ∈ S one of the following must hold:
A) ∄Y ∈ Q such that (Y,X) ∈ CD (there is no argument that attacks X), or;
B) ∀Y ∈ Q where (Y,X) ∈ CD , then:
I) either (X, Y ) ∈ CD , (X, Y ) ∈ D, (Y,X) /∈ D and Pr only uses X, or;
II) (X, Y ) /∈ CD , (Y,X) /∈ D, where Pr only uses preferences or;
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C) let SD ⊆ D such that:
SD = {(Y,X) : Y ∈ Q, (Y,X) ∈ D}
then there exists a set S ′D, where S
′
D ⊆ D and S
′
D ∩ SD = ∅, such that:
S ′D = {(Z, Y ) : ∀(Y,X) ∈ SD ∃(Z, Y ) : Z ∈ S, Y ∈ Q, (Z, Y ) ∈ D}
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Figure 3.14: Credulous fairness: Cace B): Possible sub-cases: a) Case B)I)a), b)
Case B)I)b), c) Case B)II)a), d) Case B)II)b)
Our goal is to show that for each of these cases, the possible dialogues that may
be induced with a root move DMcon0 = X, will definitely be a winning strategy
for Pr and that therefore, Pr will always be the winner. To do so we rely on
showing that each of the possible disputes that begin with X will end with a Pr
move.
• Let A) be the case, then:
The dialogue will trivially terminate with d0 : Pr − X. Thus d0 ∈ T
′ which
makes Pr the winner.
• Let B)I) be the case, then:
By completeness conditions and due to PCG, according to which Op cannot
repeat a move in the same dispute while Pr can, the dialogue will be extended
with a move DMconj = Y , while DMi will be repeated against DMj:
d0, Op− Y, Pr −X
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We further differentiate between the following cases:
a) either (X, Y ) ∈ CD is a preference-independent attack, or;
b) (X, Y ) ∈ CD is a preference-dependent attack on Y ′.
◦ If a) is the case:
i) This directly implies that (X, Y ) ∈ D.
ii) In addition, based on PCG—according to which Op cannot repeat the same
move in the same dispute line—Y cannot be repeated against X.
iii) Based on i) and ii) the dispute will end with Pr’s move (Figure 3.14a).
◦ If b) is the case, then:
i) If Op is not aware of a preference-ordering Y ′ > X able to undermine the
success of (X, Y ) ∈ CD as defeat, then, similarly to B)I)a), the dialogue will
end with Pr’s move (Figure 3.14a).
ii) Else, if Op is aware of a preference-ordering Y ′ > X this would be moved as
the content of a move DMj′ against the repeated DMi:
d0, Op− Y, Pr −X,Op− (Y
′ > X)
1. Since by assumption (X, Y ) ∈ D, Pr must also be aware of a counter
preference-ordering X > Y ′, which will be moved as the content of a
move DMi′ against DMj′ (advise Figure 3.14b):
d0, Op− Y, Pr −X,Op− (Y
′ > X), P r − (X > Y ′)
2. Based on PCG, which dictates that Op cannot repeat its moves in the
same dispute, the dispute will again end with Pr’s move.
3. Notice that, by Definition 37 for the credulous game, we keep X > Y ′ ∈
PD at the expense of Y ′ > X.
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4. Note that as we assume the concerned dialogue to be taking place on the
basis of a PAF , and given that set PD is consistent by definition, move
DMj′ can never appear in the concerned dispute.
5. Thus, the dispute will actually end with the repetition of DMi by Pr
(Figure 3.14a).
• Let B)II) be the case, then:
By completeness conditions the dialogue will be extended with a move DMj :
Op−Y . Since by assumption (Y,X) /∈ D, then (Y,X) ∈ CD must be a preference-
dependent attack on X ′, while Pr must be aware of a preference-ordering X ′ > Y
which will be introduced into the game against DMj as the content of a move
DMi′ :
d0, Op− Y, Pr − (X
′ > Y ′)
We then differentiate between the following cases:
a) Either Op is not aware of a counter preference-ordering Y > X ′, or;
b) Op is aware of a counter preference-ordering Y > X ′.
◦ If a) is the case, then:
i) DMi will simply be the last move in the dispute (Figure 3.14c).
◦ If b) is the case, then:
i) Y > X ′ will be moved into the game as the content of a move DMj′ , against
DMi′ :
d0, Op− Y, Pr − (X
′ > Y ), Op− (Y > X ′)
ii) By PCG, Pr can repeat its move—DMi′—against DMj′ in the same dispute,
in contrast with Op:
d0, Op− Y, Pr − (X
′ > Y ), Op− (Y > X ′), P r − (X ′ > Y )
1. Thus the dispute will end again with Pr’s move (Figure 3.14d).
122
2. Notice again that, by Definition 37 for the credulous game, we keep X ′ >
Y ∈ PD at the expense of Y > X ′.
3. As we assume the concerned dialogue to be taking place on the basis of
a PAF and given that set PD is consistent by definition, move DMj′ can
never appear in the concerned dispute.
4. Thus, the dispute will actually end with move DMi′ by Pr (Figure 3.14c).
Therefore in case B) all the possibly induced disputes can end either with




X X ′ > Y1 X
...
Figure 3.15: A possible dialogue tree induced for argument X and all the possible
Y s that may be moved against it, which fall into cases A) and B).
• Let C) be the case then:
Suppose S is defined as follows:
S = {X1, X2, . . . , XI−1, XI , XI+1, . . . , Xn}
while we assume a set Q′ ⊆ Q where:
Q′ = {Y1, Y2, . . . , YJ−1, YJ , YJ+1, . . . , Ym}
where every element in Q′ is a defeater of some element in S.
Suppose Pr initiates a game for an argument XI moved into the game as the
content of a move DMI=0, while there exists a YJ such that (YJ , XI) ∈ SD and
(XI , YJ) /∈ D. Let mod(a, b) be a function that returns the remainder of division
of a by b. Then:
i) The dispute will be extended with YJ being moved against XI as the content
of a move DMj.
123
X1 X2 XI−1 XI XI+1 XN











X1 X2 XI−1 XI XI+1 XN X1Y1 Y2 YJ−1 YJ YJ+1 YM... ...
(b)
Figure 3.16: a) Sets S and Q′, and a possible defeat relationship between their
elements, b) A dispute where the initiating argument is X1
ii) As S is an admissible set, assume that it holds that (Xmod(I+1,N), YJ) ∈ S
′
D.
iii) The dispute will be further extended with Xmod(I+1,N) being moved against
YJ as the content of a move DMi′ .
iv) Assume then that there exists a Ymod(J+1,M) such that:
(Ymod(J+1,M), Xmod(I+1,N)) ∈ SD and (Xmod(I+1,N), Ymod(J+1,M)) /∈ D
i.e., the attacked argument does not counter-attack the attacker.
v) The dispute will be extended with Ymod(J+1,M) being moved againstXmod(I+1,N)
as the content of a move DMj′ .
vi) As S is an admissible set, then for every Ymod(I+k+1,M), where k = 1, 2, . . .,
for which for some Xmod(I+k,N) holds that:
(Ymod(J+k+1,M), Xmod(I+k,N)) ∈ SD
and which is moved into the dispute byOp, we can assume that ∃Xmod(I+k+1,M)
such that:
(Xmod(I+k+1,M), Ymod(J+k+1,M)) ∈ S
′
D
through which Pr will further extend the dispute moving against Op’s move.
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vii) As both S and Q′ are finite sets (Figure 3.16a), in a worst case scenario for
some Xmod(I+k+1,M) where:




mod(I + k + 1,M) = I
viii) Thus XI will be repeated in to the dispute by Pr.
ix) Nevertheless, while ∃(YJ , XI) ∈ SD, according to PCG argument YJ cannot
be repeated into the dispute by Op.
x) Thus the dispute will terminate with Pr’s move (Figure 3.16b).
Generally, in all three cases, A), B) and C), all the possible disputes that
can be induced from AFD with a root move DM
con
0 = X, where X ∈ S, and
S is an admissible extension, can only end with a Pr move. This implies that
any produced dialogue will also be a winning strategy for Pr. Therefore Pr will
always be the winner.
Theorem 4 (Grounded Fairness) Given a finite AFD = (A
D ,D), and S is in
the grounded extension of AFD , then for any X ∈ S there exists a finite logically-
complete legal grounded persuasion dialogue D , such that Pr is winning.
Proof LetAFD = (A
D ,D) be an argumentation framework induced by a PAF =<
AD ,PD ,CD >, where GE ⊆ AD is the grounded extension in AFD , |GE| the num-
ber of elements in GE, and Q = AD − GE. Assume then that for an argument
X ∈ GE a legal, logically complete, grounded persuasion dialogue game will take
place.
Let us assume that the game is initiated by Pr’s move such that d0 =<
Pr,DMi=0 >, where DM
con
i=0 = X. Given that GE is a set where |GE| = n, then
∀X ∈ GE one of the following must hold:
A) ∄Y ∈ Q such that (Y,X) ∈ CD (there is no argument that attacks X), or;
B) ∀Y ∈ Q where (Y,X) ∈ CD , then (Y,X) /∈ D (Y does not defeat X), or;
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C) let SD ⊆ D such that:
SD = {(Y,X) : Y ∈ Q, (Y,X) ∈ D}
then there exists a set S ′D, where S
′
D ⊆ D and S
′
D ∩ SD = ∅, such that:
S ′D = {(Z, Y ) : ∀(Y,X) ∈ SD ∃(Z, Y ) : Z ∈ GE, Y ∈ Q, (Z, Y ) ∈ D, Z 6= X}
while
∃(Z, Y ) ∈ S ′D : ∄(W,Z) ∈ SD
i.e., for every Y that defeats an X in GE there exists a Z in GE that defeats
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Figure 3.17: a) Case B), b) A possible dialogue tree induced for argument X and
all the possible Y s that may be moved against it, which though also fall into Case
B).
Our goal is to show that for each of these cases, the possible dialogues that may
be induced with a root move DMcon0 = X, will definitely be a winning strategy
for Pr and that therefore, Pr will always be the winner. To do so we rely on
showing that each of the possible disputes that begin with X will end with a Pr
move.
• Let A) be the case then:
The dialogue will trivially terminate with d0 : Pr − X. Thus d0 ∈ T
′ which
makes Pr the winner.
• Let B) be the case then:
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i) The dialogue will be extended with a move DMconj = Y :
d0.Op− Y
ii) Due to PGG, according to which Pr cannot repeat a move in the same
dispute while Op can, and since by assumption (Y,X) /∈ D then:
1. In the case where (X, Y ) ∈ CD , DMi will not be repeated against DMj.
2. (Y,X) ∈ CD must be a preference-dependent attack on X ′.
3. Pr must be aware of a preference-ordering X ′ > Y which will be moved
into the game as the content of a move DMi′ against DMj (Figure 3.17a):
d0.Op− Y, Pr − (X
′ > Y )
4. Notice that since the dialogue is taking place on the basis of a PAF and
given that set PD is consistent by definition, Op cannot be aware of a
counter-preference ordering Y > X ′, since otherwise by Definition 37 for
the grounded game, we would keep:
Y > X ′ ∈ PD
at the expense of:
X ′ > Y
5. Thus the dispute will end with Pr’s move.
Therefore in case B) all possible disputes can only end with a preference-ordering
X ′ > Yi for i = 0, . . . , k, for every Y that attacks X (Figure 3.17b).
• Let C) be the case then:
Suppose S is defined as follows:
S = {X1, X2, . . . , XI−1, XI , XI+1, . . . , XN}
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X1 X2 XI−1 XI XI+1 XNY1 Y2 YJ−1 YJ YJ+1 YM... ...
(b)
Figure 3.18: a) Sets S and Q′, and a possible defeat relationship between their
elements, b) A dispute where the initiating argument is X1
while we assume a set Q′ ⊆ Q where:
Q′ = {Y1, Y2, . . . , YJ−1, YJ , YJ+1, . . . , YM}
where every element in Q′ is a defeater of some element in S.
Suppose Pr initiates a game for an argument XI moved into the game as the
content of a move DMi=0, while there exists a YJ such that (YJ , XI) ∈ SD and
(XI , YJ) /∈ D. Then:
i) The dispute will be extended with YJ being moved against XI as the content
of a move DMj.
ii) By assumption it must hold that (XI+1, YJ) ∈ S
′
D.
iii) The dispute will be further extended with XI+1 being moved against YJ as
the content of a move DMi′ .
iv) Assume then that there exists a YJ+1 such that:
(YJ+1, XI+1) ∈ SD and (XI+1, YJ+1) /∈ D
v) The dispute will be extended with YJ+1 being moved against XI+1 as the
content of a move DMj′ .
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vi) As GE is the grounded extension, then for every YI+k+1, where k = 1, 2, . . .,
for which for some XI+k holds that:
(YJ+k+1, XI+k) ∈ SD
which is moved into the dispute by Op, we can assume that ∃XI+k+1 such
that:
(XI+k+1, YJ+k+1) ∈ S
′
D
through which Pr will further extend the dispute moving it against Op’s
move.
vii) As both GE and Q′ are finite sets and since GE is the grounded exten-
sion, after exhaustively using the elements of GE, there will be an element
XI+k+1 ∈ GE (which in a worst case scenario will be the last element in
GE), where:
(XI+k+1, YJ+k+1) ∈ S
′
D
and for which it should hold that: ∄(YJ+k+2, XI+k+1) ∈ SD
viii) Thus, the content of the of the dispute’s last move will beXI+k+1 moved by Pr.
Generally, in all three cases, A), B) and C), all the possible disputes that
can be induced from AFD with a root move DM
con
0 = X, where X ∈ GE, and
GE is the grounded extension, can only end with a Pr move. This implies that
any produced dialogue will also be a winning strategy for Pr. Therefore Pr will
always be the winner.
3.4 Strategic Considerations
In this section we deal with the possible strategic considerations that may be
employed by a participant in a persuasion dialogue game. Particularly we fo-
cus on illustrating how not taking into account the underlying logic fails again
in accounting for the dynamic nature of a dialogue game. The basic idea is to
illustrate particularly, how accounting for the underlying logic may have a con-
siderable effect on the outcome of a dialogue game. In order to do so, we need
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to first show how an abstract approach differs from one that accounts for the
underlying logic. For this purpose, we rely on the following example which aims
to stress the impact of backtracking on strategy planning.
3.4.1 The Importance of Backtracking
We begin by illustrating how backtracking may affect the outcome of a dialogue
game, through comparing two protocols for the grounded semantics, where the
first does not allow for it while the second does.
Example 1 Let there be a persuasion dialogue D where:
• the goals of the participants, Pr and Op, concern proving (GPr) respectively
disproving (GOp) the acceptability of an argument X in dispute, with respect
to the grounded semantics
• the participants exchange arguments based on a binary attack relationship
C, Pr begins with X
• we assume two protocols PGS1 and PGS2 where backtracking is not respec-
tively is allowed
• assuming D is expressed in the form of a tree T = {d1, ...dL} with X as its
root, then given a labelling applied on T based on Definition 33, an argument
can be introduced in D only if it changes the dialogical status of X
• both PGS1 and PGS2 dictate that ∀d ∈ T, no two arguments with speaker
Pr are the same, and; the game terminates if one of the players cannot
respond in any way
Let us then assume, that in order for the participants to strategise, they rely on
building a similar opponent model as the one described in Section 3.1, with respect
though only to the arguments and their binary attack relationship, assumed to be
known by their opponents.
We are interested in investigating the possible ways based on which a game
on the acceptability of an argument A may evolve, based on the perspective of






































Pr5 : Pr3 :
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(d)
Figure 3.19: a) An AF instantiated based on both an agents own KB and its op-
ponent’s model, b) Scenario I:[PGS1] [PGS2], c) Scenario II:[PGS1], d) Scenario
II:[PGS2], the simulated dialogue tree.
{A,D, F,G}; assumes that Op believes {B,C,E}. Given the binary attack re-
lationships between the elements of these sets of arguments, we assume that for
the purpose of strategising, Pr instantiates a new abstract AF (Figure 3.19a)
combining his own beliefs (grey nodes) with his assumptions about the beliefs of
Op (white nodes). For the purpose of this example we assume that Pr’s beliefs
about the beliefs of Op are Complete.
Based on the AF depicted in Figure 3.19a1, Pr, who is to prove the accept-
ability of A, is able to simulate the possible ways based on which the dialogue
may evolve, with respect to the different protocols, as described by the following
scenarios:
Scenario I:[PGS1] Pr moves A. Op responds with B. Out of the two possible
options Pr responds with D. Consequently, Op follows with E and finally Pr
ends the game with G, since Op has no way to counter G (Figure 3.19b).
Scenario II:[PGS1] Pr moves A. Op responds with B. Out of the two possible
options Pr responds with F . Consequently, Op ends the game with C, since
1In Figures 3.19b, 3.19c, 3.19d, the arrows depicted are deem, since they do not represent
actual attack relationships between dialogue moves, but rather concern the sequence order in
which they are introduced
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according to the game’s rules Pr is not allowed to backtrack (Figures 3.19c).
Scenario I:[PGS2] Pr moves A. Op responds with B. Out of the two possible
options Pr responds with D. Consequently, Op follows with E and finally Pr
ends the game with G, since Op has no way to counter G or any option for
backtracking, even though backtracking is allowed (Figure 3.19b).
Scenario II:[PGS2] Pr moves A. Op responds with B. Out of the two possible
options Pr responds with F . Op responds with C. Since there is no way of
countering C, Pr now can only backtrack to countering B with D. Op follows
with E and finally Pr ends the game with G, since Op has no way to counter G
or any option for backtracking (Figure 3.19d).
Based on this example, one is able to observe that in PGS2, Pr is able to reach
the desirable outcome regardless of the choices it makes through the game. The
latter does not hold for PGS1. If for some reason Pr chooses to counter B with
F instead of G then, given PGS1, Pr wont be able to alter the outcome through
backtracking, and thus will loose. In contrast, choosing to counter B with either
D or F makes no difference for Pr under PGS2, since in either case backtracking
allows for all possible choices to be exhaustively employed, and therefore if there
exists a way for Pr to win, it will be reached.
Based on these observations Theorem 5 can be derived, to which we will be
referring as the Pinball Theorem. Essentially, what the theorem states is that
regardless of how a dialogue may evolve, if backtracking is allowed then the same
outcome will always be reached. This is similar to how the balls of a pinball
machine will always end falling into the drain situated at the bottom of the play
field, regardless of the course they follow during the game.
For stating the theorem it is first necessary that we define a particular set of
protocol rules that need to describe a dialogue for it to be characterised by the
Pinball theorem.
Definition 40 (Protocol rules PS) Let PS stand for a set of protocol rules
where:
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1. The goals of the participants, Pr and Op, concern proving (GPr) respectively
disproving (GOp) the acceptability of an argument X, with respect to a given
semantics S={Credulous, Grounded};
2. The participants exchange arguments based on a binary attack relationship C,
Pr begins with X;
3. Backtracking is allowed, and so a dialogue D characterised by PS may be ex-
pressed in the form of a tree T = {d1, ...dL} with X as its root;
4. Assuming a labelling applied on T based on Definition 33, an argument can be
introduced in D only if it changes the dialogical status of X;
5. If S=Grounded then ∀d ∈ T, no two arguments with speaker Pr are the same,
while if S=Credulous then ∀d ∈ T, no two arguments with speaker Op are the
same, and;
6. The game terminates if one of the players cannot respond in any way.
Theorem 5 (Pinball Theorem) Let there be a terminated persuasion dialogue
D1 for an argument X characterised by PS, and assuming that all arguments dis-
tinctly known to either participants that could have been moved in D1 have been
moved, then if:
result : D1 × GPr −→ {Success}
then there exist no other sequence of dialogue moves D2 for X, subjected to the
same assumptions that characterise D2 such that:
result : D2 × GPr −→ {Failure}
Respectively for GOp.
Proof We prove this by contradiction. For convenience let I ∈ {Pr,Op} and bpI
represent a participant’s branching—backtracking—point in a dialogue tree, i.e.
a point where more than a single response choice are available to a participant.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.20: a) An example of Case A) where Pr (grey) has no branching choices,
while Op (white) has an alternative which was not employed in the game, b) An
example of Case B) where though Pr does have possible branching alternatives,
they all follow after Op’s branching point at the top.
Let us assume that a persuasion dialogue D1 for an argument X, terminates with
Pr(Op) as the winner. Let us also assume that there exists another sequence of
moves D2 for X with the opposite result. Termination of D2, implies that a point
is reached where:
1. Pr(Op) cannot counter Op’s(Pr’s) last move, and;
2. Pr(Op) cannot backtrack to an alternative reply.
Given that all disputes in a dialogue tree share the same root, as it is the case for
the two concerned dialogues, it is then implied that:
A) either, Pr(Op) had no branching options in D1 at all (advise the example in
Figure 3.20a), or;
B) Pr(Op) had possible branching points in D1 (advise the example in Fig-
ure 3.20b).
Let A) be the case, then:
i) Op(Pr) must have had at least one branching point in D1, which, though
not used, supports the existence of D2
134
ii) Existence of D2 suggests that the result of D1 was a ‘false’ choice—selection
of argument—at a certain branching point by Op(Pr), which led to Pr(Op)
being the winner.
iii) In turn, ii) implies that D1 should not have terminated when it did, since
Op(Pr) had a backtracking choice to a different branch, which contradicts
with the assumption that D1 was terminated.
Let B) be the case, then:
i) if there were any branching options for Pr(Op) in D1, then Op(Pr) must
have had at least one bpOp(bpPr) in D1 preceding those of Pr’s(Op’s), through
which Op(Pr) would be able to guarantee its victory in D2.
ii) Note that in the opposite case, since we are concerned with a possible victory
by Op, it would not be possible to guarantee that D2 does not contain a
winning strategy for Pr, since:
1) if Op(Pr) had no branching options preceding those of Pr, then Pr(Op)
would primarily be the one able to affect the course of the dialogue game,
diverting it back to the course followed in D1.
2) 1) implies that it would then be impossible for Op(Pr) to deviate from
D1, as there would be no move capable of altering the labelling status
of the root argument, and thus to invalidate the existence of a winning
strategy in D1.
3) Given 2) and since there exists a terminated game that led to Pr′s(Op′s)
victory (D1) then, given backtracking, Pr(Op) should always be able to
reach the same outcome.
4) However, assuming termination of D2, Pr(Op) should not be able to reach
the outcome achieved in D1 through backtracking.
iii) This implies that D2 resulted from an Op’s(Pr’s) branching point that pre-
cedes all of Pr’s(Op’s) branching points.
iv) Therefore the result of D1 must again be a ‘false’ selection of argument at a
certain bpOp in D1 by Op(Pr), leading to Pr(Op) falsely being the winner.
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v) This suggests that D1 should not have terminated when it did since Op(Pr)
had a backtracking choice to a different branch, which was not employed.
vi) The latter contradicts with the assumption that D1 was terminated.
In general we have shown that the existence of D2 contradicts with the fact
that its outcome should have already been reachable through D1, since both
dialogues share the same root. Given backtracking, termination guarantees that
all possible alternatives have been exhaustively countered.
3.4.2 Accounting for the Underlying Logic
As shown in Section 3.3.2, abstract approaches fail to account for the possibility
of a new argument being instantiated from the logical content accumulated from
the dialogue process. The instantiation of such an argument is evident in the
example presented in Figure 3.5. However, apart from accounting for logical
completeness when strategising, in the following example we illustrate another
way of accounting for the structured form of arguments when which relates to
the use of an OM, also not captured by abstract approaches.
In similar sense to the previous example, we assume a pair of agents engaging
in the previous section’s grounded game dialogues, making use of their beliefs
about their interlocutor’s knowledge to strategise, thus instantiating the gen-
eral definition of the strategy function in Definition 27. Given a dialogue D =
< DM0, . . ., DMk > the protocol rules determine a set of possible locutions for
inclusion in DMk+1. Speaker(DMk+1) then relies the protocol; its own argumen-
tation theory; the commitment store of Hearer(DMk+1), and; what it believes
is Hearer(DMk+1)’s argumentation theory; to simulate how the dialogue may
evolve with respect to the possible locutions M1, . . . ,Mn for inclusion in DMk+1.
For i = 1, . . . , n, the agent Speaker(DMk+1) simulates a dialogue Di extending
D with DMk+1i containing locution Mi.
The agent can then evaluate which of these dialogues result in success, and
so make the choice of locution accordingly. Let us illustrate with an example.
Example 2 Suppose an argumentation system (L, −,R,≤) where:
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• L is a language of propositional literals, composed from a set of propositional
atoms {a, b, c, . . . } and the symbols ¬ and ∼ respectively denoting strong
and weak negation (i.e., negation as failure). α is a strong literal if α is a
propositional atom or of the form ¬β where β is a propositional atom. α
is a wff of L if α is a strong literal or of the form ∼ β where β is a strong
literal.
• For a wff α, α and ¬α are contradictories and α is a contrary of ∼ α.
Consider a grounded persuasion dialogue D =< DM0, . . ., DMk > is to be
extended with a Pr move DMk+1, and let us assume that for Pr to win, the
dialectical labelling of DMk must be made out. Figure 3.21a (resp. 3.21b) shows
Pr’s own (resp. what Pr believes is Op’s) premises, rules, pre-orderings and
goals, relevant to extending D . Accordingly, Figures 3.21c and 3.21d, illustrate
the set of arguments we assume that Pr can construct based on S ′(Pr,Pr), and Pr’s
beliefs about the arguments that Op can construct based on S ′(Pr,Op). Notice that
because of the absence of premise p /∈ K(Pr,Op), Pr believes that Op is unable to
instantiate argument E (Figure 3.21e). Pr has a choice of replying to DMk with
arguments A or A′ and thus simulates the following two dialogue trees (T1,T2)
based on them, of which the second is depicted in Figure 3.21f 1:
• T1: Pr moves A leading to an immediate victory for Pr since it cannot be
countered
• T2: Pr moves A′. Op then replies with B, giving Pr a choice between C and D.
In its simulation Pr opts for D, which leads to a repetition of B by Op as licensed
by protocol PG, followed by Pr replying with C. Pr wins this dispute, making
DMk out (this would also have been the case if Pr had chosen C rather than D
at the earlier choice point). Since p is now in Pr’s commitment store, then given
Pr’s beliefs about Op’s knowledge, Pr simulates Op’s use of this commitment to
construct E and simulates Op’s backtrack moving E in reply to A′, thus making
DMk in. Hence Pr backtracks to move A, followed by Op reusing E which results
in DMk in. Based on PG, Pr cannot repeat A against E and thus loses the game
1
in and out labelled nodes are expressed with double respectively single lines. Dashed
arrows concern the possible replies that may follow after a dialogue move
137
S ′(Pr,Pr) K s, p, r, w
≤′ ∅
R s⇒ a, r ⇒ a, p⇒ q
≤ s > w
G prove α
S ′(Pr,Op) K w
≤′ ∅
R w, p⇒ ¬a,∼ q ⇒ ¬r
≤ w > s
G disprove a
A′Pr A : s; s⇒ a
A′ : r; r ⇒ a




A′Op B :∼ q ⇒ ¬r























Figure 3.21: a) & b) illustrate a subset of Pr’s own knowledge (S ′(Pr,Pr) ⊆ S(Pr,Pr))
respectively beliefs about Op’s knowledge (S ′(Pr,Op) ⊆ S(Pr,Op)), c) & d) concern
respectively the set of arguments A′Pr ⊆ APr that Pr can construct based on
S ′(Pr,Pr), and the set of arguments A
′
Op ⊆ AOp that Pr assumes Op can construct
based on S ′(Pr,Op), e) Argument E f) the simulated dialogue tree (T2) instantiated
if DMk+1 =< Pr,A
′ >
The above example illustrates that if Pr, in its strategising, accounts for
the logical content of arguments updating the commitment store, the choice of
content for DMk+1 makes a difference to the outcome of the actual dialogue,
under the assumption that Pr’s beliefs about Op’s knowledge is indeed accurate.
Pr prefers to move A rather than A′, as the latter would result in there being no
winning-strategy for Pr.
If one relied on an abstract representation of the employed arguments, the
simulated dialogues (we show only the arguments) would have been < A >,
and < A′, B, C > or < A′, B,D,B,C >, all of which would make DMk out
and Pr winning. In other words, Pr would be indifferent to choosing between
A and A′ since the construction and use of argument E would not have been
simulated. Given this we also argue that although soundness and fairness can
be shown for the purely abstract approach, such an approach is inadequate, as it
fails to accommodate the fact that new arguments can be made available during
the course of a dialogue, due the dynamic evolution of knowledge available for























Figure 3.22: Example 2 extended with the use of preferences
the arguments constructed by another).
Further in relation to the provided example and to the use of preferences, as-
sume that after the deployment of E by Op against A, Pr updates its preference-
orderings such that not only s > w, but also p ⇒ a > w, p ⇒ ¬a. The latter
would, under the weakest link principle, give the argument ordering A ≻ E, which
Pr can simulate moving in as a reply to E, thus making DMk out. In a similar
sense, suppose Pr assumes that Op will also update its preference-orderings such
that in addition to w > s, Op also believes p > s and w, p⇒ ¬a > p⇒ a. Then,
again under the weakest link principle, this would produce a counter argument
ordering E ≻ A, which if included in Pr’s simulation as Op’s reply to A ≻ E, and
based on PG which dictates that Pr cannot repeat A ≻ E in the same dispute,
will result in the dialogue ending with DMk in, as illustrated in Figure 3.22.
3.4.3 Other Strategic Considerations
Additional strategic considerations may concern external factors that could pos-
sibly affect a participant’s goals, such as time dependencies. In the presence of
time constraints a participant may require to reach a result as soon as possible
and thus to probably take a risk. Similarly, in their absence, stalling the dialogue
game for as long as possible may also be an objective since such an attitude could
possibly result in protruding their interlocutor into taking a risk. Additionally,
a participant’s sole objective might concern exploring its interlocutors beliefs. In
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this sense stalling a dialogue game as long as possible may also serve in increasing
the possibility of coming across new information about one’s opponent.
These objectives are concerned with the structure of a dialogue tree. Par-
ticularly, they concern the depth of a winning line of dispute (tree path), the
differentiation between winning and losing sub-trees and accordingly a calcula-
tion of a risk factor with respect to possible time dependencies or other similar
constrains. Therefore, a strategic analysis of the structure of a simulated dia-
logue tree is imperative, in order to reveal any possible strategies that may be
employed. Such issues could be accounted by a utility evaluation function and
are further discussed in Chapter 6.
3.5 Conclusions & Contributions
In this chapter we have provided a general framework for dialogue that enables
formal, off-line, analysis that each agent may undertake in order to strategise over
the choice of moves to make in a dialogue game. The latter relies on a logical
conception of arguments, that an agent may undertake in order to strategise
over the choice of moves to make in a dialogue game, based on its model of its
opponents.
Our intention was to make two main contributions in this chapter. Firstly, we
defined persuasion dialogue instances of our framework, related to those described
in Prakken [2005], but extended so as to also account for admissible semantics,
while we provided soundness and fairness results for both. Furthermore, we have
enabled the introduction of preferences into the game that ‘undermine’ the success
of attacks as defeats relying on a similar formalism to the one proposed by Am-
goud and Cayrol [2002b], though in the context of dialogues. These preferences
may be contradictory and are effectively treated as mutually attacking arguments.
The latter we consider to be a novel property of our system, while it suggests
future work, building on Modgil [2009], to enable agents to argue about their
preferences. We note other mechanisms have been proposed in the literature for
describing and embodying preferences. The work of Amgoud and Cayrol [2002b]
is only one such approach. Of some relevance, is the work of Bench-Capon et al.
[2007]; Dunne and Bench-Capon [2004] where a similar formalism is proposed,
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though in the context of value-based argumentation (Bench-Capon [2003]). In
their work “preference” is considered in terms of the notion of “audience”: the
relative importance that agents may ascribe to the (qualitative) social/ethical
values associated with arguments, while agents are allowed to argue over value
orderings on arguments for resolving conflicts.
The second concerns the provision of an ASPIC+-based dialogue framework
which allows for a structural analysis with respect to the underlying logic. We
contrasted such an analysis with abstract opponent modelling, showing that ap-
propriate mechanisms for strategising need to account for the logical content of
arguments, thus accounting for the possibility of a new argument possibly being
constructed from the mutually provided information, i.e. account for the logical
completeness property. In addition, and particularly in relation to strategising
we also showed how revealing certain constituents of an argument may allow one
to instantiate arguments by combining its own as well as information provided
from the game which could alter an anticipated result. We thus illustrated how
the inherent feature of the dynamic construction of arguments can be captured
though our framework, both with respect to the soundness of the framework as
well as from a strategic perspective.
Overall, our framework not only accounts for this inherit nature of dialogues,
but we also provide the means through which one may actually instantiate pos-
sible new arguments and include them in the dialogue process. Finally we note
that because ASPIC+ explicitly models the logical content and structure of argu-
ments, while accommodating many existing logical approaches to argumentation,
we can claim a similar level of generality for our dialogical framework.
A limitation of our framework is that it does not account for how agents up-
date their own knowledge after the end of a dialogue game. This issue could be
investigated under two perspectives. One concerns whether the loser of a dialogue
should incorporate the disputed argument (we refer to its logical constituents)
into his knowledge provided that he has failed to disprove its acceptability. Con-
sequently one would find reasonable to also include arguments used by one’s
opponent if they are found within a winning-strategy in a dialogue tree. The
other perspective could be concerned with whether the winner of a game should
or should not incorporate any of his knowledge with arguments moved by his
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opponent.
One could support that all knowledge should be incorporated in both of the
participants’ actual knowledges, since it should not alter their personal percep-
tion of that argument’s acceptability, provided that their personal perception co-
incides with the result of the dialogue game. However, this requires that agents
are ‘truthful’ in their efforts to prove or disprove the acceptability of a disputed
argument. In other words, that they introduced into the game all possible argu-
ments they could have introduced, and did not conceal any information due to
pursuing side objectives. In addition, the introduction of a set of arguments may
affect the acceptability status of other arguments in an agent’s own knowledge-
base and this may be an undesirable side-effect. A more flexible approach would
be to allow the participants to either concede to their defeat or reject it and
respectively choose to update or not update their knowledge.
These are interesting issues that we intend to investigate in future work since
they are out of the research scope of this thesis. We simply note that, for the
purpose of this thesis, regardless of whether agents do or do not update their
knowledge with knowledge provided by their opponents or acquired in any other
way (such ways are listed in the next chapter), we assume that every agent’s
set of arguments—arguments instantiated from their own sub-theories (S(i,i))—
increase monotonically. This is compatible with the idea that the beliefs from
which arguments are constructed are not revised upon incorporation of conflicting
beliefs, but rather the conflicts are resolved through evaluation of the justified




For a participant in a dialogue, the best response problem concerns the selec-
tion of a locution that (by some measure) optimises the outcome. As Dunne
and McBurney [2004] explain, the precise interpretation of ‘optimise’ may vary
greatly, depending on the nature and intent of a dialogue area. Within a compet-
itive context of persuasion dialogues a perspective of this problem concerns the
strategic choice of a locution to make, from amongst a range of possible locutions,
so as to better achieve its objectives. Many researchers rely on a participant’s
modelling of their opponents, when modelling the participant’s strategy. In the
literature this is widely studied in terms of opponent modelling in competitive
game contexts. In most cases though, the formalisation of an opponent model is
left implicit. The basic assumption is that knowledge about one’s opponents is
obtained as a result of accumulated experience in playing against them, or may
be supplied by some external source. However, if one is to rely on such a model
for strategising, it is necessary to formally define the mechanisms responsible for
building and updating it, so as to account for a variety of factors that may have
a considerable impact on the model’s credibility, which in turn largely affects the
effectiveness of any strategic decision. In this respect, an interesting research
direction is to investigate how an opponent model may be built and updated so
as to achieve a high level of credibility.
In this chapter we assume the general framework presented in Chapter 3
focusing on persuasion dialogues, and rely on a structural conception of arguments
to formally define a number of mechanisms responsible for building, updating,
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and augmenting an opponent model. We focus on the augmentation mechanism,
which is used to expand an agent’s current model of its opponent, by adding
to it information that has a high likelihood of being related with information
already contained in it. Precise computation of this likelihood is exponential in
the volume of related information. We thus describe and evaluate an approximate
approach for computing these likelihoods based on Monte-Carlo simulation.
4.1 Introduction
The essential contribution of the dialogue framework presented in Chapter 3,
is not only that it allows for the dynamic nature of dialogues to be taken into
account, thus guaranteeing the system’s soundness and fairness with respect to
the underlying logic, but that it also provides the means based on which this
essential property of dialogues can be taken into account when strategising. As
we have extensively discussed, not accounting for the dynamic instantiation of
an argument through the dialogue process, results in possibly providing one’s
interlocutor with crucial information based on which a new argument could be
instantiated and introduced into the game, possibly altering its outcome. How-
ever, even accounting for this dynamic property of dialogues does not change the
fact that the effectiveness of any strategy, largely depends on the credibility of
one’s opponent model (OM).
We begin this chapter in Section 4.2, by presenting a simple mechanism for
building and updating an OM relying on an agent’s experience in playing against
a certain adversary. Since such problems are inherently part of a wider class
of decision problems with which game theory is concerned, we borrow certain
game theory concepts for providing a theoretical basis for our research, beginning
with defining the notion of history, which is generally concerned with the logical
information exchanged between players in dialogues.
In Section 4.2.2 we define and associate a confidence value with the logical
information found in an OM, based on how that information became part of the
model, i.e. based on the information collection methods (ICMs) which may be
employed by an agent. We then explain how this value is used for characterising
the credibility of an OM and assists in accounting for the fact that an agent
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may be in error in its modelling, as well as for resolving possible conflicts which
may occur in the modelling process. We differentiate between three distinct
ICMs: direct collection through the opponent’s commitment store in dialogues
(on which the basic update mechanism relies on); information provided by a third
party, and; information added as a result of an augmentation attempt of an OM.
We focus on the augmentation mechanism in Section 4.3, which essentially
concerns how one may extend its beliefs (arguments) about its opponent’s beliefs,
based on what one already believes its opponent believes. The proposed technique
relies on how arguments used in dialogues against a certain opponent are likely to
be associated in some way with other arguments which appear in dialogues with
other adversaries. This association is represented in the form of a directed graph
referred to as relationships graph (RG) (a graph of arguments), assumed to be
incrementally constructed from an agent’s general history of dialogues with all of
its opponents, and not just on its experience against playing a certain opponent
alone.
We discuss the complexity of this augmentation process, and propose a Monte-
Carlo simulation in Section 4.4, which relies on experimentally computing the
distinct likelihoods of the relations between arguments. We provide experimental
results for the proposed methodology, prove convergence of the produced likeli-
hood values towards the corresponding theoretical values while we also show how
it significantly improves the tractability of our approach.
In Section 4.5 we show how based on the results of the Monte-Carlo simula-
tions one can incorporate the constituents of the additional arguments into an
OM, focussing on the resolution of confidence conflicts between the same con-
stituents choosing between those already in the model and newly incorporated
ones, and show how a confidence value can then be generated to characterise
arguments instantiated from the OM. We finally summarise our work and our
contribution and present our conclusions in Section 4.6.
4.2 The Modelling Framework
The notion of game theoretic history was first introduced by Osborne and Rubin-
stein [1994] and is concerned with a particular category of games called extensive
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games. Informally, an extensive game concerns a specification of the sequential
structure of decision problems encountered by participants (players) in a strate-
gic situation. In turn, a sequential game (or dynamic game) is one where the
participants have some information about earlier actions of other participants.
This information might either be perfect, meaning that all participants know the
actions made by all other participants, or imperfect meaning that a certain subset
of the previous moves of other participants is known to the players.
For example, the persuasion dialogue instance of the general framework pre-
sented in Section 3.2 can be described as an extensive game with perfect in-
formation, given its sequential—turntaking—structure and the employment of
commitment stores. To recap, in Section 3.1, we assume each agent Agi oper-
ating in a multi-agent environment to have a model of its opponents, expressed
as an agent theory AgTi =< S(i,1), . . . , S(i,ν) >. An agent theory consists of a
number of sub-theories, each of which expresses an OM, S(i,j) = 〈AT(i,j),G(i,j)〉
where i 6= j, concerned with a particular opponent agent (Agj) in a multi-agent
environment. Each sub-theory expresses Agi’s beliefs about Agj’s argumentation
theory AT(i,j), i.e. its premises (K), pre-ordering on those premises (≤
′), rules
(R), pre-ordering on those rules (≤), and goals (G).
As discussed in the previous chapter, by modelling information based on a
logical conception of arguments, we allow for a more thorough strategic analysis
with respect to the underlying logic and its effects on the dialogue process. How-
ever, in contrast with the opponent modelling approaches presented by Carmel
and Markovitch [1996] and Oren and Norman [2010] we do not accommodate
the notion of nested OMs. In other words, we do not account for the possibility
that one’s opponent might also adapt its strategising based on its own OM of
its interlocutors, i.e. to counter-strategise. We, nevertheless discuss this issue in
Chapter 6, where we present a number of strategising approaches proposed in
relation to the matter and show how one may extend our framework in order to
account for counter-strategising.
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4.2.1 The notion of History
In the context of dialogue games, and for an agent operating in a multi-agent en-
vironment, the notion of history should ideally include all information exchanged
between an agent and its opponents in a series of distinct dialogues. In addition,
it should also include information related to when, or against which other moves,
was a particular move deployed in a game, i.e. account for the structure of dia-
logues, as the latter encodes information related to a participant’s strategy. We
thus define a history as follows:
Definition 41 (History) Let Ags be a set of agents {Ag1, . . . , Agν}, then ∀
Agi,Agj, j 6= i, we assume h(i,j) = {D






is the set of all histories of Agi with each member Agj ∈ Ags.
One of the aspects this chapter is concerned with how an agent’s experience
can be exploited in a multifaceted way. In other words we care to learn more from
an agent’s history of dialogues than just the locutions deployed by its opponents.
We thus focus on the order based on which these locutions are exchanged. As
the latter is captured by the tree-structure of dialogues, and is thus part of an
agent’s history H, we propose a function below which is specifically concerned
with the distinct disputes found in a set of dialogues between two agents, which,
as it will become more evident later, better fits our modelling objectives.
Definition 42 (Disputes’ History) Let h(i,j) be Agi’s history of dialogues
with Agj, then:
disputes(h(i,j))→ {dm|∃D
k ∈ h(i,j) : dm ∈ D
k}.
In other words, disputes is a function that returns the set of all distinct disputes
found in all dialogues between agents Agi and Agj.
Having defined the notion of an agent history h(i,j) one can better understand
the nature of an OM (S(i,j)) which basically encapsulates all the logical elements
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found in the dialogues of a history, divided in distinct subsets based on their na-
ture. The difference between an OM and an agent history is that tan OM ignores
the structure of the dialogue from which information is collected. In other words,
it ignores the where, the when and why were certain logical elements introduced
into a game through an argument. Thus, any strategy that may be developed
on the basis of an OM consequently lacks in accounting for these questions as
well. One of our research objectives is to propose a modelling approach able to
additionally account for the structure of dialogues from which logical information
is collected.
Given an agent’s history one can instantiate and maintain an OM through
the employment of an update mechanism whose form depends on the nature of
the information collection method (ICM) for which it is employed. We proceed
with providing a set of definitions of update mechanisms. These are particularly
concerned with the different ICMs we care to investigate for the OM defined in
Definition 17 in Chapter 3, which focusses on the logical information exchanged
in dialogues, and and disregards modelling an agent’s opponents’ strategies.
At this point it is worth discussing that modelling an agent’s opponents’
strategies, e.g. by deducing possible behavioural patterns of moves in a series of
dialogues, may not always be possible, or, even if it is, it might not be as fruitful as
one would expect. This is because agents participating in dialogues are assumed
to rely on a dynamic way of strategising for satisfying their current objectives in a
game. Note that apart from persuading its opponent in a dialogue, a participant
may also have the objective of stalling, or gaining information about, deceiving or
even misleading its opponent. It might even be that agents alter their objectives
half way through a dialogue game. In essence, in every dialogue a participant
is only concerned with achieving the highest possible utility with respect to its
goals, and thus accordingly adjusts its strategy in the game. Therefore, as Oren
and Norman [2010] argue, for modelling an agent’s current strategy it is enough
that we deduce its current goals. In this sense, monitoring an agent’s behaviour
in a series of games could assist in deducing its goals in a current game. However,
given that the we do not provide an explicit set of the possible goals that an agent
might pursue in a dialogue game, we leave the goals update function implicit, and
also leave this particular topic for future investigation.
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4.2.2 Information Collection Methods
We begin by associating a confidence value c to the elements of the sets:
< K,R,≤′,≤,G > of S(i,j).
Essentially, for an agent Agi this value expresses the probability of a certain
belief being part of Agj’s actual knowledge (S(j,j)). To compute this value we
differentiate between whether a particular information is:
a) gathered directly by Agi, on the basis of its opponents’ updated commitment
store, referred to as dir,
b) provided by a third party, referred to as tp, or
c) a result of an augmentation attempt of Agi’s current model of Agj, referred
to as aug.
The latter (aug) concerns an incrementation of a current OM with the addition
of beliefs that are likely to also be known to Agi’s opponent, which is further
analysed in this Section 4.3.
In the case of dir, we will generally assume that every agent always retains its
own beliefs without revision, i.e. that introduction of conflicting information does
not cause any older information to be discarded, but rather conflicts are decided
by some non-monotonic inference mechanism—in particular the non-monotonic
inference relation defined by the ASPIC+ argumentation theory, as the latter
is described in Chapter 3. We therefore assume that the confidence value c of
information acquired directly from the commitment store of one’s opponent is
equal to 1, which represents the highest level of confidence.
Still, avoiding revision of the modelled knowledge base can hold only for all
the sets of logical components comprised in the distinct sets of an agent’s knowl-
edge (K,≤′,R,≤), but not for goals (G), as it is unreasonable for an agent to




We proceed with defining four distinct update mechanisms with respect to each
of the logical components K,≤′,R,≤, found in a sub-theory S of an agent’s AgT .
To do so we rely on the notion of a commitment store as the latter is generally
described in Definition 23, and provide a more explicit definition for each of the
sets in S.
Definition 43 (Commitment stores) Given a set of agents {Ag1, . . . , Agν}
participating in a dialogue D , and assuming that σi, where i = 1, . . . , ν, is a sub-
sequence of D which lists all moves by agent Agi in the order they appeared in D ,





whose evolution is defined as follows:
1. CS0i = < ∅,∅,∅,∅ >
2. For k = 0 . . . n, CSk+1i is obtained by updating CS
k
i with the contents of the
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(4.1)
Provided these and upon completion of a dialogue game, an agent’s OM is up-
dated based on the following definition:
Definition 44 (Update mechanism) For an agent Agi, U is an update func-

















of a dialogue Dµ(i,j) and produces a new sub-theory S
µ




























In essence, the four distinct update mechanisms presented here simply incorporate
the newly obtained information into the existing logical sets.
4.2.2.2 Handling third party information
In relation to third party provided information, a modeller’s existing OM will also
be updated according to Definition 44. That is, premises, rules, as well as priority
ordering over those premises and rules, will simply be added to the corresponding
sets in the existing model. Nevertheless, such information cannot be characterised
with the same level of confidence that characterises information directly collected
by the modeller, as trust issues arise. We have to therefore develop a different way
of handling third party information through the development of a methodology
for assigning a confidence value to it.
Relying on third party information for strategising is not a trivial issue, as
it requires the handling of trust issues and deception. Assume for example that
an agent, George, informs another, Michael, that a third agent, Mark is aware
of a certain argument. To what level should Michael trust that this information
is valid? In other words issues concerned with the credibility of the provided
information, the credibility of the source that provides that information, or even
whether certain information is provided by a third party as an attempt to mislead
or deceive its own opponents, need to be resolved.
In this respect, it is important that trust mechanisms are employed, so as
to deal with this additional kind of uncertainty. Intuitively, what needs to be
handled is how the credibility of information changes as it is passed from one agent
to another. A common approach for dealing with this problem is to associate that
information with a credibility value, normalised to express the probability of that
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information to actually hold (Y. Tang et al. [2010]). Of course this results in
assigning a similar credibility (confidence) value to all the information providers
operating in a multi-agent environment—a degree of trust. Consequently, the
credibility of a particular information provided by an agent Agi, to which it was
provided by another agent Agj, to which it was in turn provided by an agent
Agz and so on, can be computed by means of calculating the propagated trust
value of that information. The latter results from following a path beginning
from the information provider and ending, through the intermediate providers,
to the original source.
Assume for example that information is passed between four co-workersMark,
John, Michael and George. John believes that Mark is aware of an argument A
with a certain confidence value equal to c, and that this information is conveyed
to Michael who trusts John with a certain trust value tr(Michael,John) who then
passes it to George who trusts Michael with a tr(George,Michael). Assuming that
both the confidence as well as the trust values are normalised values which es-
sentially represent probabilities, then computing the trust value of the conveyed
information from George’s perspective, could be done through multiplying the
trust values found on the path between John and and George, as well as with
John’s confidence value on argument A, e.g.:
trc(George,John) = c · tr(Michael,John) · tr(George,Michael)
since these quantities are assumed to be dependent. The propagated probability
value trc(George,John) can then be associated with the third party information as a
confidence indicator for the conveyed information.
For doing this, one may rely on a relationship network (an example of the
latter is provided in Y. Tang et al. [2010]). As discussed, for the purpose of our
work we incorporate the idea of assigning a numerical credibility value to all parts
of logical information concerned with an OM as well, expressed in the form of
confidence. Thus in the case where information is provided by a third party, the
confidence of that information will be equal to the propagated trust value of that
information represented as tr(Agi,Agj) according to the following definition:
Definition 45 Let TN = {Ags, τ} be a trust network where Ags = {Ag1, . . . , Agν}
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is a set of agents in a multi-agent environment and τ is a set of binary trust re-
lations over the agents in Ags such that if (Agi, Agj) ∈ τ then {Agi, Agj} is a
directed arc in TN . Let p =< Agi, Agi+1, . . . , Agj−1, Agj > be a path between
agents Agi and Agj in a TN , while we assume that Agj holds information on
another agent Agw with a certain confidence c which is conveyed through p to Agi
then:
trc(Agi,Agj) = c · tr(Agi,Agi+1) · tr(Agi+1,Agi+2) · . . . · tr(Agj−1,Agj)
where trc 7→ [0, 1].
We opt to leave the formal definition of the trust values tr implicit, as there are
already many numerical systems that deal with propagating trust information,
such as those presented by Katz and Golbeck [2006]; Richardson et al. [2003],
and Wang and Singh [2006]. We also ignore issues related with how these trust
values may be moderated based on reputation information or based on a subjec-
tive evaluation of the credibility of a provider, as these are not in the scope of
our work. We refer the reader to Section A.2 of Appendix A, where, borrowing
from Y. Tang et al. [2010], we show how a trust network can be defined in a multi-
agent environment, while we also provide an abstract function for computing the
propagated trust value which we assume to be assigned in turn as a confidence
value to the logical information of an OM acquired from a third party agent.
4.2.2.3 The Confidence Value
So far we have defined two different kinds of information collection methods
(ICMs). These are direct collection of information from commitment stores and
provision of information by a third party agents. The third party ICM inher-
ently has to deal with deception, which is a very difficult issue to address. As in
the case of “hidden agendas” (Silverman [2005]) third party agents may provide
misleading information to a modeller in an attempt to satisfy self-interested ob-
jectives. We address this possibility only to some extent by relying on trust. We
know however, that handling trust does not completely resolve deception issues,
and this is something we intend to investigate in future work.
In relation to the direct collection of information ICM, we iterate that the
employment of this method bears on the assumption that information is never
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discarded. Specifically, we assume that even in the case where an agent is faced
with conflicting information, this is resolved through the employment of some
non-monotonic inference mechanism. We however assume monotonicity of ar-
gument construction. In other words, we assume that agents will always be
able to construct arguments they previously uttered. To some extent, this is an
unrealistic assumption, since argument construction can be threatened by new
information (e.g. information that does not allow the use of negation as failure
any more, or information that undercuts the use of a certain defeasible rule). In
addition, we cannot exclude the possibility of an agent simply deleting informa-
tion for whatever reason (e.g. to save resources). Though we are aware of these
issues, we consider them to be out of the scope of this thesis and leave them to
future work.
In the following sections we will be dealing with another information collection
method which concerns an augmentation attempt on an OM. Prior doing so, we
first define how a modeller assigns confidence values to the collected information,
to be later used for decision making purposes.
In general, based on the ICM through which information is collected it will
accordingly receive a corresponding confidence value. This is described by the
following definition:
Definition 46 (Confidence assignation) Let S(i,j) ∈ AgTi, and Y ∈ {K(i,j),
≤′(i,j),R(i,j),≤(i,j),G(i,j)}, then X is a tuple < x, c > such that:




1 if x is directly collected by Agi (a)
trc(Agi,Agz) if x is provided by a third party agent Agz (b)
Pr(x) if x is part of an augmentation of S(i,j) (c)
where c represents the confidence level of x, and where Pr(x) is the likelihood of
x being known to Agj, determined partly by the current form of S(i,j).
In case (c) of Definition 46 the confidence value Pr(x) is assumed to be obtained
by the augmentation process analysed in the next section, which aims to increase
the credibility of an OM.
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4.3 The Augmentation Mechanism
The basic idea behind the employment of an OM is its use for simulating the
possible choices of one’s opponent in a dialogue game. In contrast with perfect
information games though, anticipating one’s opponent moves in dialogue games
is much more difficult, given that one cannot be perfectly aware of one’s oppo-
nents knowledge. Thus strategising against an opponent needs to additionally
account for the possibility that the opponent is aware of more (or less) alter-
natives, possibly not part of one’s OM. In other words, a participant might be
in error in its modelling of its opponents’ beliefs, or may hold beliefs about its
opponents’ knowledge with varying degrees of certainty, and this is something
that should also be accounted for.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to model opponent information perfectly, as we
cannot know everything that our adversaries might use against us in a dispute,
and this is a basic characteristic of the nature of disputes. However, a possible
way based on which we may increase the credibility level of an OM is through
addressing the question of how we can add further reliable information to it—
augment it—based on:
a) what we currently believe our opponent believes, and
b) what we assume others, with knowledge similar to our opponent’s, believe.
This can be done with the development of an augmentation mechanism, through
which one may add to an OM information that is likely—has a high probability—
to be associated with information already contained in it. For doing this we rely
on an agent’s general history of dialogues monitoring the times that certain
opponent arguments (OAs) follow after certain others. In this way we utilise an
agent’s experience in a multifaceted way:
a) through updating an OM based on information an agent collects directly from
a particular opponent through their history of interactions as described in
Section 4.2.2, and
b) through relying on it for associating the logical information in an OM with


















Figure 4.1: A dialogue between agents Ag1 and Ag2
The proposed approach is concerned only with persuasion dialogues defined in
Section 3.2.
In order to convey the intuition behind our approach we begin with the fol-
lowing example:
Example 3 Let two agents, Ag1 and Ag2, engage in a persuasion dialogue in
order to decide where is the best place to have dinner:
- Ag1:(A) We should go to the Massala Indian restaurant since a chef in
today’s newspaper recommended it.
- Ag2:(B) A single chef ’s opinion is not trustworthy.
- Ag1:(C) This one’s is, as I have heard that he won the national best chef
award this year.
- Ag2:(D) Indian food is too oily and thus not healthy.
- Ag1:(E) It’s healthy, as it’s made of natural foods and fats.
The dialogue illustrated in Figure 4.1 is essentially composed of two lines of dis-
pute, {A←B←C} and {A←D←E}. Assume then, that Ag2 engages in a persua-
sion dialogue with another agent, Ag3, on which is the best restaurant in town.
Let us also assume that at some point in the dialogue Ag3 cites the newspaper
article, by asserting argument A in the game, as Ag1 did in the previous dialogue.
It is then reasonable for Ag2 to expect that to some extent Ag3 is likely to also be
aware of the chef ’s qualifications (argument C).
Intuitively, this expectation is based on a relationship between consecutive argu-
ments in the same dispute lines of a dialogue. In this case, the “chef’s proposition”
(A) is defended against B’s attack (i.e., ‘supported’) by “his qualifications” (C),
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suggesting some likelihood that awareness of the first implies awareness of the
second. This is also the case for arguments A and E. However, assuming such
a relationship between the chef’s qualifications (C) and the argument on why
Indian food is considered healthy (E), seems less intuitive, as these arguments
belong in different dispute lines, and so do not support each other. We thus
assume that two arguments can be related if they are found in the same dispute
lines of a dialogue, where this relationship can be understood in terms of the
notion of support, e.g., C supports A against B.
Given this, one may rely on an agent’s accumulated dialogue experience to
define a graph in which links between OAs asserted in a series of dialogues, in-
dicate support. We will be referring to this graph as relationships graph (RG).
A participant may then rely on a RG to augment an OM, by adding to it ar-
guments (precisely, their logical constituents) which, according to the graph, are
linked with other arguments already contained in the OM (i.e. arguments which
may be constructed from the logical elements found in an OM), and which are
thus likely to be known to that opponent.
At this point it is worth going through a couple of detailed examples so as
to illustrate how the proposed methodology can be found useful in the sense
that it can increase the effectiveness of an agent’s strategising. For presentation
convenience we will avoid referring to the logical constituents contained in an OM
from which one may instantiate a set of arguments and will assume that OMs
simply contain sets of arguments. What we want to stress is the relationship
of those arguments with other arguments found in a RG, and how exactly that
relationship might be of use to a modeller when found at a strategic point. In
the following examples we investigate two scenarios where backtracking is and is
not allowed, and where the sole objective is winning.
Example 4 (Backtracking not allowed) Let Dk be an ongoing dialogue be-
tween two agents Agi (Grey) and Agj (White) where Agi has initiated a dialogue
by moving argument A (DM0), found at the root of the dialogue tree presented in
Figure 4.2a). Let us also assume that Agi holds an OM for Agj (Figure 4.2b))
which comprises arguments B and D thought to be part of Agj’s knowledge base
with absolute certainty. At the same time Agi is aware of arguments C,G and E.


























































Figure 4.2: Example 4: a) A simulated dialogue based on just the OM, b) Agi’s
OM of Agj, c) Agi’s RG, d) The combination of Agi’s OM of Agj’s and its RG,
e) The extended simulated dialogue tree which results from the addition of OM’s
neighbouring arguments in the RG.
1. Let B be an attacker of A, and assuming that Agj does actually know B,
then B is moved into the game as the content of its first move DM1 against
DM0.
2. Assume then that both C and G can attack B, then Agi is found at a
strategic point having to choose between the two arguments.
3. Given Agi’s belief of D’s existence in Agj’s knowledge, and assuming that
D is an attacker of C while additionally E is an attacker of D, Agi can
simulate the two possible paths which describe how the dialogue may evolve.
These are:
• A← B ← C ← D ← E, and;
• A← B ← G.
as they are both depicted in Figure 4.2a).
At this point the modeller, Agi, is relying solely on the OM in order to simulate
the possible dialogue tree, according to which either option—C or G—is equally
preferable, given that the objective of the game is simply winning and since both
options lead to a winning leaf.
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4. Assume now that in addition to the OM (Figure 4.2b) Agi holds a RG
(Figure 4.2c)), according to which arguments D and H usually follow after
B in dialogues, with some likelihoods wBD and wBH , where w is a weight
value expressed in the form of a probability.
5. As B is part of Agj’s—the opponent’s—knowledge, then based on Agi’s RG
it is likely that Agj is aware of H with some probability wBH (Figure 4.2d)).
6. Given this, Agi can now extend the previous dialogue tree (Figure 4.2a))
through adding argument H following after G (Figure 4.2e1).
Notice that, regardless of the probability wBH which describes how likely it is for
Agj to be aware of H, moving G into the game is no longer the clear option as it
may lead to a defeat, given that backtracking is not allowed.
7. Thus, Agi chooses argument C and moves it into the game.
Example 5 (Backtracking allowed) Let Dk be an ongoing dialogue between
two agents Agi (Grey) and Agj (White) where Agi has initiated a dialogue by
moving argument A (DM0), found at the root of the dialogue tree presented in
Figure 4.3a. Let us also assume that Agi holds an OM for Agj (Figure 4.3b)
which comprises arguments B and D thought to be part of Agj’s knowledge base
with absolute certainty. At the same time Agi is aware of arguments C,G and E.
Let us now assume that the following scenario evolves:
1. Let B be an attacker of A, and assuming that Agj does actually know B,
then B is moved into the game as the content of its first move DM1 against
DM0.
2. Assume then that both C and G can attack B, then Agi is found at a
strategic point having to choose between the two arguments.
3. Given Agi’s certainty of D’s existence in Agj’s knowledge, and assuming
that D is an attacker of C while additionally E is an attacker of D, Agi can
simulate the two possible paths which describe how the dialogue may evolve.
These are:
1The dialogue tree in Figure 4.2e is deliberately separated into two parts, since the resulting
labelling is different for every case.
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• A← B ← C ← D ← E, and;
• A← B ← G.
as they are both depicted in Figure 4.3a.
At this point the modeller, Agi, is relying solely on the OM in order to simulate
the possible dialogue tree, according to which either option—C or G—is equally
preferable, since both options lead to a winning leaf.
4. Assume now that in addition to the OM (Figure 4.3b)) Agi holds a RG
(Figure 4.3c), according to which arguments D and H usually follow after
B and F follows after D, with likelihoods equal to wBD, wDF and wBH
respectively, where w is a weight value expressed in the form of a probability.
5. As B is part of Agj’s—the opponent’s—knowledge, then based on Agi’s RG
it is likely that Agj is aware of H with some probability wBH (Figure 4.3d).
6. Furthermore, given D’s relationship with F in the RG and since Agj is
assumed to be aware of D according to the OM, it is also likely that Agj is
aware of F with some probability wDF (Figure 4.3d).
7. Given this, Agi can now extend the previous dialogue tree (Figure 4.3a)
through adding arguments H and F following after G and D respectively
(Figure 4.3e).
Notice that whereas before either choice was leading to victory now both options
seem to be leading to defeat. Thus, once again the modeller is found at a point
where he may be indifferent in choosing between C and G, as backtracking allows
Agi to exhaustively move both its choices, if either leads to defeat, rendering
strategising unnecessary. Thus:
8. As both choices seem to be leading to defeat Agi may randomly choose be-
tween them.
In the first example the added value of the proposed approach is evident: whereas
































































Figure 4.3: Example 5: a) A simulated dialogue based on just the OM, b) Agi’s
OM of Agj, c) Agi’s RG, d) The combination of Agi’s OM of Agj’s and its RG.
to the same outcome, the additional information, i.e. the arguments used for
augmenting the existing OM, made following just one path an imperative choice.
In the second case though the benefit is not as apparent as one would expect.
In contrast to Example 4, the modeller faces the exact opposite situation, as
it appears at first that regardless of backtracking all options lead to victory,
while it turns out that it is possible for all paths to lead to defeat, deeming
choosing between the two possible options, again, a random choice. This example
is deliberately provided in order to convey to the reader that the essence of the
augmentation mechanism is not so much to provide the means for overcoming
what seems to be a decision ‘deadlock’ when found at a strategic point (e.g. in
the previous example, choosing either C or G based on the likelihoods of their
possible attackers D and F , defined by weights wBD, wDF if backtracking was
not allowed), but mostly in the incorporation of information worth taking into
account when building an OM. How that information will be used and whether it
will lead to assisting in decision making or further complicate the decision making
process depends on the modeller’s objectives, as well as on how one estimates the
utility of a certain choice in relation to those objectives.
For instance, assume that Agi’s objective is to stall its opponent, or to main-
tain the dialogue process for as long as possible so as to increase the possibility
of encountering new opponent-arguments and thus to collect information about
Agj aimed to be used in a later more significant dialogue. Then, if F was more
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likely to be known to Agj (i.e. wBD < wDF ) than H, Agi could opt for C.
In general, the essence of the presented examples is to stress how a possible
outcome, anticipated through a dialogue simulation, may be altered if additional
information is taken into account, and that if this is the case then accounting for
that additional information becomes important. Having clarified this, it is worth
to further extend Example 5 in order to present a scenario where if one attempts
an analysis on the structural information of the arguments which appear in the
game, it may be possible to overcome the strategic ‘deadlock’.
Example 6 (Example 5 extended) Let as assume that the following two ta-
bles comprise the logical information known to Agi and assumed to be known to
Agj by Agi respectively (we are only concerned with the logical premises K and
inference rules R known to either of them):
S(i,i)
K p, y
≤′ . . .
R p⇒ q;∼ r ⇒ t;∼ f ⇒ s;∼ x, y ⇒ g
≤′ . . .




≤′ . . .
R ∼ s,∼ t⇒ ¬q;∼ g ⇒ f ; y ⇒ r
≤′ . . .
G . . .
(b)
Table 4.1: a) Agi’s knowledge base, b) Agi’s OM of Agj.
Then the arguments which may be instantiated respectively are:
S(i,i)
A p; p⇒ q
C ∼ f ⇒ s
E y; y,∼ x⇒ g




B ∼ s,∼ t⇒ ¬q
D ∼ g ⇒ f
(b)
Table 4.2: a) Agi’s arguments, b) Agj’s assumed arguments.
Then, given Agi’s RG and the relationships between the opponent arguments









D H : y; y ⇒ r
F : m;m⇒ x
wBH
wDF
OM = { , } S(i,j)
K y,m
≤′ . . .
R ∼ s,∼ t⇒ ¬q;∼ g ⇒ f ; y ⇒ r,m⇒ x
≤′ . . .




Figure 4.4: a) Agi’s OM of Agj, b) Agi’s RG, c) The combination of Agi’s OM
of Agj’s and its RG, d) Agi’s augmented OM of Agj.
S(i,j) in order to include the logical constituents of H and F . These constituents
will be associated with a confidence value1 which will result from the relationship
weights in the RG.
Notice that by augmenting S(i,j) through adding premises y and m as well
as the defeasible inference rule m ⇒ x, Agi may then assume that Agj may be
additionally able to instantiate arguments F and H with some likelihood associated
with each of them, and which occurs from the confidence values of the logical
constituents that compose them. Let us respectively refer to those likelihoods as
P (F ) and P (H). Let us also accept that these likelihoods are respectively equal to
the weights associated with the arguments they are concerned in the RG, i.e.:
P (F ) = wDF
P (H) = wBH
Agi may then extend the simulated dialogue which appears in Figure 4.5a and
strategise accordingly. Notice that:
1. Due to backtracking, at least at an abstract level, opting for either C or G
seems pointless.
1At this point we abstain from providing the exact way based on which these values are
computed, as we do so in the later sections of this chapter.
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A : p; p⇒ q
B :∼ s,∼ t⇒ ¬q
C :∼ f ⇒ s
E : y; y,∼ x⇒ g
G :∼ r ⇒ t
D :∼ g ⇒ f H : y; y ⇒ r



































































Figure 4.5: Example 5 continued: a) The extended simulated dialogue tree which
results from the addition of OM’s neighbouring arguments in the RG, b) Dialogue
sequence when opting for G, c) Dialogue sequence when opting for C.
2. This is supported by computing the propagated probability values that char-
acterise how possible it is for Agi to face defeat by opting either for C or
G, i.e. how likely it is for the dialogue to respectively end at leaf H or
F . Let us represent these probabilities as PC→H and PG→F ,then assuming
that the intermediate argument D which appears in both of the possible di-
alogue sequences illustrated in Figures 4.5b & c is known with certainty to
the opponent (Agj), then these likelihoods are equal to:
PC→H = P (F ) · P (H)
PG→F = P (H) · P (F )
which are equal.
3. Let us assume that Agi opts for C (Figure 4.5c).
4. Let us also assume that argument D is believed to be known to the opponent
(Agj) with a confidence value equal to 1 (which is the highest possible value).
5. Given 2 and 3 it is expected that Agi will be forced to move argument E
into the game.
6. By moving in E Agi will be revealing premise y which will be added into its
commitment store.
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7. As we also assume that Agj is also aware of the defeasible rule y ⇒ r with
a confidence value equal to 1, it is then definitely the case that Agj will be
able to instantiate argument H.
8. This means that instantiation of H will no longer be simply probable (P (H) 6=
0.6) but will be certain (P (H) = 1).
9. Accordingly, PC→H will now be equal to PC→H = P (F ).
10. As it now holds that:
PC→H > PG→F
since:
P (F ) > P (F )P (H)
it is imperative that Agi opts for G (Figure 4.5b)
For once more, Example 6 stresses the necessity of accounting for the underlying
logic when strategising while it illustrates how doing so combined with infor-
mation provided from a possible augmentation may prove essential in decision
making.
We note that in the above examples we restrain from providing the exact way
through which the likelihood values are computed—which define the relationship
between certain arguments in the RG with others instantiated from the contents
of an OM. This is a complex issue thoroughly explained in the following sections.
At this point it is enough to note that these values depend on the probability
values expressed by the weights on the directed edges of a RG.
In relation to the quantification of these probability values, we essentially rely
on how often a certain argument follows after another in an agent’s history of
dialogues, and present two ways based on which this likelihood can be computed.
One is presented in this chapter while the other appears in Chapter 5, where we
further investigate the modelling aspects of the proposed augmentation process.




we generally assume that wAB is equal to the number of times that A has appeared
in dialogues immediately followed by B, divided by the number of times that A
has appeared in dialogues. This fraction may then be adjusted to account for
additional modelling objectives which will be further discussed in Chapter 5.
Though this appears to be a rather simplistic approach for quantifying the
arguments’ relationship in a RG, it is nevertheless statistically sound, as it reflects
the occurrence ratio of a following argument (e.g. B’s occurrence ratio after A).
In addition, though this may not be really apparent, through this quantification
a modeller manages to inadvertently account for the structure of dialogues when
collecting information about its opponent’s knowledge. The reader is reminded
that in contrast to an agent history an OM ignores the structure of dialogues
as it only stores the exchanged logical information. However, by recording this
occurrence ratio represented by the arc weights of a RG, through which the
likelihood of an argument may then be defined, the modeller accounts for when
and how often certain arguments appear in a game, thus accounting to some
extent for the structure of dialogues.
In Chapter 5, the proposed weighting approach is extended to account for the
cumulative effect concerned with relationships between indirectly related argu-
ments. Take for example the case of three opponent arguments A,B and C in a





If we assume that A and C are indirectly related, i.e. that C does follow after A
in dialogues but only after B does, which implies a dependency between B and
C. Then how should wAC be modelled so as to account for this dependency?
In future we intend to investigate more complex ways for quantifying this
likelihood, accounting for contextual factors such as how common certain infor-
mation is, or whether an agent is part of a certain group having access to shared
information, the relationship of certain information with a particular topic etc.
Furthermore, an another interesting issue we intend to investigate in the future
is the susceptibility of a weighting approach to manipulation. Suppose in our
case, that in an attempt to diminish the significance of a relationship between
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two opponent arguments A
wAB−−→ B, a player can invoke A many times, leav-
ing the modeller anxious to maintain the weighting wAB only with the option of
responding B every time A appears.
We should clarify that, though in the full length of this chapter we describe
a process which relies on an abstract representation of arguments, the incorpo-
rated information, which is assumed to be included in the new OM through the
augmentation process, concerns the logical information contained in the added
arguments. In other words, what will actually become part of the model is the
logical constituents of the incorporated arguments. These constituents will also
be characterised by a certain confidence value, as is the case with information
collected by the other two ICMs. This value will be equal to the likelihood of
that information being known to the concerned opponent. Specifically, the con-
stituents of an added argument will inherit the argument’s likelihood to represent
the modeller’s confidence on whether or not the opponent is aware of them. The
exact confidence assignation process to the logical constituents of the added ar-
guments as well as how those may be used for defining an arguments’ confidence
value, after the latter is instantiated from them, is thoroughly discussed in Sec-
tion 4.5.
To recap, our approach is used when an agent is found at a strategic point
in a dialogue. In this case the general approach is to instantiate a dialogue tree,
relying on an OM, simulating the possible ways based on which a dialogue game
may evolve. Then, each of the possible tree paths is evaluated, based on some
utility function, and a choice is made. In a series of steps, the strategising process
that utilises the proposed modelling approach, discussed in Examples 4 & 5, is
analysed as follows:
1. When found at a strategic point, prior to the simulation of the possible
dialogue tree, the concerned OM is first augmented with additional infor-
mation, based on the relationship between arguments in it and arguments
in the RG.
2. The logical constituents of the incorporated arguments resulting from the
augmentation process, are associated with a confidence value, one which




































Figure 4.6: a) A dialogue between agents Ag1 (white) and Ag2 (grey), b) The
resulting RG induced by Ag2 , c) A possible dialogue between Ag3 (white) and
Ag2 (grey).
are added to the OM.
3. After the OM is augmented, the modeller instantiates the new set of argu-
ments that the opponent is assumed to be aware of; associates them with a
confidence value that results from the confidence values of its constituents,
and; simulates the possible dialogue tree.
4. The utility of all the possible outcomes found at the leaves of this tree, the
computation of which accounts for the confidence value assigned to each of
the opponent arguments, is then evaluated in order for a choice to be made.
5. The process is repeated until the dialogue is completed.
The above approach concerns an on the fly approach taking place during the
course of a dialogue game and which accounts for all the possible arguments in
a RG which maybe related to arguments instantiated from an OM, assuming
that no filtering methods are applied for further distinguishing between subsets
of those arguments (e.g. by assuming a likelihood threshold). In the case where
such filtering is not applied, the augmentation process will be referred to as an
expansion, as it relates to a graph expansion process, where a sub-graph in a graph
is expanded to include all its immediate neighbours (nodes that are at a one hop
distance from nodes in the concerned sub-graph).
One may generally act in four different ways:
1. On the fly expansion: During the dialogue and when found at a strategic
point, the modeller will expand its OM with all the logical information of
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arguments in the RG that are likely to be related to arguments instantiated
from its OM. Thus the modeller will be able to strategise on the fly and on
the basis that its opponent might be aware of those additional arguments,
characterised by a certain level of confidence.
In the trivial case of Example 3 where Ag2 is assumed to be the modeller,
having induced the RG depicted in Figure 4.6b, would assume that Ag3 is
with some likelihood aware of arguments C and E as soon as Ag3 moves A
into the game, and assuming that these—C and E—are not already part
of its OM of Ag3. Thus, for deciding on whether to deploy argument B or
D, Ag2 would rely on the likelihoods of C and E respectively.
2. Oﬄine expansion: At the end of the dialogue, the modeller will expand
its OM with all the logical information of arguments in the RG that are
likely to be related to arguments instantiated from its OM. That is, all the
logical information likely to be related to the new arguments used in the
terminated dialogue, characterised by a certain confidence value resulting
from this likelihood, will now become part of the OM in order to be used
in the next time this opponent is encountered.
In the case of Example 3, assuming that the second dialogue between agents
Ag2 and Ag3 terminates after arguments A← B ← C are exchanged (Fig-
ure 4.6c) and that for some reason related to Ag2’s objectives, though being
aware of argument D, Ag2 opts to not backtrack against A and lose. Then,
assuming that Ag2 is the modeller, at the end of the dialogue Ag3’s OM
would be expanded with the inclusion of argument E, given its supporting
relationship with A, to be used at a later dialogue.
3. On the fly augmentation: During the dialogue and when found at a
strategic point the modeller can attempt to augment its OM with including
the logical constituents of arguments likely to be related with arguments
instantiated from the OM, but only those with a high likelihood, satisfying
some predefined threshold. Thus the modeller may strategise on the basis
that its opponent might be aware of additional arguments with a confidence
higher than a provided threshold which will affect the utility of its choice.
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In the trivial case of Example 3 where Ag2 is assumed to be the modeller,
as soon as A is introduced into the game by Ag3, and assuming a likelihood
threshold of 0.5, then, if the relationship likelihoods of arguments C and E
are respectively 0.75 and 0.45 (Figure 4.6b), only C would be considered
for strategising purposes while E would be ignored.
4. Oﬄine augmentation: At the end of the dialogue, the modeller will
attempt to augment its OM with the the logical constituents of arguments
likely to be related with arguments instantiated from the OM, but only
those with a high likelihood, satisfying some predefined threshold. That is,
information highly likely to be related to the new arguments used in the
terminated dialogue, given satisfaction of a certain threshold, will become
part of the OM to be used for the next time this opponent is encountered.
The incorporated information will be characterised by a confidence value
resulting from how likely they are to be actually aware to the opponent.
In the case of Example 3, assuming that the second dialogue between agents
Ag2 and Ag3 terminates after arguments A← B ← C are exchanged (Fig-
ure 4.6c) and that for some reason related to Ag2’s objectives, though being
aware of argument D, Ag2 opts to not backtrack against A and lose. Then,
assuming that Ag2 is the modeller, at the end of the dialogue, given a likeli-
hood threshold of 0.5, Ag3’s OM would be augmented with the inclusion of
just argument E as its relationship likelihood with A is above the threshold,
to be used at a later dialogue.
In essence, augmentation approaches concern approximative solutions which
attempt to reduce the search space, while providing equally effective results.
As tractability is often a very important practical factor in decision making,
the development of approximation methodologies which are both efficient, by
reducing complexity, as well as effective, by producing a reliable outcome though
sacrificing accuracy, is essential. Obviously, expansion approaches allow one to
thoroughly account for all possibilities (e.g. again in relation to Example 3, Ag2
can account for both the possibility of C as well as E being known to Ag3 even if
one of them has a really low likelihood to be related with an argument instantiated
from Ag3’s knowledge base). The added value of opting to expand rather than to
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augment, is that it is possible for an argument with a low relationship likelihood
(which intuitively seems to have no reason to be taken into account) to be part of a
dispute which eventually leads to an outcome with the highest utility. Though this
may not be obvious at this point, it is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 5 where
we analyse how confidence values which occur from the augmentation process can
be used for computing the different utility values of the possible simulated paths
of a dialogue tree, through the application of a strategy function.
In any case, the objective of this chapter is not differentiate and choose be-
tween these four possible options but to provide the technical machinery which
allows the application of any of them. After all, an expansion is essentially an
augmentation where the likelihood threshold for including an argument in the
new OM is set to 0.
We should also note that for the purpose of our work we disregard arguments
concerned with logical information in the form of preferences when building a
RG. This is because preferences can only be supported by themselves. In other
words, preferences that appear after other preferences in a dispute must always be
contradictory preferences, and thus the possible options that may follow after a
pre-ordering cannot vary. For example, if a pre-ordering A > B is introduced into
a game the only thing which can follow after it, is a contradictory pre-ordering
A < B, which in turn can only be countered by the repetition of A > B. In this
sense, it is evident that A > B is the only thing that may support itself against
A < B, which makes modelling the support relationship between preferences
useless due to its trivial form.
In addition, for deducing a possible relation of a different kind between the
preference orderings moved in dialogues, it is necessary that we are aware of the
mechanisms that agents use to form and update their priority-orderings over rules
and premises. In general, we assume that agents use generic principles to do so,
e.g. the well known specificity principle, and the temporal principle (which orders
newly acquired knowledge over older knowledge). In this work, we leave these
mechanisms implicit, as modelling them is out of our research scope. We admit
that there is some value in at least including arguments with preferences in a RG
which follow, not after another preference but, immediately after an argument
in a dispute thus serving as a different form of support, to previously attacked
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opponent arguments. However, we choose to leave the provision of a complete
augmentation mechanism able to also account for preferences to future work.
4.3.1 Building a Relationship Graph
As noted, intuitively we expect our opponents to be aware of arguments that are
likely to follow in a current dialogue, given that they have appeared in previous
dialogues and relate to what we currently assume our opponent to know. We
assume this likelihood to increase as the relation between the contents of an OM
and the arguments external to the model becomes stronger, i.e., as we observe
assumed relationships between arguments on the modeller’s part being verified by
its opponent through a dialogue process. Essentially, the appearance of particular
sequences of arguments in dialogues, which relate the two sets, is what validates
the modeller’s relationship assumptions.
For example, assume that two agents Agi and Agj, bearing the roles of the
proponent and the opponent respectively, engage in a persuasion dialogue, where
backtracking is allowed. Let us further assume that the dialogue tree illustrated
in Figure 4.7a describes this dialogue. In this case Agi and Agj introduce ar-
guments {A,C,E,G} respectively {B,D, F,H}. Assume then, that Agi engages
in another persuasion dialogue with a different agent Agm who also happens to
counter Agi’s A with B. It is then possible that Agm is likely to be aware of
arguments D, H or even F . As we have already discussed, this likelihood can
be defined with respect to how many times arguments D, H, or F have followed
after B in previous dialogues. Our focus in this section is the instantiation of
implied support relationship between these arguments. Once these relationships
are instantiated as links between opponent arguments in a RG, if then Agm does
indeed put forth arguments D,H and F in the game, then the likelihood of
someone knowing D,H and F , contingent that she knows B, should increase.
As discussed, for augmenting an OM (S(i,j)), we rely on a RG. For Agi a
relationship graph (RGi) is a graph that associates nodes, that represent argu-
ments asserted by an Agi’s opponents in Hi. This association is represented
through weighted directed arcs which represent a support relationship between








































Figure 4.7: a) A dialogue tree T where the grey and the white nodes concern
Ag1’s respectively Ag2’s moves, b) A 1-hop RG modelling approach, c) A 2-hop
RG modelling approach.
i.e. the extent to which two arguments are related. We assume a RG to be
incrementally built as an agent Agi engages in numerous dialogues, being empty
at the start, i.e. for Hi = {∅}, and constantly updated with newly encountered
opponent arguments (OAs). Notice that in the case of the example presented
in Figure 4.7(a), assuming that the grey agent is the modeller, OAs (the white’s
arguments B,D, F and H) can only appear in odd levels of the dialogue tree.
For assigning arcs between these arguments one may rely on how and when an
opponent argument appears in a tree, i.e. on the structure of a dialogue tree, since
it inherently encodes relationship information between the arguments that appear
in it. Though we focus on the support relationship between arguments, one may
opt between numerous modelling perspectives for building a RG, focusing on
particular aspects of the structure of a dialogue tree that better reflect one’s
modelling objectives. Different modelling approaches are further discussed in
Chapter 5.
Definition 47 (Relationships Graph) Let AH represent the arguments intro-
duced by an agent’s opponents in H. Then a RG is a directed graph RG =
{AH, R}, where R ⊆ AH × AH is a set of weighted arcs representing support
relationships. We write rAB to denote the arc (A,B) ∈ R, and denote the arc’s
weight as wAB obtained via a weighting function w, such that w :R→ [0, 1].












Figure 4.8: a) A dialogue tree T, b) The induced RG for T.
to assume that two OAs, A and B, are connected in a RG via an arc, if they are
found in the same path of the dialogue tree, i.e. in the same dispute. In addition
to appearing in the same dispute, one has to follow at most after a predefined
number of levels from the other. For example, consider the case of the dialogue
depicted in Figure 4.8a. The induced RG for opponent arguments that are two
levels away from each other appears in Figure 4.8b. Specifically, the opponent
arguments B and D are connected in the RG as they both appear in the same
dispute line with D following directly after B’s attacker in the dispute. This also
holds for arguments B and F , as well as for D and H. In contrast arguments D
and F appear in different dispute lines and thus are not connected in the RG,
while in the case of H and B, though they do appear in the same dispute, their
distance exceeds the 2 levels threshold.
At this point we provide two definitions in relation to the support relationships
between arguments in order to differentiate between direct and indirect supports,
by specifically referring to the first as reinstatement.
Definition 48 (Reinstatement) Let d =< DM0,DM1, . . . ,DMn > be a dis-
pute in a dialogue tree T and A,B and C be three arguments that serve as the
respective constituents of a subsequence of three dialogue moves in d, such that
< DMi,DMi+1,DMi+2 >, where 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 2, we then say that C reinstates A.
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Definition 49 (Indirect support) Let d =< DM0,DM1, . . . ,DMn > be a
dispute in a dialogue tree T and A and B be two arguments that serve as the
respective constituents of a subsequence of two dialogue moves in d, such that




say that B indirectly supports A.
We define the distance between two opponent arguments A,B in a dialogue
tree as θAB, and assume a predefined threshold set by the modeller referred to as
θt for deciding their connectivity in a RG as follows:
Definition 50 (θ-distance) Let ∆ = {d1, . . . , dk, . . . , dm} be the disputes of a
dialogue tree T. Also, let level() be a function applied on a dialogue move DMi
such that:
level(DMi)→ li
where li is the level of DMi in T. For every distinct pair of opponent dialogue
moves DMi and DMj respectively comprising arguments A and B, then:
θAB =
{
∞ if DMi,DMj /∈ dk
|li−lj |
2
if DMi,DMj ∈ dk.
Definition 51 (Connectivity Condition) Let A and B be two arguments re-
spectively serving as the content of two opponent dialogue moves DMi and DMj
in a dialogue tree T, if:
• i < j, and;
• θAB ≤ θt
then ∃rAB ∈ R.
For example, in Figure 4.7a arguments B and D are assumed to be at a
θBD = 1 distance from each other, while B and F are at a θBF = 2 distance.
In addition, Figures 4.7b and 4.7c illustrate two distinct RGs induced from the
dialogue tree of Figure 4.7a, for θt = 1 and θt = 2 respectively. Through modifying




























(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 4.9: a) A dialogue D1 between Ag1 (grey) & Ag2 (white), b) The induced
RG1, c) A dialogue D
2 between Ag1 (grey) & Ag3 (white), d) The updated RG1,
e) A dialogue D3 between Ag1 (grey) & Ag2 again (white), f) The updated RG1,
g) A dialogue D4 between Ag1 (grey) & Ag4 (white), h) The final RG1
in the same path of a T, and correspondingly between arguments in the induced
RG. Notice that the direction of the arc that associates two arguments in the RG
is defined by the requirement that i < j, without which all relationships would
have been reciprocal.
An example of incrementally building a θt = 1 RG after four consecutive
persuasion dialogues, where the modeller is Ag1, is illustrated in Figure 4.9. In
this example Ag1 faces random opponents in Ags, engaging in dialogues which
have different topics. The illustrated modelling approach, as well as our modelling
hypothesis which relies on the notion of support, are independent of the topic of
the dialogues. In other words, it is not necessary that two arguments relate to
each other only if they appear in dialogues with the same topic. As far as deducing
some properties of the induced graph is concerned, it is easy to see that it is not
necessary that RG is a connected graph. Evidently, arguments M and O are not
related in any way with previous OAs and are therefore disconnected from the
rest of the graph. Finally, in this simple example, the connectivity between the
related arguments is kept to a minimum, both because of the trivial structure of
the dialogues, i.e. because the concerned dialogues do not evolve in depths that
exceed four levels, but also because of setting θt threshold to 1.
Obviously, modelling dialogues with more than, for example, four levels and
for a θt > 1 would result in a more dense RG (see Figure 4.7c where for a θt = 2
an additional arc is included between arguments B and F ). At the same time
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though, assigning a large value to θt raises a cognitive resources issue, due to the
large volume of information that needs to be stored. Thus, for practical reasons
we will generally avoid using large numbers for θt. Additionally, it is questionable
whether an argument Y , that follows at a large distance after another argument
X in the same dispute, actually supports X. A reasonable question raised here
is, why not build the RG only for a θt = 1? In other words, what is the added
value of inducing RGs with a θt > 1 value. Similar questions can be raised in
relation to whether arguments should be linked regardless of whether they appear
in the same line of dispute or that the relationship between the linked arguments
should be reciprocal. However, our intention in this chapter is to provide the
basic modelling framework. We address the above questions in the next chapter,
where we also propose a more complex way for inferring relationships between
arguments, accounting for additional inherent properties between dialogue moves
introduced in a dialogue game when inducing a RG.
Lastly, for providing a weight value wAB which will essentially represent the
relationship likelihood of an argument A with an argument B, we rely on Defi-
nition 52, which is essentially a normalisation that allows us to compute a prob-
ability value Pr(rAB) = wAB for arc rAB. We simply count the number of times
that an argument A appeared in discrete dialogues followed by B, and we put
them against the total number of times that A was used in discrete dialogues.
Let us assume for example a weight value wAB = 0.78 or 78%. This percentage
tells us that out of a total number of 100 times that argument A was used, for
78 of them A was followed by B in the same dispute lines of distinct dialogues,
as recorded by a modeller’s history of dialogues.
Definition 52 (Weight Assignation) Let RG = {AH, R} be an agent’s rela-
tionship graph, while arguments A,B are elements of AH then:
Instances(H, A,B) =MAB
is a function that returns a number MAB representing the times that argument A
was put forth A followed by B in the same disputes in distinct dialogues in H,
such that θAB ≤ θt, then:
wAB ≡MAB/MA∗ (4.3)
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where ∗ represents the use of any and of no argument at all.
In essence, MA∗ represents the set of agents that have simply used argument A
in distinct dialogues followed by anything or even followed by nothing, i.e. A
appears as the leaf-node of a dispute line, while it is evident that:
MAB ≤MA∗
i.e. the denominator will always be at least equal to the enumerator.
We should note that there is a problem with the aforementioned approach.
Namely if we consider the example shown in Figure 4.9, based on Definition 52
all the arcs in the induced RG will initially have a weight value of 1. It is
apparent that this value does not represent the real likelihood which relates the
arguments at either endpoint of the arc. In order to better approach the real
likelihood a larger number of dialogues with numerous distinct participants need
to be considered. This problem is better known as the cold start problem and
is encountered in various other contexts as well, (e.g. Lashkari et al. [1994]). A
solution to this problem is to initialise the arc weights of an induced RG with
non trivial values representing, in a sense, assumptions based on either expert
knowledge or previous experience. However, we leave this for future work.
4.3.2 Relationship augmentation
Having built a RG an agent Agi can then attempt to augment its OM of Agj
by adding to it the arguments (nodes) that are of n-hop distance in RG from
those contained in that OM and which are most likely to be related with the
arguments already in it. As this approach relies on the relationships formed
between arguments, for convenience we will be referring to an OM as a set of
arguments, those which can be instantiated from the logical information found
in an S(i,j), expressed as A(i,j).
We will also be referring to a possible augmentation of a S(i,j) as S
′
(i,j), which
we assume to be an isomorphic process to the augmentation of A(i,j) (the incorpo-
ration of additional arguments into A(i,j)), which will be referred to as A
′
(i,j). For




≤′ . . .
R ∼ s,∼ t⇒ ¬q;¬g ⇒ f ; y ⇒ r
≤′ . . .




≤′ . . .
R ∼ s,∼ t⇒ ¬q;¬g ⇒ f ; y ⇒ r;m⇒ x
≤′ . . .
G . . .
(b)
Table 4.3: a) The input of function faug, b) The output of function faug.
it will be omitted.
Definition 53 (Augmentation) Let S(i,j) be Agi’s model of Agj’s knowledge,




through which new information is incorporated into S(i,j).
For example, let us recall the opponent model S(i,j) presented in Example 6
in Table 4.3b, which represents Agi’s assumption of Agj’s knowledge. S(i,j)’s
augmentation S ′(i,j) which results from the relationship between the arguments B
and D instantiated from S(i,j) with arguments F and H in Agi’s RG, appears in
Figure 4.4b. Both tables appear in Tables 4.3a, 4.3b as the input respectively
output of faug, depicting the augmentation process in an abstract way.
As the augmentation process focusses on the relationships between the argu-
ments instantiated from an OM and arguments in a RG, rather than between
their logical constituents, henceforth we will be referring to an augmented OM
only as A′(i,j) and will abstain from using its analytic form (S
′
(i,j)). Thus we may
at times use a more high level form of faug, assuming its application on A(i,j) as




We stress though that A′(i,j) does not necessarily encapsulate all arguments that
may be instantiated from S ′(i,j)
1.































In order to understand the complexity of the proposed approach we examine
a trivial scenario for the augmentation of an OM. Let us assume a RG1 induced
by Ag1 as it is illustrated in Figure 4.10a, where for the purpose of this example
we assume that the weights on the arcs have received their values after numerous
dialogues. Let us assume that based on Ag1’s OM of Ag4, Ag1 believes that Ag4
is aware of two arguments A(1,4) = {B,H} (the grey nodes in Figure 4.10a).






F , and A
′
DF
as they respectively appear in Figures 4.10b,c,d & e. In this example, instead
of enumerating the possible augmentations with numerical subscripts, we list the
added arguments as subscripts to make the example easier to follow.
For augmenting A(1,4) the modeller Ag1 has to choose between these augmen-
tations the one with the highest likelihood. In the following example we illustrate
in a step by step process how these likelihoods are computed.
Example 7 Assume we want to calculate the likelihood of augmentation A(1,4) to
A′F . In this simple example the likelihood of including argument F is the likelihood
of including the in-coming arcs to F 1. These are rHF and rBF , which means that
is incorporated into an existing S(i,j).
1Since the weights on the arcs indicate the frequency with which the connected arguments
follow each other in Ag1’s history.
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F can be included either if rHF or rBF is chosen, or if both are chosen. Therefore:
Pr(F ) = Pr(rHF ∪ rBF )
= Pr(rHF ) + Pr(rBF )− Pr(rBF ∩ rHF )
= wHF + wBF − wBF · wHF = 0.82
The probability of inducing A′F is the probability of including argument F and not
including D which is:
Pr(A′F ) = Pr(F )(1− Pr(D)) = Pr(F )(1− wBD) = 0.328.
Similar computations need to take place for calculating the likelihoods of the




DF ). For providing a general
formula for computing the likelihood of a possible augmentation, we rely on basic
graph theory notation with respect to a node X in a graph RG, such as:
• in-degree of X (d+(X)): The number of arcs adjacent to X which end at X.
• out-degree of X (d−(X)): The number of arcs adjacent to X which begin
from X.
• degree of X (d(X)): The total number of adjacent arcs that either end at
or begin from X:
d(X) = d+(X) + d−(X)
• neighbouring nodes of X (N(X)): The union product of the set of nodes
adjacent toX with in-bound arcsN+(X), and with out-bound arcsN−(X):
N(X) = N+(X) ∪N−(X) where |N(X)| = d(X)
• adjacent arcs of X (R(X)): The union product of the set of in-bound arcs
R+(X), and out-bound arcs R−(X) adjacent to X:

























Figure 4.11: A RG where the yellow nodes represent set A, the orange nodes
represent set NA, and the red arcs represent set RA (Please refer to this figure in
colour).
In addition, assuming a set of arguments A (the yellow nodes in Figure 4.11), we
define two sets NA and RA where:
• neighbouring nodes of A (NA): Represents the neighbours of the nodes in
A (the orange nodes in Figure 4.11), and is formed from the union of the





• adjacent arcs of A (RA): Is the adjacent arcs of the nodes in A (the red
arcs in Figure 4.11) and is equal to the adjacent arcs of every element X in




R(X)− {rXY Y /∈ A}.
We note that for A(i,j) it reasonably holds that A(i,j) is a subset of the opponent
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arguments instantiated from Agi’s overall history A
Hi , i.e. A(i,j) ⊆ A
Hi . For
convenience we will hence refer to a A(i,j) as A and to its augmentation as A
′.
Given these, we can now provide the following definitions:
Definition 54 (Possible augmentations) Let P = {A′0,A
′
1, . . . , } be the set
of the possible augmentations of A. Then the number of all of A’s distinct pos-
sible augmentations |P | with respect to the neighbouring nodes that are of 1-hop
distance from A, is the sum of the k-combinations of the elements of NA, for























In the case of Example 7, since |N(A(1,4))| = 2 (arguments D and F ) the possible























= 1 + 2 + 1 = 4.
For providing the general formula for computing the likelihood of a possible
augmentation A′ one has to simply compute the product of the probabilities
of every neighbouring argument Y in N(A) assumed to be in the augmented
set (A′), multiplied by the product of the probabilities of every neighbouring
argument Y in N(A) assumed not to be in the augmented set (A′). In the simple
case of Example 7 this was reflected by multiplying the probability of including
argument F (Pr(F )) and not including argument D (1− Pr(D)).
Definition 55 (Likelihood formula) Let A be a set of arguments instantiated
from an opponent model S, and N(A) the neighbouring nodes of A. Then, the
general formula for computing the likelihood of a possible augmentation A′ with
respect to each of the neighbouring nodes (arguments) of a A, i.e. for every
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In essence, Equation 4.6 is the union product of the probabilities associated with
each of the the in-bound arcs of Y , and is computed in accordance to the inclusion
exclusion princible for probability, the representation of which requires that we
index the elements of the set of the in-bound arcs R+ of a neighbouring argument
Y , such that R+(Y ) = {r1, r2, . . . , rn}:

























rk) . . . .
where ri, rj , rk, . . . ∈ R
+(Y ).
Lastly, since the likelihood of each possible augmentation should define a
distribution of likelihoods then it must also hold that:
∑
A′∈P
Pr(A′) = 1. (4.7)
At this point it is essential to mention that Equation 4.5 heavily relies on
knowing the likelihood of each argument. This is because, while the number
of possible augmentations of a set A is exponential in the size of the adjacent
nodes (O(2NA)), determining the augmentation with the highest likelihood is
equivalent to simply determining the arguments with the highest likelihoods, or
more precisely those that have a likelihood higher than 0.5. As counter-intuitive
as this may be, if:
Pr(X) > 1− Pr(X). (4.8)
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holds for all included arguments of a possible augmentation A′, then Equation 4.5
obtains its highest possible value. In other words, if an argument has a likelihood
above 0.5, which therefore serves as a selection threshold (θS = 0.5) then it will
definitely be part of the augmentation with the highest likelihood.
Particularly, threshold θS results from solving Equation 4.8 with respect to
Pr(X):
Pr(X) > 1− Pr(X)










DF} that appear in Figure 4.10, the augmentation with the highest likeli-
hood contains, indeed, two arguments with a likelihood value above 0.5, and that
is augmentation ADF .
After computing the distinct likelihoods of arguments D and F , the likelihood
of each of the possible augmentations is computed as follows:
Pr(F ) = Pr(rHF ∪ rBF )
= Pr(rHF ) + Pr(rBF )− Pr(rBF ∩ rHF )
= wHF + wBF − wBF · wHF = 0.82
Pr(D) = Pr(rBD) = wBD = 0.6
Pr(A′∅) = (1− Pr(F )) · (1− Pr(D)) = (1− 0.6) · (1− 0.82) = 0.072
Pr(A′D) = Pr(D) · (1− Pr(F )) = 0.6 · (1− 0.82) = 0.10.8
Pr(A′F ) = Pr(F ) · (1− Pr(D)) = 0.82 · (1− 0.6) = 0.328
Pr(A′DF ) = Pr(F ) · Pr(D) = 0.82 · 0.6 = 0.492.
This is further supported by the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Assume a RG, an opponent model A and an augmentation A′
of A such that Pr(A′) is the highest likelihood. Assume that RG is expanded
to include an additional argument X such that X is a neighbouring node of the
arguments in A. If X is included in A′ then A′ remains the augmentation with
185
the highest likelihood if:
Pr(X) > 1− Pr(X).
Proof We prove this by contradiction. Let us assume that it holds that Pr(X) <
1− Pr(X), while Pr(A′ ∪X) = Pr(A′) · Pr(X) is the highest likelihood. Then
it must also hold that:
Pr(A′) · Pr(X) > Pr(A′) · (1− Pr(X))
⇔Pr(X) > 1− Pr(X)
The latter obviously contradicts with our original assumption.
Finally, given that A′DF is the augmentation with the highest likelihood, its ar-
guments (D and F ) will be chosen to be incorporated into A, while Pr(A′DF )
will be used to denote the confidence value c of the logical constituents of those
arguments which will be incorporated into S ′(1,4), as defined in Definition 46(c).
4.4 The Monte-Carlo Simulation
A drawback of the proposed approach is that, the fastest (known) algorithms
for calculating the probability of Equation 4.6 have run-time exponential in their
input size. This makes the approach practically intractable. However, drawing in-
spiration from the work of Li et al. [2011] we rely on an approximate approach for
computing these likelihoods based on a Monte-Carlo simulation. For the case of
the 1-hop augmentation—augmenting with the direct neighbours—we know that
the number of possible augmentations is exponential on the size of NA (Equa-
tion 4.4). However, it is possible to deduce a high likelihood augmentation in
linear time, provided we know Pr(Y ) for ∀Y ∈ NA. Also, Pr(Y ) is calculated
through Equation 4.6 using the inclusion-exclusion principle found in basic al-
gorithm textbooks such as Knuth [1997]. But computation of Pr(Y ) also has
exponential run-time on the in-degree to calculate. We therefore proceed to sam-
ple for Pr(Y ), by describing a Monte-Carlo method to sample for high likelihood
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arguments, which we will include in our 1-hop augmentation of a set A. We will
generally refer to the arguments in A as augmentation nodes.
In essence, Monte-Carlo methods rely on sampling, repeatedly and randomly,
through running a series of simulations for the purpose of heuristically calculating
probability values, the theoretical computation of which is very expensive. A
simple and intuitive example which will assist in explaining the complex aspects
of the proposed sampling procedure analysed in this section, is an experiment
concerned with approximately computing the probability of getting at least one
6 when throwing two dice.
Obviously in a perfect world one would assume that this probability is equal to
the probability of getting a 6 with the first die 1/6, plus the probability of getting
a 6 with the second die 1/6, minus their joint probability 1/36, ergo 11/36. This
is the theoretical probability value. However this is based on various assumptions
which may not seem so apparent. For example, that the dice are unbiased—with
their weights evenly distributed on all six sides, no worn edges, etc—or that the
surface on which they are thrown is flat and so on. Accounting for these details
makes computing this probability a much more complex task.
A solution could be given by performing the following experiment. That is to
throw the dice for a large number of times, i.e. 6000 times, and record the results
referred to as sample. Through recording the results of this sampling method and
assuming that the method is well defined so as to guarantee convergence, i.e. that
the experimental probability will indeed be an approximation of the theoretical
probability, one may acquire an approximation of the desired theoretical values.
In our case this can be done in a tractable and quick way, since directly computing
the theoretical probability values of the possible augmentations would be much
more expensive.
We propose a similar method for our simulation. There are two ways we can
move from here in order to define our sampling approach:
1. Obtain a sample of n augmentations A′ and infer their likelihood by their
frequency of occurrence.
2. Obtain a sample of n augmentations A′ and infer the likelihood of each
of the nodes (arguments) by the frequency in which they were included in
187
augmentations.
We proceed with the second approach, simply because, as mentioned above, the
number of possible augmentations are exponential in the number of possible nodes
that can be included. Such a large distribution size means that probabilities will
be very low and almost uniform if we assume the first sampling approach. In this
case even the slightest sampling error would be unacceptable. In addition, due to
Proposition 3 determining the argument likelihood is in essence all that is required
for determining the highest likelihood augmentation. Thus we are not interested
in determining the likelihoods of all augmentations but instead only of a single
high likelihood augmentation. In other words, since, based on Proposition 3,
this particular augmentation is obtained by including each argument Y with
probability Pr(Y ) > 0.5, our simulation is a process which attempts to do exactly
that: approximately determine whether an argument Y ∈ NA should be part of
the augmentation with the highest likelihood, according to whether its inclusion
frequency in the sampled augmentations exceeds the threshold of θS = 0.5.
Abstractly described, the method we propose is described in the following
series of steps:
1. Assume a RG= {AH, R} and a set A.
2. We begin with an initial augmentation A′ = A.
3. For each argument Y ∈ NA, if ∃rXY ∈ R where X ∈ A, we accept rXY if
wXY is greater that a random value random between 0 and 1.
4. If an arc rXY is accepted, we then add Y to A
′ and increase a counter
kY by 1, which monitors the number of times that Y was included in an
augmentation A′.
5. At the end of the process, A′ contains a possible 1-hop augmentation of A.
6. Steps 1 to 5 are repeated for a number of times equal to n which is suffi-
cient for guaranteeing convergence to the theoretical probability values of
including each of the elements of NA in A
′.
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ALGORITHM OneHopAugmentation(RG, δ, ǫ,A)
Ensure: n, kY ∈ K for all Y which were sampled




3: for i = 1 to n do
4: A′ ← A
5: for all rXY ∈ RA do
6: random ← Random(0− 1)
7: if wXY ≥ random then
8: if Y /∈ A′ then
9: A′ ← A′ ∪ {Y }
10: if kY ∈ K then
11: kY ← kY + 1
12: else
13: kY ← 1






Algorithm : 4.1: Monte-Carlo simulation
7. Finally, we estimate the likelihood of each of the arguments in NA (by divid-
ing their distinct observations kY by n) and infer a probability distribution
of arguments1.
Steps 1 to 6 are analytically described in Algorithm 4.1.
In the case of the dice experiment, inferring a probability distribution of ar-
guments would be equivalent with counting the number of times we got a 6, a 5,
a 4 and so on, on at least one die—when throwing both—divided by 6000 to infer
the frequency of that event. Using any selection policy we wish, we can construct
a set of arguments we believe that the opponent is likely to know. This policy
can be a specific cut-off, e.g. we only include an argument Y with Pr(Y ) > θS,
where θS can be set to any value, e.g. 70% or 60%. For the purpose of our work
1A probability distribution assigns a probability to each measurable subset of the possible
outcomes of a random experiment. In our case these are the arguments considered for the
augmentation.
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we assume θS to be set to 50% in order to reflect the properties of Proposition 3.
Let us further analyse the proposed algorithm, beginning with explaining the
variables used:
RG: The relationships graph.
ǫ: The acceptable error bound for an estimate.
δ: A proportion of the experiments which produce estimates with error values
not within the ǫ± bounds.
zδ: Refers to z1− δ
2
which is the normal distribution quantile function.
A: The set of arguments instantiated from an OM.
A′: A possible augmentation of A.
K: The set of observations of arguments included in the sampled augmenta-
tions.
kY : The number of times that argument Y was observed in a sampled augmen-
tation.
The first step of the algorithm is to initialise setK as an empty set (∅).
1: K ← ∅
Following on n is assigned with z2δ
1
4ǫ2
which the minimum number for which we
must repeat the experiment in order to guarantee convergence to the theoretical
probability values of each of the neighbouring arguments. We elaborate more on




Next, we inititate a for loop repeated for n times, in which the first step is to
assign to A′ the content of A, i.e. at this point the augmented set contains no
additional arguments.
3: for i = 1 to n do
4: A′ ← A
5: . . .
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6: end for
Then, for every arc rXY in RA where X in A and Y in NA we produce a random
number between 0 and 1:
5: for all rXY ∈ RA do
6: random ← Random(0− 1)
7: . . .
8: end for
and if the arc’s corresponding weight value wXY is greater or equal to that num-
ber:
7: if wXY ≥ random then
8: . . .
9: end if
then if argument (Y ) is not already part ofA′, it is included inA′:
8: if Y /∈ A′ then
9: A′ ← A′ ∪ {Y }
10: . . .
11: end if
and if a kY , the variable responsible for recording the number of times that Y is
included in an augmentation, is already an element of K, then its existing value
is simply increased by 1, else kY is initialised with the value of 1 and is added
into K:
10: if kY ∈ K then
11: kY ← kY + 1
12: else
13: kY ← 1
14: K ← K ∪ {kY }
15: end if
In essence, according to Algorithm 4.1, the probability of accepting an argu-
ment Y is assumed to be equal to the probability of accepting the arc in which it
participates as the end node. In turn, the probability of accepting an arc Pr(rXY )
is equal to the arc’s weight value Pr(rXY ) = wXY . We also note that we assume
the events of accepting rij and rkm, where rij 6= rkm to be independent but not
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mutually exclusive.
Equivalently, in the case of the dice experiment, this means that getting a 6 on
one die is independent of what we get on the other and at the same time it does not
mean that if we get a 6 on one die we wont get a 6 on the other, i.e. not mutually
exclusive. Correspondingly, the probability of accepting of rij (Pr(rij) = wij) is
independent of the probability of accepting rkm (Pr(rkm) = wkm), while both can
also happen at the same time (Pr(rij ∩ rkm)).
Therefore, for computing the probability of accepting both rij ∪ rkm we rely
on the following formula:
Pr(rij ∪ rkm) = Pr(rij) + Pr(rkm)− Pr(rij ∩ rkm)
This means that the probability for a node (argument) to be added in A′ follows
Equation 4.6. Consequently the probability of obtaining a specific augmentation
A′ follows Equation 4.5, and therefore the described procedure essentially sam-
ples from the probability distribution of augmentations. In other words, though
it seems that the proposed Monte-Carlo simulation, which relies on Algorithm
4.1, behaves differently in relation to how the theoretical values that characterise
the likelihood of a certain augmentation are decided; since it deals with likeli-
hoods that characterise arguments rather than augmentations, the fact that the
probability of a node being added in A′ follows Equation 4.6 serves as proof that
it essentially does the same thing—it samples from the probability distribution
of augmentations.
Assuming a sampling procedure which generates a number of n samples us-
ing the described method, then each node Y is included with probability equal
to Pr(Y ). Thus after n independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples, a





where I is the indicator function, taking the value of 1 if the predicate within is
satisfied and A′i is the set of nodes contained in the i-th sampled augmentation.
In the dice experiment the value of the kY indicator would be the number of times
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we rolled either 1 : 6, 2 : 6, 3 : 6, 4 : 6, 5 : 6, or 6 : 6. In our case kY is used to
denote the number of times we sampled Y .
4.4.1 Sampling accuracy & Experimental results
The development of any simulation for the approximative computation of certain
theoretical values needs to be characterised by certain properties which can guar-
antee that the concerned simulation will eventually converge to the theoretical
results, while as well that it is feasible. These properties are related with the
notions of:
ǫ: Experimental error of an argument’s likelihood to be included in A′,
which, at least abstractly, represents the deviation of the calculated proba-
bility approximation from the actual theoretical value;
E{ky}: The expected number of observations of a certain argument Y ;
Var{ky}: The variance of each of these observations, which is a non-negative
value that measures how far a set of numbers is spread out1;
δ: A value, produced through mathematical analysis, which represents
our confidence that ǫ will be within the bounds of a certain threshold, and;
Pˆ r(Y ): The expected probability of accepting a Y in a A′.
We note that for the computation of the experimental error (ǫ) it is necessary
that we do compute the actual theoretical probabilities for all the arguments we
consider in our experiments.
Generally, the feasibility of using a Monte-Carlo simulation is based on:
• whether or not the sampling procedure yields a sample from the distribution
in question;
• if each sample is independent of previous samples;
1A small variance indicates that the data tend to be very close to the mean (expected
value) and hence to each other, while a high variance indicates that the data are very spread
out around the mean and from each other.
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• if running the simulation is much more efficient and tractable than exhaus-
tively computing the theoretical probabilities; and
• whether it accurately computes the underlying probability distribution.
Based on these, the augmentation procedure which requires determining the ar-
gument likelihoods makes for an ideal candidate for the use of the Monte-Carlo
simulation as described in Algorithm 4.1. The proof for quick convergence is
presented in this section.
Let us again consider the dice experiment. Essentially, the principle is the
same and at the end of each experiment we will obtain an estimated probability
for getting at least a 6 on one of the dice. Ideally we want this estimate to be
11/36. However in practice we get a result which will be reasonably close to
that. In this case the ǫ would be an error value meaning that we would accept
an estimate which is ±ǫ away from the real value (11/36). At the same time, we
would like in the results of this estimate to be within ǫ bounds for most of the
times we perform the experiment, e.g. for a proportion of δ of the experiments
we might get a value outside these bounds, but for the rest of the experiment
that value will be within these bounds.
The expected number of augmentation samples which contain Y follows a
binomial distribution, as it is the case with the dice experiment. Generally, the
binomial distribution is the discrete probability distribution of the number of
successes in a sequence of n independent success/failure experiments, each of
which yields success with a certain probability. Our trivial dice experiment is
one such experiment. This distribution is frequently used to model the number
of successes in a sample of size n, i.e. in the dice experiment, how many times
we expect to observe a 6 after n rolls. Equivalently in the case of our experiment
that is how many times we expect an argument Y to be chosen after n tries.
Due to the law of large numbers and the fact that each sample is i.i.d., it
holds that the expected number of observations kY , of any given node Y for a
number of tries n is:
E{kY } = n · Pr(Y ) (4.9)
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and the variance is:
Var{kY } = n · Pr(Y ) · (1− Pr(Y )) (4.10)
Note that the above equations concern a single experiment. This defines a multi-
nomial distribution over the set of nodes, i.e. a binomial distribution for every
neighbouring argument. Therefore we can estimate the probability of accepting
Y as follows:




which directly follows from Equation 4.9 and where Pˆ r(Y ) denotes our estimates
of Pr(Y ). In other words, the estimate of the likelihood of a certain argument Y
would be the frequency of which we sampled it.
To recap, the procedure described here is a method to sample for the inclusion-
exclusion probability as an alternative of exhaustively calculating these probabil-
ities, which is of exponential complexity in the number of arcs considered. As
this is an approximative solution we expect that the sampled probability will
be characterised by some error which we intend to bound, deviating from the
actual theoretical values. Bounding that error can be achieved by calculating
the number of necessary samples n we need to collect prior to computing these
probabilities. The number of samples n required to achieve an accuracy an error
ǫ with a confidence δ for the case of the augmentation sampling, is given in the
following theorem:
Theorem 6 The Monte-Carlo approach to sample the probability distribution of






Proof Assume we sample n points from AHi . This would yield a sample K.
We now need to determine how far the empirical observations kY are from the
expected E{kY }. We use the normal approximation interval which can be found
in various textbooks, e.g. Mood [1963]. Since we know that for each argument in
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NA the probability to observe it in a given sample follows a binomial distribution,
the normal approximation can be expressed as follows:
Pr

|Pˆ r(Y )− Pr(Y )| ≥ z1− δ
2
√
Pˆ r(Y )(1− Pˆ r(Y ))
n

 ≤ δ (4.13)
where z1− δ
2
is the normal distribution quantile function (the inverse of the CDF1)
which gives the value for which a standard normal random variable Y has the




ǫ = z1− δ
2
√
Pˆ r(Y )(1− Pˆ r(Y ))
n
which represents the desired upper bound for the error of our estimation. We are




Pˆ r(Y )(1− Pˆ r(Y ))
ǫ2
(4.14)
Since Pˆ r(Y )(1− Pˆ r(Y )) ≤ 1
4







Equation 4.13 states that our estimate Pˆ r(Y ) is ǫ close to the real value
Pr(Y ) with probability less than δ. In this case δ and ǫ are the accuracy and
confidence parameters we require. Equation 4.14 gives us a strict bound on the
rate of convergence of Pˆ r(Y ) to Pr(Y ). As a direct consequence we notice that
values approaching Pr(Y ) = 0.5 have the slowest convergence. On the other
hand Equation 4.12 gives us a more generic with high probability bound for n.
In essence, Equation 4.12 gives us the expected upper bound of the error,
which is reaches an accuracy equal to ǫ = 0.05, with δ = 0.05 confidence by
1Cumulative distribution function (CDF), or just distribution function, describes the prob-
ability that a real-valued random variable X with a given probability distribution will be found
to have a value less than or equal to a certain x, where x is one of the values X may attain
with a certain probability.
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independently of the size of the RG. Using Algorithm 4.1 we can estimate the
likelihood of a given set of arguments (by dividing their observations by n) and
infer a distribution of arguments. Based on these results we can augment our
OM by adding to it arguments with probability values above 0.5.
For testing the proposed simulation, we generated Poisson random graphs,
with edge probability set to 50/v (where v is the size of the graph). The reason
for selecting this probability was to ensure there exists a giant connected com-
ponent and have a graph which is sufficiently dense and coherent to justify the
need to use a sampling method to infer the argument likelihoods rather than to
directly measure them, but also sufficiently sparse, in order to be able to use it on
a computer with limited capabilities. Due to the lack of benchmarks to compare
with, we do not know whether a random graph better corresponds to a realistic
argument graph, however for the purposes of the Monte-Carlo simulation we be-
lieve that the graph structure is irrelevant for the purpose of argument likelihood
estimation (assuming that the real argument graphs will not be complete or have



















Figure 4.13: Error per argument likelihood over n samples
Performing tests on graphs of various sizes we have obtained the results of
the average error which can be seen in Figure 4.12. We can see that the average
error is upper bounded by the theoretically expected value. In practice the con-
vergence is much quicker than what the theory suggests (O(n|RA|) translated to
n experiments multiplied with the total number of elements in set RA), resulting
in error less than 0.1 after only 15 samples. Additionally in Figure 4.13 we can
see the error per argument likelihood Pr(Y ). We observe how the error is maxi-
mized for likelihoods in the range of 0.4− 0.6 which further supports the results
of Equation 4.14.
Finally, we make use of a correlation coefficient to measure the correlation
between the sampled argument likelihoods with the real likelihoods. In general
the use of correlation coefficients is used to determine correlation, or dependence
between two random variables. Assuming for example we want to check if there
is any correlation between peoples IQ and their GPAs. The correlation coefficient
could be an indicator of this correlation, and to obtain it we can first rank each
person’s IQ and each person’s GPAs so as to then test how similar these two
rankings are. The idea is that if a person’s ranking of his IQ coincides with the
ranking of its GPA, e.g. the person with the highest IQ has the highest GPA and
so on, then the correlation coefficient would obtain its maximum value (typically
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1) indicating that there is a perfect correlation between IQs and GPAs.
In our case we require sampled argument likelihoods to be heavily correlated
with the real likelihoods since the first should eventually converge to the second.
There are many commonly used approaches to measure the correlation such as:
• The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, written as r, which
measures the linear relationship between two variables;
• The interclass correlation coefficients used to describe the similarity of units
between a specific group of units, and;
• The rank correlation coefficient which measures the linear relationship be-
tween the ordering (or ranking) of two variables.
The correlation coefficient we have chosen to use is a rank correlation coefficient,
and specifically Spearaman’s ρ coefficient. The reason we have chosen to use the
ranking correlation coefficient is due to some drawbacks of Pearson’s r on very
large data1, underlined by Litvak and van der Hofstad [2012].







where ri is the rank difference of the i − th item in the distribution, and n the
number of ranked items; in our case, the number of arguments. The Spearman
ρ can obtain values between −1 and 1, with −1 meaning that the samples are
perfectly anti-correlated and 1 meaning the distributions are perfectly correlated.
Values that approach 0 indicate that the distributions are not correlated.
The way we compute the ranking of the items is simply by ordering the argu-
ments by their real likelihood and by their experimentally determined likelihood
and comparing the ranks of each argument Yi in each ordering in order to de-
termine ri. In Figure 4.14 we can see the correlation of our samples with the
real ranks of the nodes in NA. The main point that is apparent in this figure is
that the distributions are strongly correlated (over 0.9 correlation) even at small
1Particularly, for very large data the second product moment of the coefficient dominates
the value, meaning that when used on very large data it will likely result in negative correlation.
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Figure 4.14: Spearman ρ over number of samples n
sample sizes (k ≈ 15). This means that (empirically) after around 80 samples
at most, we should stop sampling since the improvement that would be yielded
by additional samples would be of greatly diminished value. Furthermore, the
strength of the correlation and the rate of the increase of the correlation is in-
dependent of the graph size and does not affect the accuracy of our estimations,
which supports the scalability of our approach.
4.5 Augmenting the Opponent Knowledge Base
Given the results of the Monte-Carlo simulation, the next step is to select the
neighbouring arguments of the concerned OM with a likelihood higher than a
threshold θS = 0.5 and augment the concerned OM with the logical constituents
of those arguments. Assume for example that an agent Ag1 augments its opponent
model S(1,2) of another agent Ag2, with the following two arguments:
A : p, s; p, s⇒ q chosen with a likelihood Pr(A) = 0.91
B : r, t; r, t→ w chosen with a likelihood Pr(B) = 0.84
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It is then expected that the contents of A and B will become elements of setsK(1,2)
and R(1,2) according to whether they are premises or rules, while they will also
receive a confidence value equal to the likelihood of the argument they compose,
as defined in Definition 46(c), i.e.:
< p, 0.91 >,< s, 0.91 >,< p, s,⇒ q, 0.91 >
< r, 0.84 >,< t, 0.84 >,< r, t⇒ w, 0.84 >
Nevertheless, this process is not as trivial as it may seem, as even though it
may very well be the case that the augmentation concerns arguments new to the
model, logical elements of those arguments may already be part of the concerned
OM. In this case we face the problem of dealing with conflicting confidence values
between those elements. The question raised is whether to either:
• discard the existing confidence value and use the new one, or;
• discard the new confidence value and keep the existing one, or;
• compute an average or a propagated value of the two.
Choosing between one of these three possible ways for resolving these conflicts
can be based on various contextual factors, or factors related with the modeller’s
objectives.
Another issue discussed in this section concerns the instantiation of arguments
with logical elements with varying degrees of confidence. Assume for example an
argument:
C : f ; f ⇒ y where < f, 0.87 > and < f ⇒ y, 0.63 >
then what is the confidence of the produced argument? In other words, what is the
confidence with which the modeller assumes an opponent to know a constructed
argument? In a similar way to how the conflicting confidence problem can be
resolved, numerous approaches can also be employed in this case as well, that are
again dependent on the concerned context and on the modeller’s goals. In what
follows we discuss possible solutions to these problems as well as their advantages
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and limitations, while we also choose those that better reflect the objectives of
our research scope.
4.5.1 Resolving conflicts between confidence values
Since we assume agents to maintain confidence values as a metric for evaluating
the likelihood of certain arguments to actually be part of an opponent’s knowl-
edge, a naive assumption would be to simply maintain the largest confidence
value whenever faced with a conflict. However, this approach seems too general
and does not account for the fact that the confidence values result from different
information collection methods (ICMs). In other, words one should differenti-
ate between whether a confidence value collected through an augmentation is
replaced with a confidence value collected through a third party informer and
vice-versa, or with information directly collected through an agent’s commitment
store.
For example, if certain data are given a confidence value equal to 1 resulting
from their direct collection from an agent’s commitment store, in the case of
conflict their confidence value must not be replaced with a new one. However,
in the opposite case it should. In this sense, it is worth defining a precedence
hierarchy between the three information collection approaches and the confidence
values that result from them. In addition, in the case where a confidence value
is the product of a propagated probability acquired through a third party, if it
conflicts with a value also acquired from another third party, then, assuming a
static trust network, it seems reasonable to discard the lowest of the two—the
one we trust the less.
Finally, if the conflict concerns information collected from two distinct aug-
mentations, since the newest of the two will be based on more dialogues, i.e.
on more experience, the old one should be discarded. This could also be the
case for when a conflict occurs between information collected by third parties—
if the concerned trust network is dynamic we should rely on the newest of the
two values. Furthermore, again in the case of conflicting confidence values which
may result from the same augmentation, i.e. confidence values for the same log-
ical constituent found in discrete arguments included in an OM from the same
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augmentation, one could choose between the following alternatives: compute an
average, discard the lowest or discard the highest of the two.
However the question that remains unanswered is how to deal with conflicts
between augmentation confidence values and third party trust related confidence
values. Intuitively the difficulty of responding to this question results from the
fact that these ICMs appear to be independent, and thus defining a metric able
to objectively characterise the two, and thus to choose between them, is at least
a complex issue. Even if one assumes that, for example, contradiction between
the two could be defined in the sense that it is counter-intuitive to assume that
information provided by a single agent could ever be more reliable than one’s own
general experience suggests, it is perhaps arbitrary to assume that augmentation
confidence values should always take precedence over trust related confidence
values.
For practical reasons and for the sake of completeness we propose computing
an average of the two. In general though, researching the relationship between
the implications that follow if an agent strongly trusts a peer, while its experience
stands against its trust, appears to be an interesting research problem.
We provide a definition of a function for resolving such conflicts, which also
describes how this function can be practically used. We nevertheless note that
resolving such conflicts can be done in various ways, which may depend on the
nature of the concerned context, or on the perspective and the objectives of the
modeller. We thus hold no absolute stance on the appropriateness or on the
correctness of this particular approach. In essence, every possible combination of
information collection methods (t, t′), out of a total of 23 possible combinations,
is mapped to a specific operation which reflects the approaches discussed so far.
We assume three different information collection methods:
• dir: Direct collection
• tp: Third party information provider
• aug: Augmentation mechanism
and we accordingly define a different operation for all possible combinations which
appear in Table 4.4 as described in Definition 56.
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Definition 56 (Resolving confidence conflicts) Let S = {K,≤′,R,≤,G} and
< x, c, t > be a tuple, where x ∈ {K,R}, c is x’s corresponding confidence value,
and t ∈ ICM where:
ICM = {dir,tp,aug}
Assume then that < x, c′, t′ > is an element to be incorporated into S such that
c 6= c′, then fc is a function where:
fc : t× t
′ → [0, 1]
through which we decide on the final confidence value c associated with x as fol-
lows:
fc(c, c
′, t, t′) =


c if t = dir (a)
c′ if t′ = dir (b)
max{c, c′} if t = tp and t′ = tp (c)
c′ if t = aug and t′ = aug (d)
c+c′
2
if t = tp and t′ = aug and vice versa (e)
Notice that in the case where both t as well as t′ are equal to dir it is also
the case that both c and c′ will be equal to 1 and thus to each other, in which
case there is no conflict.
4.5.2 Computing an argument’s confidence value
In a similar sense to the approaches proposed for resolving possible conflicts
between the conflicting confidence values, in the case of computing an argument’s
confidence value, one may rely on a variety of ways. These may concern:
• computing the propagated confidence value resulting from the multiplica-
tion of the constituents of a particular argument;




dir tp Keep c
dir aug Keep c
tp tp max{c, c′}




aug aug Keep c′




Table 4.4: The possible combinations of the three information collection methods
and how they are resolved in the case of conflict, where: dir: Direct collection;
tp: Third party information provider, and; aug: Augmentation mechanism.
• assigning a confidence value equal to either the largest or the smallest con-
fidence value of the argument’s constituents.
However, another issue needs to be raised at this point; one which is more related
to the employed logic system and the nature as well as the semantics of the
encoded logical information used in that system.
In general, in the ASPIC+ framework the construction of an argument is
partly based on the use of deductive principles that allow for deductive inferences
of conclusions from premises. Examples of such principles are modus-ponens
or modus-tollens (p → q, p ⊢ q respectively p → q,¬q ⊢ ¬p) which generally
represent inference rules that exist independent of the logical language. The set of
strict inference rules (Rs) encodes such classical deductive inferences. At the same
time these rules can be expressed as elements of the language, i.e. be represented
as forms of axiomatic premises resulting from material implication, (e.g. α, α ⊐
β → β) whose validity is indisputable (Kn). Thus, arguments constructed based
on deductive or strict inference rules can be based on premises that are equally
valid to strict or deductive rules in the sense which are also unquestionable. In
this case, the validity of such arguments cannot be compromised, while since
these arguments are based on axiomatic beliefs as well as on deduction rules that
are independent of the employed logic (though expressed as elements of it) these
arguments should be perceived as commonly known arguments and be given a
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confidence value equal to 1. In other words, it makes sense to assume that all
agents in a multi-agent environment partly share such ‘absolute’ information (we
refer the reader to Definition 18, Section 3.1).
ASPIC+ additionally allows for the construction of arguments based on de-
feasible inference rules (Rd), which can be attacked on both their conclusions and
premises, as well as on their inference steps. The distinction between premises
that are axiomatic and that cannot be attacked (Kn) from other forms of premises
with questionable validity and susceptible to attacks (Kp ∪ Ka), as well as be-
tween strict and defeasible rules (Rs and Rd) is very useful. One may rely on
this distinction for assigning confidence values to constructed arguments, which,
based on their logical constituents, appear to be axiomatic and which should thus
be assumed to be part of a ‘universally’ shared knowledge, and thus to distin-
guish them from other arguments whose validity is questionable and for which a
confidence value should be calculated and assigned to them.
However, the ASPIC+ framework also allows for domain specific representa-
tion of strict inference rules and and axiom premises; something which adds to
the framework’s flexibility. To provide a simple example, assuming that:
bachelor→ ¬married
is a strict inference rule or a defeasible one is a debatable issue. In either case,
one should be flexible enough to decide which ever better reflects one’s percep-
tion. We generally assume that agents’ OMs allow for any kind of premises and
rules. Therefore the association of any kind of a logical constituent with a con-
fidence value makes more sense, as the concerned constituent can no longer be
perceived as being part of a shared universal knowledge base, but is rather one’s
own personal belief.
In general, each of the proposed approaches presented in the beginning of
this section, relies on different perspectives and accounts for different inherent
properties that should characterise an argument’s confidence value. For example
the first case follows from basic probability theory laws which state that the
probability of an event taking place is equal to the propagated probability of the
events it depends on. In this sense it is only reasonable that the confidence value
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of an argument:
C : f ; f ⇒ y where < f, 0.87 > and < f ⇒ y, 0.63 >
is equal to 0.87 · 0.63 = 0.5481. In addition the employment of this approach
results in defining a probability distribution over the possible combinations of
the constituents of an argument, with respect to the possibility of them being
actually part of the opponent’s knowledge base or not, i.e.:
Pr(f) · Pr(f ⇒ y) = 0.5481
Pr(f) · (1− Pr(f ⇒ y)) = 0.3219
(1− Pr(f)) · Pr(f ⇒ y) = 0.0819




where A is an argument instantiated from a knowledge base S and x is a logical
constituent of A.
A similar approach to this has been proposed by Hunter [2013]. In his work
Hunter looks into the logical constituents of arguments as well for defining a
probability value for characterising the argument’s uncertainty, though in his case
the objective is to decide the extend to which an argument is true in general, in
addition to the fact that he assumes arguments constructed based on classical
logic inferences, i.e. only assumes strict inference rules in the language. In our
case we care to find out the certainty level with which one should believe that its
opponents are aware of certain information.
Though propagation appears to be a reasonable approach for deciding on the
confidence of a constructed argument, there is a problem with its employment
in our case. Namely, that it produces an antisymmetry between the confidence
value of an argument whose confidence value is also assigned to its constituents
and the confidence value of the same argument after its reconstructed from those
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constituents. Assume for example that an argument’s likelihood to be known
to a certain opponent satisfies an augmentation threshold set at 0.5. Let that
argument be A, then this likelihood value will be directly transferred to its con-
stituents:
< A : p; p⇒ q, cA = 0.5 > where < p, cp = 0.5 > and < p⇒ q, cp⇒q = 0.5 >
which will then be added to that opponent’s OM. Reconstruction of that same
argument from its constituents, and computation of its confidence value will result
in an overall argument confidence value of 0.25, which will be half of the original
value which one would expect it to have.
One could imply that this suggests that assigning the constituents of an ar-
gument with the likelihood value of an argument is also false. If the construction
of an argument is based on whether its constituents are both part of a knowledge
base, then knowledge of each of those constituents should be perceived as a ran-
dom events with discrete probabilities, while the constructed argument should
be their propagated result. In other words, if one assumes for example that an
argument’s likelihood of being known to a certain opponent is equal to 0.5 then
that number should be the product of the propagated likelihood values of its
constituents, e.g.
< A : p; p⇒ q, cA ≈ 0.5 > where < p, cp = 0.91 > and < p⇒ q, cp⇒q = 0.55 >
However there are infinite combinations of numbers whose product will be equal
to 0.5. In addition, our augmentation approach relies on an abstract perception
of arguments and it thus disregards likelihood information related directly to
the constituents of arguments. In other words deducing the likelihood of the
constituents of arguments rather than of the arguments constructed by them is
a different issue, is not accounted in our approach. We elaborate more on this
issue in Chapter 5.
One could try computing the average of the confidence values of the contents of
an argument, as it also appeals to intuition. It is generally a common approach
to assume that the volatility of a possible event can only belong in the range
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between the highest or the lowest probability of the events it depends on. It can
thus be expressed through the average value of those probabilities. However the
same asymmetry issues arises here as well.
We therefore resort to, the last approach, which resembles the weakest link
principle presented by Prakken [2010] for deciding on whether a certain argument
defeats another, in the case where the smallest of the confidence values of the con-
stituents of an argument is selected to represent the argument’s confidence value.
Intuition here lies in the fact that if an event depends on a number of other events
in order to happen, then in essence its probability of happening is at most equal
to the probability of the event with the lowest probability. In contrast to the two
approaches previously mentioned, in this case the confidence value of the argu-
ment from which the values of the constituents are inherited and the confidence
value of the same argument reconstructed from those constituents will be the
same. We note that the symmetry between the original argument’s confidence
value and the confidence value of that argument after it has been reconstructed
from those constituents should only hold in the case where no confidence value
conflicts occur between the newly imported constituents and constituents which
are already part of an OM, as in such case resolution of conflicts will result in
altering those values, as explained in Section 4.5.1.
We thus opt to rely on the latter approach for defining the confidence value
of an argument composed of logical constituents with varying degrees of confi-
dence. Nevertheless, we provide two general formulæ for defining an argument’s
confidence value as follows:
Definition 57 (Argument confidence value) Let A be an argument and Λ =
{x1, x2, . . . , xi, . . . , xn} be a set containing A’s logical constituents where ∀x holds
that x ∈ {K,R} while there exists a tuple < xi, ci > where ci is the confidence
value of xi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then the confidence value cA of the argument
composed from the elements of Λ is computed based on the following general for-
mula:
cA = c1 ⊛ c2 ⊛ . . .⊛ cn
where ⊛ is a user-defined operator.
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Definition 58 (Weakest Link Confidence) Let A be an argument and Λ =
{x1, x2, . . . , xi, . . . , xn} be a set containing A’s logical constituents where ∀x holds
that x ∈ {K,R} while there exists a tuple < xi, ci > where ci is the confidence
value of xi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then the confidence value cA of the argument
composed from the elements of Λ is computed based on the following general for-
mula:
cA = min{c1, c2, . . . , cn}
Finally in relation to the user-defined operator used in Definition 57 we note
that, though it is not necessary, the operator should provide a result within the
closed range of [0 − 1] in order to be used as a probability value for decision
making purposes. However, in the case where this requirement is not satisfied,
the user may normalise the cA values to represent probabilities at a later stage.
4.6 Conclusions & Contributions
In this chapter we have provided a general methodology for updating and aug-
menting an OM, based on an agent’s experience obtained through dialogues. This
methodology is based on two mechanisms respectively responsible for updating
and augmenting an OM. In relation to the latter, we provided a method for
building a graph between related arguments asserted by a modeller’s opponents,
referred to a RG, and proposed an augmentation mechanism, enabling an agent
to augment its current beliefs about its opponents beliefs by including additional
information (arguments), that is of high likelihood to be related to what the
opponent is currently assumed to know. Thus, we enabled an agent to also ac-
count in its strategising for the possibility that additional information may also
be known to its opponents, while indirectly accounting for the structure of the
dialogues from which information is collected—i.e. accounting for how and when
certain opponent arguments seem to follow after certain others. We thus allowed
a modeller to utilise her dialogue history in a multifaceted way. Lastly, we defined
and analysed a Monte-Carlo simulation which enabled us to infer the likelihood
of those additional arguments in a tractable and efficient way.
We are aware that more investigation is needed with respect to relying on
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alternative contextual factors for quantifying the likelihood between elements in
a RG, such as the level of a participant’s membership in a group, and this is
something we intend to investigate in the future. In addition, it is worth to also
investigate whether the links between arguments in a RG can be attached based
on different approaches, other than relying on the notion of support. For example,
it is worth to investigate whether arguments should be related—and therefore
attached to each other—given that they allegedly attack the same arguments,
or if they are partly composed of similar constituents, i.e. it is more likely for
someone to be aware of an argument B : p, p⇒ q given that he knows A : p, p⇒ s
as they are both aware of premise p. Furthermore, it is also essential that we
investigate the added value of modelling a RG for a θt > 1, as increasing θt’s
value may significantly increase the complexity of the proposed solution. In a
similar sense, it seems also interesting to investigate whether an agent should
attempt to augment its knowledge with arguments that are at more than a one
hop distance from a concerned OM, as the proposed mechanism is only concerned
with neighbouring nodes of the model. Of course this implies the need for the
development of a different augmentation approach. All these issues are both
discussed and dealt with in Chapter 5.
Another issue is concerned with the evaluation of the effectiveness of our ap-
proach which requires that we take into account actual argumentation frameworks
and not just abstract arguments. Unfortunately, there is a general lack of bench-
mark mechanisms in the field of argumentation and this is an interesting issue
which we intend to tackle in the future. A methodology towards evaluating our
approach is discussed in Chapter 7.
It is worth noting that the proposed approach can be easily generalised and ap-
plied in different contexts. All that is necessary is the development of a methodol-
ogy for associating (linking) information (locutions) based on contextually inher-
ent properties. For example sharing access to certain information could concern
a trial case where one would expect that the participating lawyers are equally
aware of facts concerned with the trial. In this case, assuming that the modelling
subject is a lawyer participating in a trial, then we may augment his model by
adding to it information we believe other lawyers, who also participate in the
trial, know. Another example could concern information related to a particular
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topic. Let us assume that someone is aware of the fact that ”earth is a sphere”
and that ”it is part of the solar system”, this gives reasonable grounds for also
assuming that, with a certain likelihood, it is possible that that someone also
knows that ”earth is the third planet orbiting around the sun”, given of course
that we can first categorise a modeller’s collected information into topic groups.
Finally, one could even rely on ‘reasonable assumptions’ for inferring a relation-
ship between information. Assume for example that an academic is aware of a
certain paper, it is then reasonable to assume that she is likely to also be aware
of papers cited in it, while one would expect that this likelihood would increase
if she is the author of the paper. As far as our work is concerned this inherent
linking property is expressed through the notion of support. More approaches to
associating potentially related information based on whether it is characterised




This chapter focusses on extending the opponent modelling methods presented
in Chapter 4, which rely on the construction of relationships graphs (RGs). Such
graphs can be used for augmenting one’s knowledge of the possible knowledge of
its opponents, based on the relationships between the opponent arguments (OAs)
in a RG.
Particularly, we extend the weight assignation mechanism responsible for as-
signing weight values on the arcs which link OAs, that allows for a more concrete
modelling approach to quantifying these values, accounting for additional aspects
that were ignored in Chapter 4 for the sake of simplicity.
We also discuss different ways for building RGs, i.e. ways for relating OAs
based on inherent relationships they share. In Chapter 4, the inherent relationship
used was the notion of support. We introduce a new relationship notion which
allows the formation of links between arguments with common attack targets, thus
utilising another inherent linking property between arguments. We also illustrate
how both notions can be combined for the construction of a more dense1 RG.
5.1 Introduction
Out of the three modelling mechanisms presented in Chapter 4, direct collection,
through the opponent’s commitment store (dir); third party provided informa-
1Here “dense” is not use in its standard graph theoretic sense but rather as a placeholder
for “has more links”.
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tion (tp), and; augmentation (aug), we mostly focussed on the last one. The
augmentation mechanism is used to expand an agent’s current model of its oppo-
nent, by adding to it information that has a high likelihood of being related with
information already contained in it. As this is a complex mechanism which is
required for numerous new notions to be introduced and explained, we purposely
opted to present a simple version of the proposed methodology which, as it will
become evident in this chapter, disregards many important considerations which
if were taken into account could have a considerable impact on the effectiveness1
of the proposed modelling methodology, i.e on how valid our modelling approach
can be.
As discussed in Chapter 4, for linking arguments in a RG we rely on their
interrelatedness. In other words, we rely on inherent relationships that arguments
may share for associating them with some relationship likelihood. We can then
rely on these relationships in order to anticipate possible arguments that could
follow in a dialogue game, if they are related with arguments already in the game,
given that this has repeatedly been recorded in past dialogues with different
opponents. Such inherent relationship is the arguments’ ability to reinstate one
another, which we expressed through the notion of support. We differentiate
between two cases of support. In the first case, assuming an argument C that
attacks an argumentB which in turn attacks another argumentA, then we assume
that C directly supports A as it reinstates its acceptability by attacking B. The
second case concerns a weaker version of support, referred to as indirect support,
in which case another argument, D, would be introduced in the same dispute as
A by the same participant as A but not for attacking A’s direct attacker B, i.e.
intermediate arguments (e.g. C) introduced by that participant appear between
A and D in a dispute.
Let us also recall the weight assignation formula presented in Definition 52
responsible for the quantification of the support relationships between arguments
in a RG. According to this formula, assuming two related—linked—arguments
A,B in a RG, a weight value within the closed range of [0, 1] is produced by
counting the number of times that B follows after A in discrete dialogues and
1With effectiveness here we refer to the mechanism’s ability to better reflect one’s opponents’
actual knowledge, or to better anticipate the likelihood of something to follow in a dialogue.
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dividing that number with the total appearances of A in dialogues. One should
agree that this is a rather abstract approach for quantifying the relationship
likelihood between the connected arguments in a RG. For example, one could
adjust the weighing value so as to account for the θ-distance between a linked
pair of OAs in a way analogous to how strongly the following argument supports
the preceding argument. In other words, the weighing formula should be able
to discriminate between cases of linked pairs of OAs where one directly supports
the other (reinstatement) and pairs where one indirectly supports the other. Of
course, in Chapter 4 we consider only RGs built based on a θt = 1. As discussed,
increasing the value of the θt results in increasing the connectivity between the
arguments in the RG, and therefore the complexity is also increased. So, unless
there is some added value in setting a θt with values greater than 1, this should
be avoided. This is one of the issues we investigate in this chapter.
Furthermore, recall the connectivity condition presented in Definition 51. The
condition dictates that arguments should be connected only if they appear in
the same line of dispute. This is a condition imposed in order to reflect the
support relationship between OAs. However, support is not the only inherent
relationship between OAs. Another such inherent relationship could be found in
how often a set of arguments appears to attack the same target—argument—in
an agent’s history. Specifically, we could assume that arguments with common
attack targets could be associated with a likelihood deriving from how often they
appear to attack their common target, in a history of dialogues. After all, it seems
reasonable from a modeller’s perspective to hold the belief that if an opponent
is aware of a single argument able to counter one of its own, then that opponent
may also know more arguments that can do the same.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: in Section 5.2 we discuss the
added value of building RGs with θt > 1, we propose a different weighing mecha-
nism which accounts for additional modelling aspects than the original mechanism
presented in Chapter 4, and we compare the two mechanisms; in Section 5.3 we
propose a different modelling approach for building RGs, assuming relationships
between arguments with common attack targets and finally; in Section 5.4 we
summarise our contributions.
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5.2 Support–RGs with θt > 1
In Section 4.3.1 we discuss and propose a modelling approach for building a RG
which relies on the notion of support. Particularly, arguments are assumed to be
related if they are found in the same dispute lines of a dialogue and at a θ-distance
equal to θt from each other. This distance (θt) was purposely set to 1, in order
to easily introduce the proposed modelling approach, capturing support in its
strongest form—that of reinstatement. However, a question worth investigating
is whether there is any added value in assuming an indirect support relationship
between arguments—one that exceeds the θt threshold of 1.
Increasing the value of θt for modelling a RG relies on the assumption that
opponent arguments (OAs) found in the same line of dispute are related, since one
supports the other regardless of the distance between them. Though this seems
like a valid assumption there are numerous considerations that one is called to
account for prior to applying it in modelling a RG.
Firstly, increasing θt will result in building a more dense RG which means
that the complexity of computing the argument likelihoods of the augmentation
process will also increase. In other words, increasing the density of the RG graph
may make the augmentation process intractable, while at the same time from a
human point of view not bounding θt (θt ≈ ∞) or assigning a large value to it,
raises a cognitive resources issue, due to the large volume of information that
needs to be stored. In addition to these though, and more importantly, it is se-
mantically questionable whether an argument Y , that follows at a large distance
after another argument X in the same dispute, actually does support X. There-
fore, it is at least necessary that with the increase of θt corresponding weighing
mechanisms are developed in order to appropriately quantify the relationship
likelihood between the supported arguments, in such a way so as to account for
the distance between them.
For example, let us re-examine the modelling example first presented in Chap-
ter 4, which appears again in Figure 5.1. Figure 5.1c illustrates a θt = 2 modelling
approach where, in contrast to Figure 5.1b which assumes a θt = 1, shows a link
in the form of a direct arc between arguments B and F . Let us now consider









































Figure 5.1: a) A dialogue tree T where the grey and the white nodes concern
Ag1’s respectively Ag2’s moves, b) A 1-hop RG modelling approach c) A 2-hop
RG modelling approach.
decided. We remind the reader that weights on the arcs have values in the closed
range of [0, 1] and are assigned as in Definition 52, in which the weight is the
number of times that the end -argument (in this case F and D) follows after the
start-argument (in this case B), divided by the total appearances of the start-
argument. If we assume that argument F was recorded to only follow in dialogues
after argument D then its dependence on D should somehow be reflected in the
corresponding weights on the edges that link arguments B, D and F . However,
according to the proposed weighing approach the weighing values of the pairs
B,D and B,F will be exactly the same, as they will both have the same numer-
ator (the number of times that F follows after B is equal to the number of times
that D follows after B), and the same denominator (the total number of times
that B appears).
Practical issues aside, intuition suggests that there is little to learn by increas-
ing the θt threshold when modelling an RG while it may produce counter-intuitive
results. For example, since the indirect support of argument B by F as a possibil-
ity is dependent on the possible awareness of D, it makes little sense to augment
an OM with F but without D. Nevertheless, this becomes possible in the case
where θt = 2 in contrast to when θt = 1 due to the existence of rBF , even if F













































RG′1, θt = 2
(f)
Figure 5.2: a) A dialogue between an agent Ag1 (grey) and an agent Ag2, b)
The induced RG1 for θt = 1, c) The induced RG1 for θt = 2, d) Three dialogues
between Ag1 and Ag2, e) The induced RG
′
1 for θt = 1, and f) The induced RG
′
1
for θt = 2.
tification can diminish this possibility, it cannot exclude it completely. Thus,
increasing θt when building an RG seems both troublesome and not worth the
effort to do so, unless there is more to learn.
In fact, there is one more important thing we can learn by increasing θt which
we elaborate in the following example.
Example 8 Let us assume that two agents Ag1 and Ag2 engage for the first
time in a single dialogue D1 (Figure 5.2a), based on which an RG1 is induced
for θt=1 (Figure 5.2b) and another is induced for a θt=2 (Figure 5.2c) . Let us
then assume another case where the same agents engage, again for the first time,
in a number of dialogues instead of just one, D1,D2 and D3 (Figure 5.2d), based
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on which another RG′1 for θt=1 is induced (Figure 5.2e) as well as for a θt=2
(Figure 5.2f).
In both cases, for a θt=1 the structure of the induced RG, is the same, i.e.
RG1 =RG
′
1. However, if we were to induce these RGs for a θt=2 then, in contrast
to RG′1 of Figure 5.2f which would remain the same, RG1, depicted in Figure 5.2c,
would have an additional arc (the red arrow) connecting arguments B and F .
Based on this example, it is easy to see that if we were given just an RG
of the form presented in Figures 5.2b & 5.2e , then assuming that this RG was
modelled for a θt=1, we would not be able to distinguish between whether B
and F appeared in the same dialogue or not. In other words, distinguishing
between whether the concerned RG is a result of a single dialogue such as the
one illustrated in Figure 5.2a, or of numerous distinct dialogues such as those
illustrated in Figure 5.2d would not be possible, since for a θt=1 the induced
RGs would be identical in both cases. In contrast, if we build the RG for a θt=2,
an additional arc will be added between arguments B and F in the case where B
and F have actually appeared in the same dialogue (the red arc in Figure 5.2c).
Semantically, increasing the value of θt is important if we want to be more
precise in relation to better capturing the relationship likelihood between two
arguments. However, the added value of this modelling approach is not just
that it allows us to distinguish between whether two arguments have or have not
appeared in the same dialogue, by the respective existence or non-existence of an
arc between them, but that it captures an additional modelling objective which
derives from our modelling hypothesis. Namely, that in contrast with arguments
that do not appear in the same dialogue, those that do should be characterised
by a larger relationship likelihood. In other words, the likelihood of someone
knowing F given that she knows B should increase if they have both appeared
in the same dialogue.
After all our objective is to anticipate what arguments might follow in a
dialogue after certain others, and thus if two arguments do appear in the same
dialogue it is in our best interest to record/represent this in our modelling. In this
case, this is captured through the addition of an arc which directly links B and F ,
since in this way the probability of getting from B to F , through a random walk,







Figure 5.3: The possible expansion options of a sub-graph that contains only
argument B.
that our augmentation approach attempts only single-hop graph expansions. In
other words, assuming the RG that appears in Figure 5.3 where the OM to be
expanded is one that only contains argument B, the only way to get to F is
through rBF , and the probability to get to F in this case is exactly equal to the
edge’s corresponding weight, i.e. PBF = wBF . So stating that we have increased
the number of ways we can get to an argument that indirectly supports another,
does not really hold. Nevertheless, we have in fact increased the probability of
getting to such an argument (in the case of our example, to get from B to F ) from
0—since there was no direct link between arguments that indirectly support one
another before—to the weight value (wBF ) of the arc that links that argument to
the one it indirectly supports (B). What we intend to additionally account for
now, is the fact that such indirect relationships should have lower probabilities
from the direct relationships they extend. In other words, that the weight wBF
is lower than wBD, even if F always follows after D in dialogues.
The intuition behind this modelling approach lies in the fact that assuming
that the two weights are equal (wBF = wBD), would disregard that F following
B is contingent on the intermediate D being moved. In other words, if F always
follows after D in dialogues but never on its own after B, then assuming a weight
value wBF = wBD would completely ignore this fact. So far we rely on a naive
approach for providing a weight value wXY for a corresponding arc rXY , simply
counting the number of times that an argument X followed by Y appeared in
dialogues, and dividing them with the total number of times that argument X
appeared in dialogues. This approach disregards that argument Y might appear
in various distances from X. If we were to rely on this approach then, in the
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case of our example, wBF and wBD would be exactly equal if F always follows
after D. We therefore need to also take into account the distance between the
concerned arguments. This can be done through monitoring both the number
of times that a certain argument follows after another in a dispute as well as
the distance they have from each other, and using that distance for lowering the
relationship likelihood between the associated arguments. To do so we rely on
the following definition:
Definition 59 (Relationship Instances) Given an Ag and its RG = {AH,
R}, its history of dialogues H, and two arguments A,B elements of AH then let:
Instances(H, A,B) = IAB = {i1, i2, i3, . . . , iµ}
be a function that returns a set IAB representing all the instances i of argument A
followed by B in the same disputes, satisfying Definition 51 such that rAB ∈ R,
and where each ik ∈ IAB is equal to the θ-distance between A and B in that
instance1.
Essentially, through this definition, we are able to not only count the instances
of two arguments in an agent’s history of interactions, but also the corresponding
distances they have. Note that it is always the case that |IA∗| > |IAB|, where
∗ is substituted with any argument in AH including the null argument, as the
instances of argument A will be at least equal to the instances of A followed by B.
Assume for example the two dialogues of Figure 5.4 between Ag1 (the modeller)
and another two agents, Ag2 and Ag3. From these two dialogues the modeller
will induce the RG which appears in Figure 5.4c for a θt = 2. The corresponding
instances of the pairs joined by the 4 edges in the induced RG, rBD, rDF , rBF ,
and rBH are:
IBD = {1, 1} IBF = {2, 2}
IDF = {1, 1} IBH = {1}
1Note that in a single dialogue there may exist more than one instances of arguments A


























Figure 5.4: a) D1 betweeen Ag1 and Ag2, b) D2 betweeen Ag1 and Ag3, c) the
induce RG
while the total instances of arguments B and D are:
IB∗ = {1, 1, 1, 1} ID∗ = {1, 1}
Given the instances of a pair of connected arguments, we can define a mecha-
nism for assigning a weight value on their corresponding arc in a RG, as follows:
Definition 60 (Conductivity-based Weight Assignation) Given an agent
Ag and its RG = {AH, R}, its history of dialogues H, and two arguments A,B











Note that since every instance ik ∈ IAB and ik ∈ N, it must hold that 0 < 1ik ≤ 1.
















with |IA∗|, which represents the number
of all the instances of argument A, we normalise the sum of the distances of all
the instances of A and B in H thus computing a probability value. In relation to
the example of Figure 5.4 the respective weight values for edges rBD, rDF , rBF ,



































































Notice that though argument F always follows after D, wBF < wBD.
The intuition behind this approach draws from the study of electricity. If one
assumes that the θ-distance between two arguments in a dialogue acts as a metric
in an analogous way to that of resistance in an electric circuit, then using that
resistance as the denominator in a fraction where the denominator is 1 resembles
the notion of conductivity in a circuit. In our case this conductivity is expressed
in the form of 1
ik
while the sum of these conductivities serves as an indicator of
how easy it is to get to a certain argument from a certain point. Once again, the
use of the denominator |IA∗| serves only for normalisation purposes.
5.2.1 Comparing the two weighing mechanisms
At this point it is worth comparing the two weighing mechanisms proposed in
this thesis. To recap, assuming a relationship between two arguments A and
B, according to the mechanism described in Definition 52, we simply count the
number of times that argument A appears followed by B, and we divide that
number with the total number times that A generally appears in dialogues fol-
lowed by any argument. In essence, Definition 60 is an extension of Definition 52,
as it employs the same basic approach. Namely, to count the instances of the,
allegedly, related arguments in dialogues and normalise that number in order to


































Figure 5.5: a) A dialogue between two agents (we assume that the grey agent is
the modeller), b) the induced RG, c) ignoring A’s attack
about whether two opponent arguments, one subsequent to the other, have just
appeared in a dialogue, we instead record their appearances in discrete disputes,
as well as the distances they have from each other.
We should note that, given the protocol restrictions that characterise either
the credulous or the grounded dialogue games, it is not possible for the same
pair of related arguments to appear twice in the same dispute, since either the
proponent or the opponent will be restricted from repeating an argument they
have previously used in the concerned dispute. It is however possible for the
same opponent argument to appear twice in the same dispute. Let us consider
for example a sequence of arguments moved by two agents in a game that appears
in Figure 5.5. Statistically, the appearance of B after itself simply means that
it is likely for B to follow after itself in a dialogue (the dashed loop on B in
Figure 5.5b). However, semantically this is not really useful since if B is moved
into the game then the modeller already becomes aware of the opponent’s ability
to repeat B contingent on the protocol restrictions and thus accounting for this



































Figure 5.6: a) A dialogue between two agents Ag1 and Ag2, b) Another dialogue
between Ag1 and Ag3, c) The induced RG for a θt = 2
Nevertheless, the repetition of the opponent argument B here can still be
recorded without affecting the validity of our statistical approach. Of course,
depending on the value of θt the argument distances from B will vary, e.g. argu-
ment D will appear at θ-distances {1, 2} from B (Figure 5.5a), which means that
its relationship likelihood with B, particularly in the case of the second weighing
mechanism, would actually decrease compared to a case where B would not be
repeated (Figure 5.5c). But this will be the case with all other arguments related
to B as well. One may, however, choose to simply ignore its repetition, i.e. to
ignore A’s attack on B, converting such disputes into their semantically equiva-
lent forms, such as the conversion of Figure 5.5a to Figure 5.5c, and apply the
weighing mechanisms on those.
In order to better understand the differences between the two mechanisms we
go through a trivial example of building a RG and assigning weight values to its
arcs, computing these values by applying both of them.
Example 9 Let Ag1 and Ag2 engage in a dialogue game depicted in Figure 5.6a
where we assume that Ag1 is the modeller (the grey nodes). Assume that Ag1
engages in another dialogue with Ag3 depicted in Figure 5.6b. The curved green
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arrows that appear in the two dialogues indicate the θ-distances between the op-
ponent arguments that appear, and these distances are bounded at a θt = 2, while
the RG induced from the two dialogues appears in Figure 5.6c.
Assigning the weight values on the arcs of the induced RG can be done either
by relying on Definition 52 or Definition 60. Table 5.1 displays the computation




























































































































Table 5.1: The weight values of the arcs of the RG of Example 9 produced by
the two weighing mechanisms
One can immediately notice the differences between the two weighing mech-
anisms, concluding that in the second case the weight values are generally lower,
which is specifically evident in the first and the second row as well as in the last
row of Table 5.1. This appeals to our intuition as lowering the likelihood of two
arguments to be related is a reasonable thing to do if those arguments are not
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directly supported. Of course, as this is a trivial example concerned with just
two dialogues, the calculated weights are far from accurately representing the ac-
tual relationship likelihood between their concerned linked arguments due to the
cold start problem. However, the example is enough to illustrate the differences
between the two approaches.
Let us further elaborate on this issue by focussing on a certain case of the
presented example. In the case of weight wBD and assuming application of the
first mechanism the number of times that the pair (B,D) appeared is MBF = 2
while the total times that argument B was used isMB∗ = 2, resulting in a weight
value equal to wBD = 1. In contrast, if we apply the second mechanism then
since the pair appears twice at distances i1 = 1 and i2 = 2 we have a sum of their




= 1.5, which is then divided by the instances of B
which are equal to |IB∗| = 2 to produce a weight value wBD = 0.75.
It is thus evident that in the second case the weight values are lower than in
the first case. More interestingly though, if we attempt to increase the θt bound
to 3 thus allowing arguments B and F to be assumed related both in the first
as well as in the second dialogue (while with a θt = 2 they were just related in
the first dialogue), assuming application of the second weighing mechanism will















In general, this approach enhances the possibility of two indirectly supported
arguments to be related as the θt bound increases. We finally note that, the
choice of weighing mechanism depends on the user’s preferences and the domain
of the application.
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5.3 Common Attack Targets–RGs
So far we have stressed that for linking arguments in a RG one may rely on
inherent properties between the OAs used in a modeller’s history of dialogues.
However, we have only used the notion of support for doing so, i.e. the arguments’
ability to reinstate one another. Other notions can be used to serve for expressing
different kinds of interrelatedness of information to link arguments in an RG. One
such notion is that of arguments with common attack targets. In other words, to
assume that it is possible for someone capable of attacking an argument A with
an argument B, to be aware of additional arguments (e.g. C,D,E) that can do
so as well (attack A).
The modelling approach in this case is very similar to the one that relies on
the notion of support, where we essentially assume that opponent arguments in
one’s general history of dialogues that appear to reinstate other arguments that
are already part of an OM, could, with some likelihood, also be part of that
opponent’s knowledge. In an analogous way, appearance of certain opponent
arguments usually used against a modeller’s certain moves in that modeller’s
general history of dialogues, could be used to anticipate other arguments that
might be known to that opponent, given the fact that they attack the same
target.
Let us present an intuitive example. Assume that someone is trying to per-
suade a member of the Scottish National Party (SNP) that Scotland should stay
in the union (claim q) because it is in their economic interest (premise p). Let us
refer to this argument as A. To this argument the member of the SNP offers a
counter argument B stating that Scotland should exit the union (claim ¬q), since
the reason for originally joining the union no longer applies (premise w). Assume
however that another three counter-arguments could have been presented: C:
also stating that Scotland should exit the union (claim ¬q), because Scottish
people are generally different than English; D: stating that it is not in Scotland’s
economic interest to remain in the union (claim ¬p), because the monetary policy
of the United Kingdom is biased towards England (premise t), and E: also stating
that it is not in Scotland’s economic interest to remain in the union (claim ¬p),
because natural resources generated wealth would be better distributed among
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the Scottish rather than among all of the United Kingdom citizens (premise r).
One could assume that arguments B,C,D and E are allegedly associated with
some likelihood. In order to allow for their interrelatedness to become clearer let
us investigate their logical structure. We have the first argument:
A : p; p⇒ q
attacked by another four arguments:
B : w;w ⇒ ¬q, C : s; s⇒ ¬q, D : t; t⇒ ¬p, and E : r; r ⇒ ¬p
One can observe that arguments B and C produce the same claim (¬q), which also
holds for arguments D and E (¬p). Thus the relationship between the elements
of the two pairs is evident. As for the relationship between the pairs themselves,
it lies in the fact that they both share contrary or contradictory relationships
with A—the constituents of which are p and q. The extent to which one should
assume that the elements of this set of arguments ({B,C,D,E}) are related,
derives from how often they appear together to attack argument A in the same
dialogue.
Specifically, we will be linking arguments in a RG if they appear in distinct
disputes, though in the same dialogue, following directly after a certain proponent
argument, i.e. attacking the same target in a dialogue. Example 10 illustrates
this modelling approach.
Example 10 Let Ag1 engage in a dialogue with Ag2 as shown in Figure 5.7a,
followed by another dialogue with another agent (Ag3) as it appears in Figure 5.7b,
and a third one with another agent (Ag4) which appears in Figure 5.7c.
If we assume the construction of a RG based on the common attack targets
notion, then, based on the first dialogue, arguments B, C, and D will be all linked
with each other as they attack argument A. As no other proponent argument is
attacked by more than one argument, no other relationships can be formed based
on the first dialogue. Another two links can be established between arguments M
and H based on the second dialogue as they both attack argument E. Finally, the






































Figure 5.7: a) A dialogue between Ag1 and Ag2, b) A dialogue between Ag1
and Ag3, c) A dialogue between Ag1 and Ag4, d) A RG induced from the three
dialogues based on the notion of support, e) An RG induced from the three
dialogues based on the notion of common attack targets, f) The combined result
of the two RGs
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arguments H and Q as they both attack E, while arguments R,O, I and L will
be simply added in the RG with no links at all. The resulting RG appears in
Figure 5.7e.
Notice that in contrast with relying on the support notion, the links in the case
of arguments with common attack targets are reciprocal. Take for example two
arguments A and B with a common attack argument C, it makes little sense to as-
sume that awareness of A implies a likely awareness of B but not vice versa. Also
notice that, based on the same dialogue restriction, even though one would ex-
pect, arguments Q andM to also be linked as they both attack E in Example 10,
they do not. This is because our objective is to monitor and model a relationship
between arguments in the same dialogue, as we are specifically interested with
anticipating whether an argument will follow after another in a dialogue or not.
In this sense, appearance of an attacker along with other attackers in the same
dialogue is essential.
Definition 61 provides the conditions that must be satisfied for the establish-
ment of a link between two OAs in a RG.
Definition 61 (Connectivity Condition II) Let d′ be a sub-dispute of a dis-
pute d ∈ T such that d′ =< DM0, . . . ,DMk >, and let A and B be two arguments
respectively serving as the content of two opponent dialogue moves DMi and DMj
in a dialogue tree T. Then if both DMi and DMj extend d
′ in T such that:
• ∃d′1 =< DM0, . . . ,DMk,DMi >, where d
′
1 is a sub-dispute of a d1 ∈ T,
and;
• ∃d′2 =< DM0, . . . ,DMk,DMj >, where d
′
2 is a sub-dispute of a d2 ∈ T
then ∃rAB ∈ R and ∃rBA ∈ R.
For computing the weight values on the induced arcs we simply count the
number of times that a certain pair of linked arguments appeared in the same
dialogue. This number can serve as the numerator of a fraction which will even-
tually represent the desired weight value. As with the weights assigned on the
support relationships, these values also need to be normalised so as to express
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probability—likelihood—values. For this purpose we can use two possible num-
bers as denominators. These are, assuming a pair of linked arguments A and B,
the number of times that A appeared in dialogues, or; the number of times that B
appeared in dialogues. Both numbers will reasonably be greater than the number
of the respective appearances of their pairs resulting in bounding a weight value
in the closed range of [0, 1]. However, instead of resorting to the use of one of
the two for assigning equal weights on the two edges between the two arguments,
we can use the number of times that A appears in dialogues as the denominator
for the rAB edge, and the number of times that B appears as the denominator
for the rBA edge. In other words, if we assume that the weight value of rAB is
a response to the question: How many times has A appeared in dialogues with
B, both attacking the same argument?, then that weight should be equal to the
number of times that argument A appeared in dialogues with B, attacking the
same argument, divided by the total appearances of A, and vice versa for rBA.
Definition 62 formally expresses this approach.
Definition 62 (Weight Assignation II) Let RG = {AH, R} be an agent’s re-
lationship graph, while arguments A,B and C are elements of AH then:
Instances(H, A,B,C) = NAB
is a function that returns a number NAB representing the number of times that
arguments A and B attacked argument C in separate disputes in the same dialogue
in H, such that:
∃d′1& =< DM0, . . . ,DMk,DMi >, and;
∃d′2& =< DM0, . . . ,DMk,DMj >
where d′1 is a sub-dispute of d1, and d
′
2 is a sub-dispute of d2, for d1, d2 ∈ T and
where DMconi = A, DM
con
j = B and DM
con









Figure 5.8: Arguments H and I indirectly attacking the same argument, A
Obviously, in this case as well, the cold start problem still remains. Further-
more, the weighing mechanism proposed in Definition 62 as well as the linking
condition of Definition 61 could both be extended in a similar way to Defini-
tions 51 and 52, to model an indirect common attack target relationship. Take,
for example, arguments H and I in Figure 5.8. One could assume that in con-
trast with arguments B,C and D which are direct attackers of A and are thus
assumed related, H and I could also be related as they are indirect attackers of
A. Furthermore, in addition to the relationships between all the attackers—direct
or indirect—they could all be associated in various ways, with their likelihoods
quantified so as to reflect their attacking distance from their target and their
general distance from each other. However, this is something we leave for future
research.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that instead of opting between the two mod-
elling approaches—the one that relies on the notion of support and the one that
relies on the notion of common attack targets—one may choose to apply both.
This is described in Figure 5.7f where the edges corresponding to the respective
233
approaches are differentiated with red and blue edges. Notice that in contrast
with Figures 5.7d, and 5.7e, Figure 5.7f is more dense, linking all arguments into
a single coherent graph. We also note that the significance of a certain approach,
according to the user’s preferences, may be reflected by appropriate normalisa-
tions of the two possible weights. For example, the modeller may multiply all
weights produced by either approach with a certain percentage in order to en-
hance the impact of the approach she favours.
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we extended the simple modelling approach presented in Chap-
ter 4. We discussed the added value of modelling RGs with a θt bound greater
than 1, and we extended the simple weighing mechanism used for quantifying the
support relationships in a RG so as to better reflect that relationship, accounting
for the θ-distance between the related arguments. In other words, we proposed a
way for modelling indirect support relationships between arguments.
We also showed how building RGs may rely on other inherent properties that
relate arguments apart from that of support. We proposed a linking condition
that relies on the notion of arguments with common attack targets and provided
a corresponding weighing mechanism for the quantification of those relationships.
Our main intention was to illustrate the multifaceted way based on which one
may construct an RG. We showed that by simply relying on inherent linking
properties between arguments it is easy to associate them and quantify their
relationship by monitoring patterns of their appearances in an agent’s general
dialogue history.
There are several other issues drawn from our work which are worth research-
ing. One such issue is the construction of RGs with the logical constituents of
associated arguments, rather than with just arguments, which would allow for a
better understanding of the interrelatedness of information. Also, investigating
the differences between expanding/augmenting one’s knowledge on the fly or off-
line, is also an interesting problem to investigate. In other words, to research the
differences between the resulting gained knowledge and the advantages of using
the one or the other. We intend to address such problems in future work.
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Chapter 6
On the Use of Confidence Values
in Strategising
Dealing with the best response problem in competitive game contexts where the
objective is to achieve the maximum utility from a certain choice, usually orients
around von Neumann’s [1928] minimax theory. As application of the minimax
algorithm is conditional on the modeller’s knowledge of the possible knowledge
of its opponents, it is imperative that we develop mechanisms able to anticipate
what could be known to those opponents which we presented in Chapter 4. This
allows for the construction of a game tree that simulates the ways based on which
a dialogue may evolve. The basic steps that follow after construction of such a
tree are two:
1. Application of a UEF for estimating the modeller’s utility of the game
possibly ending at each of the tree’s leafs, and;
2. Application of the minimax algorithm.
In this chapter we develop and present a general UEF used for the evaluation
of the leafs of a game tree. We illustrate how this function accounts for confidence
values assigned to the possible opponent choices (arguments) that represent the
likelihood of an argument being actually known to an opponent. We then elabo-
rate on how the minimax algorithm may be applied on the evaluated game tree
in order for a decision to be made at a strategic point.
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6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 we explored issues related to modelling an opponent’s knowledge
base. According to the literature, most approaches related to opponent modelling
techniques are mostly relying on mechanisms the definition of which was usually
left implicit. Our contribution towards bridging this gap is the development of
three mechanisms which respectively relied on three different information collec-
tion methods (ICMs) which could be used for opponent modelling purposes. In
addition, for each of these methods we developed a confidence assignation func-
tion for deciding on the likelihood according to which a modeller should believe
that its opponent’s are indeed aware of certain information. Our interest in this
chapter is to illustrate how exactly these confidence values can be used for strate-
gic reasoning purposes, through the combined use of a UEF and the application
of the minimax algorithm.
The success of the minimax algorithm relies on two main factors: the accuracy
of the UEF, and; the assumption that the possible outcomes for the two partici-
pants of the game are inversely dependent, i.e. that one’s gain is the other’s loss,
which, when combined with the assumption that the opponent is a reasonable
agent, leads to the conclusion that when presented with a choice the opponent
will attempt to also maximise its utility and, ergo, to minimise the proponent’s.
However, the assumptions on which the minimax algorithm relies, are often
debated. For one, assuming that one’s opponent will apply the exact same deci-
sion making processes, suggests that it is easy to anticipate the actions of that
opponent, and thus to counter-strategise. Arguably, when strategising one has to
also account for this possibility since otherwise the effectiveness of an employed
strategy can be considerably diminished. However, in most cases, the run-time of
computing the presumingly optimal response at a given state in a game, through
additionally accounting for counter-strategising, drastically increases, deeming
most theoretical approaches practically not tractable.
Approaches that attempt to account for counter-strategising are presented in
the work of Carmel and Markovitch [1996] and Oren and Norman [2010] which
seem to be building on ideas originally proposed by Korf [1989]. In both cases
nested opponent models are proposed in the form of a recursive definition, draw-
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ing from the work of Gmytrasiewicz et al. [1991]. We should clarify that these
models refer to the possible strategies which could be employed by one’s oppo-
nent, and not to its knowledge. Variants of the minimax algorithm are proposed
in both cases as well (Carmel and Markovitch [1996]; Oren and Norman [2010]),
while pruning techniques are also provided that reduce run-time by decreasing
the search space, achieving a feasible approximative computation of the optimal
response.
An interesting approach is proposed by Rienstra et al. [2013] where a recur-
sive structure is used for modelling the beliefs an agent has on another agent’s
beliefs through the use of virtual arguments, i.e. arguments which could possibly
counter a modeller’s strategy if known by its opponent. Their approach relies
on synthesising quantitative and qualitative uncertainty information concerned
with both the actual OM and the set of the believed arguments respectively for
strategising. They were able to show, through experimenting, that the increased
complexity of the opponent modelling structure results in improving the strategy
outcomes for the modeller.
At this point it is worth mentioning the work of de Weerd et al. [2013], titled
“How much does it help to know what she knows you know? An agent based
simulation study”. The researchers of this work performed a series of experiments
based on four competitive games, where the participants were rational agents with
different orders (meta-levels) of cognitive ability, to which they refer as ”theory
of mind”. To their surprise, though both first-order and second-order theory of
mind agents were able to outperform adversaries with limited abilities, they found
that higher order of theory of mind shows diminishing returns. They generally
conclude that resorting to the use of the ability of the theory of mind provides an
advantage when employed in complex competitive game settings. In the context
of simple games participants seem to be able to benefit from simply monitoring
their opponents actions in previous interactions (i.e. through recording their
actions’ history).
Though dealing with issues like counter-strategising and nested opponent
modelling is an inherent aspect of strategising in dialogues, they are not in the
scope of our work. However, for the sake of theoretical completeness, we refer
the reader to Section A.2 of Appendix A, where we show how our model can be
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extended to incorporate the notion of nested OMs (S ′), where, in contrast to the
work of Carmel and Markovitch [1996], and Oren and Norman [2010] we model
opponent knowledge instead of opponent strategies.
Another issue concerns the impact of the UEF on the result of the minimax
algorithm. The minimax algorithm is classically applied on zero-sum games, and
persuasion dialogue games are such games, since they can either result in a win or
a loss. However, victory and defeat are not the only factors accounted by a UEF.
Secondary objectives are also accounted such as the possible information which
could be gained through a certain dispute, or the extent to which the dialogue
was stalled etc. Thus, for assuming that one’s opponent will apply the minimax
algorithm for strategising, the modeller builds on the assumption that she can
anticipate exactly how the opponent will evaluate the possible outcomes of the
game. In other words, the modeller assumes to know the opponent’s objectives
for deducing the opponent’s possible strategy.
However, a participant’s strategy cannot be anticipated prior to a game, since
the participants goals are not always evident. Though, one would expect agents
to comply to certain dialogical commitments imposed by the nature of dialogues,
as McBurney and Parsons [2002] explain in their work, agents may deviate from
those commitments, sometimes even halfway through a game. However, it may be
to some extent possible to deduce one’s objectives during a game, by monitoring
its actions while playing. This is also suggested in the work of Oren and Norman
[2010]. As they explain, provided the knowledge about an opponent’s goals it
is also possible to indirectly model its strategy. However, in games of imperfect
information, deducing one’s goals during a game can be a tricky problem.
To the best of our knowledge, these are interesting issues which still remain
unresolved in the fields of Game Theory and Artificial Intelligence. Thus, for the
time being, we can only focus on factors which we can directly affect. Such factors
concern the accuracy of the UEF applied on the leaf-nodes of a game tree, which
in turn relies on the validity of the information encapsulated in an OM. If we can
develop techniques, relying on the interrelatedness of information, for collecting
credible information about the possible knowledge of one’s opponents, then we
can increase the effectiveness of any strategy that will be relying on them. This
was our intention in Chapters 4 and 5. In this chapter we focus on exploring how
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we can use the collected opponent information for strategising.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: in Section 6.2 we provide
a definition for a utility evaluation function which uses the confidence values
assigned to arguments instantiated from an OM, and show how it is applied on a
game tree derived from a single or from multiple dialogue trees; in Section 6.3 we
elaborate on the consequent application of the minimax algorithm on that game
tree, which leads to making a decision in a dialogue when a modeller is found at
a strategic point; we finally summarise our work in Section 5.4.
6.2 Utility Evaluation
In Chapter 4 we offered a definition for associating all the logical elements in
an OM (S(i,j)) with a confidence value c (Definition 46). To recap, assuming an
OM S(i,j) then for every set Y where Y ∈ {K(i,j), ≤
′
(i,j),R(i,j),≤(i,j),G(i,j)} we
assume tuples X of the form < x, c > where x ∈ Y and c is a numerical value in
the range of 0 and 1 which is associated with x and which depends on the ICM
used for the inclusion of x in S(i,j). Then, for determining the confidence value
cA of an opponent argument (OA) we choose to rely on Definition 58 according
to which an argument A instantiated from a set of logical constituents Λ =
{x1, x2, . . . , xi, . . . , xn} is assigned the lowest confidence value associated to those
logical constituents, i.e.:
cA = min{c1, c2, . . . , cn}
This section elaborates on the provision of a UEF which utilises these confi-
dence values for assigning a utility value to each of the anticipated outcomes of
a dialogue. Having provided a method for determining the likelihoods of a set of
OAs to actually be known to a certain opponent, we can then utilise them for
computing the utility of a possible outcome of a dialogue game, i.e. the utility of
a leaf of a game tree.
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6.2.1 Game Trees
Generally, a utility evaluation function is applied to each leaf-node of a game tree,
assigning a numerical utility value to them, which represents how good each node
is as an outcome for the modeller. However, application of a UEF is not possible,
or precisely meaningless, on dialogue trees as they differ from game trees in two
important aspects.
Firstly, a dialogue does not necessarily end at a leaf-node of a dialogue tree;
due to the possibility of backtracking. In other words, since a leaf-node in a
dialogue tree does not represent a terminal state in a dialogue game it cannot be
evaluated. Let us consider the example in Figure 6.1. We note that in contrast to
the notation used for the representation of dialogue trees, arrows in a game tree
will have the opposite direction, i.e. if B attacks A in a dialogue tree (B → A)
that means that it follows after A in a game tree (A → B). In addition, double
edged arrows will be used in game trees as opposed to dashed arrows in dialogue
trees, while all nodes in a game tree will be represented with a single edge line. Fill
colours grey and white are maintained for differentiating between the arguments
used by the modeller and its opponent respectively.
Figure 6.1a illustrates a dialogue tree where two leaf-nodes appear: D and E.
However, since E was submitted on backtracking, only E is the terminal node.
Let Figures 6.1b & 6.1c represent the possible ways based on which the dialogue
may evolve. Figure 6.1c depicts the path followed in the case where when found
at the strategic point of choosing between arguments C and E the modeller opts
for E (possible path II). Alternatively, Figure 6.1b depicts the case where C is
chosen (possible path I). Path I, in contrast to path II, includes a backtrack move
which follows after D, since according to the dialogue tree (Figure 6.1a), there
is no other argument able to attack D, and E is offered as the only alternative.
The combination of the two possible paths (I & II) produces the game tree GT
that appears in Figure 6.1d. Obviously, in the case where backtracking is not
allowed, the dialogue tree and the game tree will be the same with the latter
simply having its arrows turned to the opposite direction.
The second difference between the two trees is that though they are both sim-






















Figure 6.1: Conversion of a dialogue tree to a game tree: a) A dialogue tree T,
b) Possible path I, c) Possible path II, d) The resulting game tree GT
tree can only encapsulate a subset of those possibilities, while a game tree encap-
sulates all of them. Let us reconsider the example of Figure 6.1, this time from
the perspective of the modeller. Let us assume that the modeller (the proponent)
is aware of arguments:
A(Pr,Pr) = {A,C,E, F}
while he assumes that his opponent is aware of arguments:
A(Pr,Op) = {B,D}
while let attacks represent the binary attack relationships between them, then:
(B,A), (C,B), (D,C), (E,B), (F,B) ∈ attacks
In this case, if the modeller attempts to simulate the possible ways based on
which the dialogue may evolve he would face a dilemma: After backtracking
from Op’s move D, then out of the two possible options E or F , which should
she use to counter B (Figure 6.2a)? Obviously, using both is not possible as
it would violate game protocol restrictions according to which every agent can
move a single argument at a time. It is therefore evident that for simulating
all possible ways based on which the game could evolve, the modeller has to















































Figure 6.2: a) An incomplete dialogue tree where only one between two options
can be used to complete it, b) Possible dialogue tree T1, c) Possible dialogue tree
T2, d) Possible path I, e) Possible path II, f) Possible path III, g) Possible path
IV, and h) the complete game tree.
As already noted, these two trees express two discrete subsets of the possible ways
based on which the dialogue may evolve, the complete set of which is the sum of
Figures 6.2d, 6.2e, 6.2f and 6.2g, which is expressed in the the form of game tree
in Figure 6.2h.
In sum, for the complete construction of a game tree a modeller has to go
through three steps:
1. instantiate all the possible dialogue trees, i.e. the forest of dialogue trees,
that can be constructed based on his own knowledge and his assumptions
about his opponent’s knowledge;
2. produce their corresponding game trees, and;
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3. merge these game trees in order to form a complete game tree.
We note that initial construction of the possible dialogue trees is necessary, as
only dialogue trees adhere to the protocol restrictions imposed on the possible
moves introduced by the participants at each point of a dialogue.
In this respect, we provide a formal description of a dialogue tree’s corre-
sponding game tree (GT) in Definition 65. To do so we first formally define a
dialogue tree’s reply structure, as well as the basic properties of a game tree in
Definitions 63 and 64 respectively. At this point we advise that the reader re-
calls Definition 31 in which E represents the set of edges between the nodes of a
dialogue tree, and DMr is the dialogue tree’s root dialogue move.
Definition 63 (Reply Structure) Given a dialogue tree T we assume a set R
that represents its reply structure:




i = Y }
where X and Y are arguments.
In simple words, Definition 63 states that for every pair of arguments (X, Y ) ∈ R
there exists a corresponding pair of dialogue moves (DMi,DMj) ∈ E whose re-
spective contents are arguments Y and X, where X attacks Y . We note that
a reply structure differs from the set of attack relationships between the argu-
ments employed in a dialogue game, as there may be reciprocal attacks between
arguments which cannot appear in the dialogue game due to protocol restrictions.
Provided a dialogue tree’s reply structure we define a game tree as follows:
Definition 64 (Game Tree) A game tree GT is an acyclic graph expressed as
a tuple of the form GT =< ΣN,P > where ΣN = {N0, N1, . . . , Nm} is a set of
nodes, expressed as tuples of the form:
Ni =< A, cA, ui >
where for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m:
• A is an argument;
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• cA is that argument’s confidence value;
• ui is the utility of that node, and;
and P ⊆ ΣN × ΣN . In addition let:
• N0 be the root node of GT, while let every other node receive its index
value in accordance to a depth-first search;
• LN = {Nl1, Nl2, . . . , Nlr} be the set of leaf-nodes of GT every member of
which is a terminal node, i.e. it has no children;
• P0→lk be a path representing a sequence of nodes < N0, . . . , Nlk >, where
k = 1, 2, . . . , r;
• Π = {P0→l1, P0→l2, . . . , P0→lr} be the set of all possible paths in a GT, and;
• < Ni, Ni+1 > be a subsequent pair of nodes in a P0→lk, where 0 ≤ i ≤ lk−1,
we then say that Ni and Ni+1 share a father respectively child relationship,
while every node can have at most one father-node.
We note that the confidence value for every argument moved by the modeller
(that is the proponent in the case of the example depicted in Figure 6.1) is by
default assumed to be equal to 1, while for convenience when referring to a single
game tree we will be representing its discrete paths using only the index of their
leaf-nodes (e.g. Pli as opposed to P0→li).
Provided Definitions 63 and 64 we define a dialogue tree’s corresponding game
tree as follows:
Definition 65 (Game Tree Correspondence Criteria) Given a dialogue tree
T, its reply structure R, a game tree GT, and a function arg() applied on a node
of a GT to return the argument encapsulated in that node, we then say that GT is
the corresponding game tree of T, iff:
• N0 =< A, cA, u0 >, where A = DM
con
r , and;
• ∀Nj ∈ P0→lk, for 1 ≤ j ≤ lk, and l1 ≤ lk ≤ lr, ∃Ni ∈ P0→lk, where i < j
and 0 ≤ i ≤ j − 1, such that:
∃(arg(Nj), arg(Ni)) ∈ R
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The first criterion simply states that the root node of a GT must encapsulate
the argument found in the root move of a T. The second criterion states that for
every node Nj in a path of a GT, excluding the root node, there exists a preceding
node (Ni) in the same path, such that the pair of arguments (arg(Nj), arg(Ni))
encapsulated by them exists in T’s reply structure R.
One can easily deduce the relationships between a dialogue tree (T) and a
game tree (GT). Namely, a T is composed of dialogue moves, whereas a game
tree of nodes; both have leafs respectively in the form of moves and nodes; while
in contrast to a GT a path between the root move to a leaf move in a T is referred
to as a dispute. Their only essential difference is representational and concerns
the fact that directed edges which express the father/child relationships in the
two trees are reversed, i.e. in a T the direction is from the child towards the
father while in a GT is from the father towards the child in an effort to enforce
a representational structure able to better reflect the evolution of a dialogue, i.e.
which argument/move will follow after another, as opposed to which argument
serves as a reply to another.
Consider for example the case of the dialogue tree T depicted in Figure 6.3a,
whose corresponding game tree GT appears in Figure 6.3b. The reply structure
for T is as follows:
R = {(B,A), (C,A), (D,B), (E,B), (F,C), (G,C), (I,D), (J, F )}
Let us then take any path of GT, which for convenience will be represented as
a sequence of arguments as opposed to the nodes in which they are encapsulated.
For example, in the case of path P =< A,B,E,C, F, J,G >:
• for G, there is an ancestor node C given that ∃(G,C) ∈ R;
• for J , there is an ancestor node F given that ∃(J, F ) ∈ R;
• for F , there is an ancestor node C given that ∃(F,C) ∈ R;
• for C, there is an ancestor node A given that ∃(C,A) ∈ R;
• for E, there is an ancestor node B given that ∃(E,B) ∈ R, and;
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Figure 6.3: a) A dialogue tree T, b) its corresponding game tree GT.
• for B, there is an ancestor node A given that ∃(B,A) ∈ R.
In relation to the technical problem of the actual conversion, we note that
it is a complex problem which can otherwise be expressed as finding all possible
common-source paths in a graph with multiple destinations. Specification of an
algorithm for converting a dialogue tree to a game tree remains a topic for future
work.
6.2.1.1 False Assumptions & Logically Imperfect Agents
So far we have accounted for backtracking and its impact in creating additional
terminal states in a dialogue’s states space, as well as for how one should simulate
a forest of dialogue trees in order to account for all the possible ways based on
which a dialogue may evolve, as a single dialogue can only represent a subset
of those possibilities. However, for instantiating the complete state-space of all
possible dialogues between a modeller and an opponent, one has to additionally
account for the possibility that a dialogue game may end at any point. In other
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words, to account for the fact that the participants may not play logically perfect
which means that either the proponent or the opponent may opt to not introduce
a move into the game, for whatever reason, even though this may result in them
losing. Forfeiting a game could be attributed to the respective utility values of
a game tree’s nodes for either of the participants. It could be the case that the
utility of losing the game at a certain point is greater than winning it at another.
For example, such a case would arise in a scenario where, based on a simulated
game tree, a participant would anticipate certain defeat in later stages of the game
in which case revealing more information to the opponent could be detrimental.
In addition, from the modeller’s perspective, given that dialogue trees serve
only as simulations of the possible ways based on which a dialogue may evolve,
then since knowledge assumed to be known by the modeller’s opponents is not
certain, it is possible for the game to end at a non-terminal point, simply because
the opponent was not aware of a move thought to be known to her.
In order to account for these possibilities, for the example presented in Fig-
ure 6.3, the ‘incomplete’ game tree of Figure 6.3b can be seen as a core game tree
which can be simply extended with duplicates of siblings of all non-leaf nodes
in it1, forming the complete game tree that appears in Figure 6.4. Ideally, the
modeller should strategise on the basis of the game tree in Figure 6.4 rather than
the one of Figure 6.3b.
6.2.2 The Utility Evaluation Function
The utility value ui is a value assigned to all nodes in a game tree in two steps.
The first is the application of a UEF on each of the leaf-nodes in GT. The second is
the propagation of these values upwards by applying the minimax algorithm, with
the objective of assigning a utility to the root node N0, indicating the optimal
move for the modeller.
There are multiple ways of defining the utilities of all the possible outcomes
—the terminal nodes—of a dialogue game, and all of them are concerned with the
modeller’s objectives. A naive approach would be to assume that nodes containing
1The root node should also be duplicated, though it is ignored in this example, as the
dialogue may just consist of the argument in the root node.
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Figure 6.4: The game tree of Figure 6.3b extended to include the duplicate siblings








cB = 0.65 cC = 0.75
cH = 0.9 cI = 0.55
cL = 0.4
cA = 1
cD = 1 cE = 1 cG = 1cF = 1
cJ = 1cK = 1
(b)
Figure 6.5: a) A game tree, b) The same game tree with all the arguments
replaced with their corresponding confidence values
the same arguments should be assigned the same utility. However, let us again
consider this assumption in the case of the example presented in Figure 6.1. In
this example, the terminal nodes in both of the possible paths encapsulate the
same argument (E). Assuming that both nodes should be assigned the same
utility value would disregard the fact that the two nodes are found in different
depths in the tree, or that different arguments are revealed by the modeller in each
case. Accordingly, if apart from winning it is also essential that this happens as
soon as possible, or as late as possible with the objective to stall the opponent, or
even if revealing a certain argument should be avoided even if it means losing the
game, then the leaf-nodes should receive utility values reflecting such objectives.
In general, leaf-nodes should be perceived as discrete outcomes regardless of the
arguments they encapsulate.
We provide a formula for assigning such values; one that accounts for the
modeller’s goals. Since we consider defining a set of goals for the participants in
dialogues to be a separate research issue, we only provide a general formula for
utility assignation, accounting for the nature of those objectives in an abstract
way. However, we are more concrete when it comes to accounting for the confi-
dence values assigned to each of the OAs contained in a certain path leading to
a leaf-node, and how these values affect the computation of a utility value.
Assume for example the GT which appears in Figure 6.5a, where for conve-
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nience we assume that it was constructed from a dialogue tree where backtracking
is not allowed, while we also ignore the additional terminal states produced if one
accounts for imperfect play, and where each node is represented as the argument
it encapsulates. In this case the possible outcomes of the dialogue, represented
as leaf-nodes in GT, are D,H,L, J & G. Figure 6.5b illustrates the same tree
whose nodes have been replaced with the corresponding confidence values of each
of the arguments they encapsulate. For the modeller (proponent), reaching any
of these leafs depends on two factors. The first is optimally choosing the best
move to make when found at a strategic point in a dialogue, which depends on
the expected utility values assigned to the possible outcomes of the game. The
second is whether the opponent will react as anticipated, i.e. that the modeller’s
assumptions about its opponent’s knowledge are valid and that, given so, the
opponent will reasonably act in a predictable way. As the modeller cannot be
certain of the validity of the information the modeller holds on its opponent, the
modeller can only rely on the confidence values assigned to that information.
For doing so, a leaf utility value should, among others, account for the prob-
ability of reaching to a certain leaf, which is equal to the propagation of the
confidence values found on the path that leads to the concerned leaf. Since all
the proponent arguments are assumed to have a confidence value equal to 1 they
are purposely dimmed in the figure as they have no actual effect on how the
dialogue will really evolve. Assume for example that we want to calculate the
confidence of a path that leads to L, which for convenience we represent as a
sequence of arguments, instead of nodes, from A to L in the following form:
PA→L = {A,C, F, I,K, L}. In this case, assuming a function C(PA→L) applied on
a path in a GT, the modeller’s confidence of reaching argument L through it is:
C(PA→L) = cA · cC · cF · cI · cK · cL
= 1 · 0.75 · 1 · 0.55 · 1 · 0.4
= 0.165
which is formally defined in Definition 66, bellow:
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Definition 66 (Path Confidence) Let GT be a game tree and:
P0→li =< N0, . . . , Nj , . . . , Nli >





where cj is the confidence value found in each node Nj ∈ P0→li.
We note that this product assume independence of the component multiplicands,
i.e. an argument’s confidence value is not dependent on whether arguments that
precede it in the path, will or will not appear.
Lastly, let us assume that each leaf-node receives an intermediate utility value
calculated according to the modeller’s objectives, through the application of some
general formula, which we express as uL (once again, the node index has been
replaced with the encapsulated argument for convenience). The final utility value
of the concerned leaf-node should be the product of that intermediate utility
value (uL) and C(PA→L). In this respect, we provide the following definition for
calculating the utility values of the leaf-nodes of a GT in the following definition:
Definition 67 (Utility Evaluation Function) Let Π = {Pl1, Pl2, . . . , Plr} be
the set of all possible paths in a GT, and G = {g1, g2, . . . , gn} be an agent’s goals.
Then the utility uli of every leaf-node Nli in the set LN = {Nl1, Nl2, . . . , Nlr} is:
uli = U(D , Nli,G) · C(Pli)
where U is a function applied on GT:
U : D × LN × G→ [0, 1]
that takes as input the modeller’s goals G, the concerned leaf-node, and the dia-
logue tree D (from which one can in turn define the GT), and returns a numerical
value between 0 and 1.
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In essence, function UGT produces a normalised value in the closed range of
[0, 1], in order to guarantee that any possible overall utility value will also be in
the same closed range. This is necessary in order for the modeller to be able to
evaluate all possible utilities across the same scale. In other words, since both
the confidence values as well as the intermediate utility values range between
the values of 0 and 1 their product will also exist in the same range, while the
fact that these final values are produced based on the same methods makes them
comparable.
6.3 Minimax
The next step, after defining the utility values for all the leaf-nodes in a GT, is to
also assign similar values to the rest of the nodes in it. This is done by applying
the minimax algorithm.
The minimax algorithm is an algorithm applied on a game tree, beginning
from its leaf-nodes. The algorithm assumes two roles; those of the min and
the max player respectively representing the opponent and the proponent (the
modeller) in the game. Then it traverses the tree towards the root, propagating
the leaf utility values upwards selecting interchangeably the minimum or the
maximum value to be assigned to the traversed nodes, between the utilities of
their successors.
Essentially, the min and the max roles are respectively assigned to the op-
ponent and the proponent in an attempt to simulate their behaviours in the
game. Assuming that both participants are reasonable then we should expect
them to try to maximise their respective utilities. Assuming that their utilities
are inversely dependent, maximising the proponent’s utility implies minimising
the opponent’s, and vice versa. While when found in strategic points (points
where a choice is possible) the proponent is expected to choose those paths which
will lead to the highest utility, the opponent is expected to attempt the opposite,
i.e. to minimise the proponent’s utility and maximise its own by also choosing
the appropriate paths when also found in such points in a game.
Let us assume the example depicted in Figure 6.6 which is the game tree (prior




uD = 0.75 uG = 0.68
uJ = 0.45
Figure 6.6: The game tree of Figure 6.5a prior to application of the minimax
algorithm
tice that all leaf-nodes are assumed to be assigned with an expected utility value
after the application of the UEF as described by Definition 67. The algorithm is
recursively applied to all the nodes of the tree beginning from the root node (N0)
which in this case is argument A, consistently moving downwards towards the
leafs (green dashed arrows arrows). As a convention we assume that the children
of each node are traversed from left to right. When a leaf-node is reached the
utility value of that node is returned to the father node (orange dashed arrows)
and is replaced with the existing value in accordance to whether the existing
value is greater or lesser than that of the node’s, respectively if the father node
is a min or a max player. Figure 6.7 illustrates how exactly the utility values
are propagated upwards, choosing the minimum values when found at opponent
nodes and the maximum when found at proponent nodes.
The described algorithm appears in the form of pseudo-code in Algorithm 6.1,
and it describes the standard minimax algorithm found in many text books such
as Hazewinkel [2001]. We note that the initial call values for both Ni and the
maxPlayer (which we assume to be a boolean variable) are:
minimax(N0, FALSE)
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uB = 0.75 uC = 0.68
uH = 0.55 uI = 0.65
uL = 0.65
uA = 0.68
uD = 0.75 uE = 0.55 uG = 0.68uF = 0.65






Figure 6.7: The same game tree after the application of the minimax algorithm,
with all the arguments replaced with their corresponding confidence values
Once all nodes of the game tree have been assigned a utility value, the optimal
decision making problem is resolved by choosing, when found at a certain father-
node, the path formed by the child-node with the highest utility. In the case of
the example in Figure 6.5a, the modeller (the proponent) is found at a decision
making point at node C (after the opponent opts to move argument C over B
against the root node A). At node C the optimal choice for the modeller appears
to be argument G with a utility value uG = 0.68.
6.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have provided a strategising mechanism which utilises the
logical information collected using the different collection methods proposed in
Chapter 4. Particularly, we illustrated how the confidence values associated with
the logical elements of OM can be used to affect the way that a UEF assigns
values to the terminal states of a game.
Since applying a UEF on a dialogue tree is not possible, we define a corre-
sponding game tree; a problem similar to finding all the possible, same source,
discrete paths to multiple destinations in a graph. Essentially, having provided
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ALGORITHM minimax(Ni, maxPlayer)
1: if Ni ∈ LN then
2: return ui
3: end if
4: if maxPlayer then
5: bestValue := 0
6: for all childs of Ni do
7: val := minimax(child, false)




12: bestValue := 1
13: for all childs of Ni do
14: val := minimax(child, true)




Algorithm : 6.1: Minimax algorithm
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a definition concerned with the instantiation of a dialogue tree’s reply structure,
which encapsulates all of the replies in a dialogue tree in the form of pairs of
arguments, and given both a dialogue tree and a game tree, then according to
Definition 65, we say that the game tree is the dialogue tree’s corresponding game
tree if for every element in a game tree’s path, there exist a preceding element,
where the pair of arguments encapsulated in both of them—ordered with the
argument in the preceding node appearing second—are members of the dialogue
tree’s reply structure.
We then illustrated how a general version of UEF can account for the confi-
dence values of the OAs found on the paths that lead to an evaluated leaf-node,
by multiplying their propagation product with the leaf’s utility estimate, and
we finally showed how the minimax algorithm can be applied on the utilities of
a game tree’s leaf-nodes, in order to propagate them upwards towards the root
showing how decision making at each point of a dialogue can then be defined by
the utility values of the possible choices.
As in this thesis we do not formally define the possible goals that participants
may have in dialogues, testing of the effectiveness of the minimax algorithm appli-
cation remains an open issue. In addition, accounting for counter-strategising is
also an issue worth investigating, but what matters more is evaluating the valid-
ity of the collected information, on which an agent’s strategising relies. However,
the development of benchmarks for argument-based dialogue platforms is only
recently gaining interest (Cerutti et al. [2014]). Thus, in the next chapter we
focus on proposing a methodology towards evaluating the validity and the effec-
tiveness of the information collection methods proposed in this thesis, and leave
evaluation of the strategising processes to future work.
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Chapter 7
Towards a Methodology for
Evaluation
The importance of developing mechanisms for building and updating opponent
models (OMs) has been repeatedly stressed throughout this thesis. An OM is an
essential ingredient in strategising, and thus success of any strategising approach
which relies on OMs largely depends on their validity. The formal mechanisms
defined in Chapters 4 and 5, which relate opponent information and allow for
the augmentation of OMs, rely on the interrelatedness of information expressed
through two notions; those of support and common attack targets. Modelling
opponent knowledge based on these notions needs to be tested with respect to
whether they can actually achieve an increase in an OM’s credibility. However,
due to the lack of argument-based benchmarks for agent dialogues, both ap-
proaches remain untested.
In this chapter we discuss and propose a methodology for evaluating the suc-
cess of the proposed modelling approaches in producing valid models of opponent
information, particularly concerned with the augmentation process. In addition,
we describe an extended example which summarises our work in augmenting OMs
in order to illustrate how one could evaluate our approach, given an environment
able to account for the logical representation of agent knowledge at a structural




In Chapters 4 and 5 we defined a process that allows the construction and expan-
sion of OMs, which relies on the interrelatedness of information. Development of
this approach builds on the assumption that inherent relationships between argu-
ments, such as that of support or that of arguments which share common attack
targets, can be quantified, through monitoring patterns of their appearances in
an agent’s general dialogue history, so as to allow the modeller to anticipate what
might follow in a dialogue against a certain opponent. Nevertheless, the extent
to which this quantification captures the actual strength of these relationships,
leading to a useful incorporation of additional information to an OM, remains
untested.
What has been tested and evaluated so far is the tractability of our approach,
in Chapter 4, for the purpose of which we relied on Poisson random graphs. For
the production of these graphs we ensured accounting for simple graph properties
that we expect argument graphs to be characterised with, such as that they
will not be complete or have a path-like or grid-like structure. Accounting for
additional structural properties of argument graphs requires a thorough analysis
of numerous factors mostly concerned with the employed argumentation logics,
and this is what was attempted by Hunter and Woltran [2013]. In their work,
they researched a number of logical argument systems and associated them with
certain classes of argument graphs they could induce, such us rooted, acyclic,
weakly connected, self-loop, or complete graphs. However, they note that issues
raised in their work may have ramifications particularly in relation to systems
such as ASPIC+ (Prakken [2010]) and ABA (Dung et al. [2009]).
Relying on random graphs for testing the tractability of our approach is ade-
quate for evaluating how quickly we can produce good estimates of an argument’s
relationship likelihood to an OM. It is inadequate though for deciding on whether
augmenting an OM will actually be effective in increasing its validity. Such test-
ing would have to rely on actual argument relationships graphs (RGs), since even
if one could induce random argument graphs that would satisfy, in our case, all
the structural properties of an ASPIC+ induced graph, it is still questionable
whether the produced results would be valid. This is due to the fact that the
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interrelatedness of information is more likely to be captured through the incre-
mental construction of a RG, built through a series of agent dialogues. In con-
trast, a randomly generated graph may ignore this feature, as arguments will be
randomly linked irrespective of their relationship in dialogues. In addition, since
quantification of these relationships will also be random, it will fail to capture
the statistical information on which one should rely. Thus, any conclusions on
the effectiveness of our approach that would rely on randomly generated graphs
would at least be questionable.
Furthermore, evaluation of the impact of accounting for the underlying logic
in dialogues and subsequently for the possible construction of new arguments
within dialogues (i.e. accounting for the logical instantiation of arguments which
is one of the key contribution of this thesis stressed in Chapter 3), is also an issue
that needs to be evaluated. In other words, it is important to test through a case
study the possible outcomes of numerous dialogues, comparing cases where the
underlying logic is and is not accounted for. This way we could investigate the
chain of events that might evolve, as well as the consequences that result, from
the instantiation of a new argument, either in a single dialogue or in a series of
dialogues, as well as in an agent’s knowledge base.
Unfortunately, practical evaluation of argumentation research through the use
of appropriate general purpose mechanisms for benchmarking, is only now gaining
interest (Bex et al. [2014]; Cerutti et al. [2014]; Thimm [2014]). Interest in this
research topic is initially recognised in the work of Bistarelli et al. [2013], which
is a first attempt to compare three different implementations of AAS. For the
purpose of their work they also resort to randomly generated test networks.
In an effort to address this issue Cerutti et al. [2014] attempt the development
of a benchmark framework named Probo, which aspires to serve as a platform for
easily comparing different implementations for solving argumentation problems.
It however focusses only on abstract argumentation, though extensions to struc-
tured argumentation have been mentioned in their future work. In contrast, the
work of Thimm [2014], offers a more flexible, and widely applicable, knowledge
representation framework, referred to as Tweety, in the form of a set of Java-
based libraries which, among others, allows for the representation of structured
argumentation. Interestingly, dialogue libraries are also offered, while they report
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on two case studies of strategic argumentation in an attempt to illustrate how
Tweety may be used for empirical evaluation purposes.
Lack of general purpose mechanisms in the context of dialogue games, able
to handle high level executable definitions concerned with classical features of
argument dialogue games, such as: the handling of commitment stores; rules
for turn-taking, or; the dialogical construction of underlying argument struc-
tures; is also reported in the work of Bex et al. [2014]. In their work, they rely
on certain languages for the specification of dialogue protocols in a machine-
readable way, allowing for the protocol specifications to be expressed separately
from the program that executes them. Assuming extension of these languages
aimed specifically at argumentation dialogues, they develop a Dialogue Game
Execution Platform (DGEP) which, as they explain, is not only able to execute
these dialogue protocol specifications, but can also handle connections to software
agents, argument structures, large knowledge bases and human-computer inter-
faces. Among others, DGEP is capable of producing schematic representations
of a single move in a dialogue, its reply and the connections to the underlying
argument structure in terms of the argument interchange format (AIF) ontology
(Chesn˜evar et al. [2006]).
Finally, an ASPIC+ Java-based argument evaluation platform has been re-
cently developed by Snaith and Reed. [2012], referred to as TOAST. Provided a set
of premises and a set of rules with associated preference and contrariness infor-
mation, TOAST can produce visual information on the acceptability of arguments
in the derived argumentation framework. As such, it is mostly used for medical
reasoning purposes, while future extensions of the platform through the inclusion
of appropriate libraries for the possible accommodation of dialogue frameworks
is not discussed.
In our case, the need of empirically evaluating our approach through a case
study is evident, which makes the use of such platforms imperative. Nonetheless,
since their establishment is only now taking place, we simply present a method-
ology towards evaluation, through an extended example which summarises our
work on the augmentation of OMs, and leave its application to future work. We
note, again, that evaluating the impact of accounting for the dynamic instanti-
ation of arguments by accounting for the underlying logic that characterises the
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exchanged arguments in a dialogue, is an important issue that needs to be evalu-
ated as well, and this is also something we are interested in researching in future
work.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: in Section 7.2 we present
two evaluation metrics used to characterise the validity of OMs; in Section 7.3
we present a detailed example, illustrating: the incremental construction of an
agent’s RG; an augmentation of a certain OM, and; an evaluation of the aug-
mented OM with the corresponding actual knowledge of that opponent is per-
formed, relying on the proposed evaluation metrics. Lastly we discuss another,
more strategically oriented, way of evaluating our augmentation approach in Sec-
tion 7.4, and summarise our work in Section 7.5.
7.2 Evaluation Metrics
Throughout this thesis an OM is represented as a sub-theory S(i,j) = 〈AT(i,j),G(i,j)〉,
where AT(i,j) is what Agi believes is the argumentation theory (Definition 17) of
Agj and G(i,j) is what Agi believes are the goals of Agj. For convenience, a sub-
theory is informally expressed as a tuple of sets of structural logical elements
S(i,j) =< K(i,j),≤
′
(i,j),R(i,j),≤(i,j),G(i,j) >, where, K is the set of premises, R the
set of rules, ≤′ and ≤ their respective preference-orderings, and G the set of goals,
that Agi assumes Agj to be aware of.
Evaluation of an OM essentially concerns the level at which the collected
information (S(i,j)) about a certain opponent accurately reflects that opponent’s
actual knowledge (S(j,j)). The extent to which there exists a correspondence
between these two sets is a measure of the validity and thus credibility of an
OM. Specifically, this correspondence can be distinguished in two ways: one
concerns how correct an OM is, and; the other concerns how complete it is.
Essentially, the correctness of an OM relates to the question: How much of the
modelled information is contained in the opponent’s knowledge? Similarly, the
completeness of an OM relates to the question: How much of the opponent’s
knowledge is contained in the modelled information?
These two correspondence types are formally defined as follows:
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Definition 68 (Correct Opponent Model) Let S(i,j) be Agi’s OM of Agj,
and S(j,j) be Agj’s actual knowledge. Then we say that S(i,j) is Correct iff:
α ∈ S(i,j) −→ α ∈ S(j,j)
∀α ∈ S(i,j).
Definition 69 (Complete Opponent Model) Let S(i,j) be Agi’s OM of Agj,
and S(j,j) be Agj’s actual knowledge. Then we say that S(i,j) is Complete iff:
α ∈ S(j,j) −→ α ∈ S(i,j)
∀α ∈ S(j,j).
We note that strictly speaking one can never know with absolute certainty an
opponent’s actual knowledge, unless of course this is provided within the context
of a controlled experiment.
Given these definitions, the validity of an OM can be decided with respect to
whether the model is or is not Complete as well as Correct. However, differ-
ent levels of soundness and completeness can be further distinguished, in order
to provide a more fine grained representation of an OM’s correspondence to an
opponent’s actual knowledge. The typifications introduced in Chapter 3, Sec-
tion 3.1.1, serve exactly for this purpose. To recap we assume that an OM S(i,j)
is:
• False: iff S(i,j) ∩ S(j,j) = ∅
• Partial: iff S(i,j) ∩ S(j,j) 6= ∅
• Contained: iff S(i,j) ⊂ S(j,j)
• Identical: iff S(i,j) = S(j,j)
• Excessive: iff S(i,j) ⊃ S(j,j)
Relying on these typifications, as well as on the notions of correctness and com-
pleteness, one may characterise an OM as not Correct and Partial, or not
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Complete and Contained, or even both Correct& Complete and thus Identical.
Furthermore, if an even more precise representation of the correspondence be-
tween the two sets is desired, then these typifications may also be used to charac-
terise the level of correspondence of each of the assumed sets of structural logical
elements K,≤′,R,≤,G of a sub-theory S(i,j) to S(j,j), e.g. the correspondence of
K(i,j) to K(j,j).
Given these, a first approach to evaluation is to investigate the extent to which
any of these characterisations of an OM is possible within our framework. In the
context of this thesis, provided that we rely on a defeasible reasoning model which
implies that information is never discarded, then, without loss of generality, it
is safe to assume that the accumulated information specifically concerned with
the premises and inference rules asserted by a particular opponent in a dialogue
game, will always be part of that opponent’s knowledge.
In this respect, let S− represent an OM from which priority orderings as well
as goals are excluded, then the following proposition holds:
Proposition 4 Let S−(i,j) be Agi’s OM of Agj’s actual knowledge S
−
(j,j), built solely




Proof Straightforward, given that, whatever is acquired through a dialogue pro-
cess and based on direct collection will be added to the OM, while it will never
be discarded from the opponent’s knowledge.
In other words, information about a particular agent, collected solely through
direct collection particularly related with the rules (R) and the premises (K) in-
troduced by that opponent, can neither be False nor Excessive. However, if
one additionally accounts for third party information, and augmentation infor-
mation, then S−(i,j) ⊆ S
−
(j,j) can no longer be guaranteed, while the creation of
either a False, or an Excessive OM becomes possible.
Hence, when faced with a strategic choice of move, an agent should favour
decisions based on information directly collected by itself over information pro-
vided by third party agents or which resulted from an augmentation process. Of
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course, this is implicitly already modelled in the proposed approach, given that
all information collected by a participant is assigned a credibility level equal to
1, as opposed to third party information which is assigned a credibility value
based on the result of the trust function described in Definition 46, and infor-
mation added to the model through an augmentation which is associated with a
likelihood value.
In overall, differentiating between information in an OM based on its origin
can result in increasing the credibility of the model with respect to its correctness,
and thus consequently to increase the effectiveness of the strategy function that
relies on it. Additionally, a participant has to also account for the possibility that
she may be unaware of additional information possibly known to her opponent.
In this respect, an OM can be characterised as credible if it is to a large extent
correct, and; a good approximation of all its knowledge, i.e. as complete as
possible. Practically, assuming two sets S(i,j) and S(j,j), the correctness of S(i,j) can
be computed by dividing the number of elements in the intersection of the two sets
by the number of elements in S(i,j). Obviously, the denominator in this case will
never have a higher value than the enumerator, thus always producing a rational
value in the interval [0, 1]. Similarly, the completeness of S(i,j) is computed, again,
by dividing the number of elements in the intersection of the two sets, but this
time, by the number of elements in S(j,j).
Relying on these two metrics we can decide on the correspondence accuracy
of an OM, which can be relatively expressed as the product of its correctness and
completeness. Basically, given multiplication, the more correct and complete then
the more accurate an OM will be. One may then, compare the overall accuracy
of two models by comparing the products of their corresponding correctness and
completeness. Though these metrics can be applied on any of the corresponding
logical sets of the two compared sub-theories, we present, in Definition 70, a
high level accuracy metric that only concerns the relationship between the sets
of arguments instantiated from them.
Definition 70 (Accuracy) Let S be an agent’s sub-theory and A the set of
arguments instantiated from S. Then, assuming two sub-theories S(i,j) & S(j,j)
where A(i,j) & A(j,j) are the respective sets of arguments instantiated from them,
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while the accuracy of S(i,j), referred to as αˆ(i,j) ∈ [0, 1], is:
αˆ(i,j) = ̺(i,j) · ω(i,j)
In a trivial example, assuming two sub-theories S(1,2) and S(2,2) and the cor-
responding sets of arguments instantiated from them A(1,2) and A(2,2) where:
A(1,2) = {A,B,C,D,E,X}
and
A(2,2) = {A,B,C,D,E,W, Y }














while its accuracy to S(2,2), would be:











7.3 An Extended Evaluation Example
In this section we present, in a series of detailed steps, an extended example in
an attempt to illustrate how one could evaluate our approach in an environment
able to account for the scalability and complexity of multiple agent dialogue
interactions. We begin by stating a number of necessary assumptions.
1. All agents share the same contrary relation, the same language L, and the
same way of defining preferences over arguments, i.e. all agents share the
same function p (Definition 17).
2. The incrementally constructed RG will be built for a θt threshold equal to
1 and in accordance to Definition 51;
3. Weighting on the arcs of the constructed RG will follow the Conductivity-
based Weight Assignation definition (Definition 60);
4. Agents may engage in both grounded as well as credulous dialogue games,
where respectively the proponent (Pr) cannot repeat the same move in a
dispute while the opponent (Op) can, and vice versa;
5. The instances where an opponent argument (OA) is repeated in a dispute
will be ignored, as they can only be interpreted as self-supporting rela-
tionships and thus have no impact on our augmentation approach (refer to
discussion in Section 5.2.1);
6. With respect to the knowledge of the participating agents, rather than
looking at the sub-theories that each agent holds with respect to one’s own
(S(i,i)) or one’s opponent’s knowledge (S(i,j)), we are basically representing
these sub-theories as argument graphs. We will therefore be representing
an S(i,j) as A(i,j), which represents the set of arguments instantiated from
S(i,j), and;
7. Finally, though instantiation of additional arguments by an agent is gener-
ally possible through the incorporation of structural information, by means
of any of the three ICMs, into an OM, since this is an abstract example
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we will assume that no such arguments appear throughout the evaluation
process.
In addition to these assumptions, it is important to remind the reader that in
our framework we do not account for how agents update their knowledge based
on arguments submitted in dialogues by their opponents (Section 3.5). Hence,
in the dialogues that follow in this chapter, while an agent Agi may use some
argument X which was previously introduced in other dialogues by Agj 6=i (other
dialogues between Agi and Agj 6=i) introduction of X by Agi will not be because
Agi has updated his knowledge by including argument X in it, but because that
argument was already known to Agi.
Furthermore, we note that for evaluation purposes it is necessary that com-
plete knowledge of all the information used in the dialogues that will appear is
provided prior to the commencement of those dialogues. In other words, we as-
sume the role of an observer from the outset to whom the distinct knowledge of
every dialogue participant is known. We refer to the sum of all these knowledge
bases as Multi-Agent Omni-Base (MAOB) (refer to Table3.1a), and we represent
the set of arguments instantiated from them as Omni-Graph (OG).
Example 11 Let us assume a set of agents Ags = {Ag1, Ag2, Ag3, Ag4, Ag5, Ag6},
where Ag1 is the modeller who will be interacting with the rest of the agents
through a series of 10 dialogues. Also, let the knowledge of Ag6, be composed of
the following arguments:
A(6,6) = {W,Y, T, U,E,O,A, F, P, C,H, V, L, J, Z}
and the complete knowledge known by all agents be expressed as an OG, whose
form appears in Figure 7.1. The evaluation process is broken down to a series of
steps as follows:
1. A series of 10 dialogues will be presented, between Ag1 and agents Ag2, Ag3,
Ag4 and Ag5 along with the incremental construction of a RG1 by the mod-
eller (Ag1). Edge-weights will be concurrently computed.
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Figure 7.1: The omni-graph which comprises the complete knowledge of all agents
participating in the dialogues.
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3. At the end of this latter dialogue, Ag1 will produce a model of Ag6’s knowl-
edge (A(1,6)), solely based on direct collection of information from commit-
ment stores.
4. After construction of A(1,6) the modeller, Ag1, relying on RG1 will attempt




in order to incorporate additional arguments based on the augmentation
process described in Chapter 4;
5. Finally, after the augmentation takes place, assuming knowledge of the ac-
tual information known to Ag6, expressed as A(6,6), the accuracy between
the augmented OM (A′(1,6)) and A(6,6), as well as between the non-augmented
OM (A(1,6)) and A(6,6) will be computed and compared.
We note that reference to a dialogue move will be expressed as a tuple < I,DMconi >
where I ∈ {Pr,Op} with Pr and Op being replaced with the corresponding agents
participating in a dialogue, and DMconi is the argument in the corresponding di-
alogue move, which is a slightly different representation of the form provided in
Definition 20. Also, for presentation convenience a dialogue sequence (Defini-
tion 21) will be expressed as a sequence of such tuples, e.g.:
D1 =<< Ag1, A >,< Ag2, B >, . . . , < Ag1, F >>
Additionally, in all dialogues, and in contrast to the colouring convention main-
tained throughout the thesis so far according to which the proponent’s moves ap-
pear in grey colour and the opponent’s moves in white, in this example the mod-
eller’s moves will appear in grey colour as opposed to all other moves which appear
in white.
Step 1: Incremental Construction of RG1
Dialogue 1: Ag1 vs Ag2 on the grounded acceptability of A. Argu-





























Figure 7.3: a) Dialogue D2, b) the correspondingly extended RG1
, < Ag1, K >, < Ag2, N >< Ag1, L >,< Ag2, D >>. Winner of the
dialogue is Ag2 whose last move (D) results in A being labelled out.
The dialogue along with the correspondingly constructed RG1 is shown
in Figure 7.2.
Dialogue 2: Ag1 vs Ag3, on the credulous acceptability of A. Argu-
ments are moved in the following order: D2 =<< Ag1, A >,< Ag3, D >
,< Ag1, J >,< Ag3,M >,< Ag1, I >, < Ag3, S >,< Ag1, I >>. Win-
ner of the dialogue is Ag1 whose last move (I which is repeated in the
game) results in A being labelled in. The dialogue along with the corre-

























Figure 7.4: a) Dialogue D3, b) the correspondingly extended RG1
Dialogue 3: Ag4 vs Ag1, on the grounded acceptability of A. Argu-
ments are moved in the following order: D3 =<< Ag4, A >,< Ag1, D >
,< Ag4, J >,< Ag1,M >,< Ag4, N >, < Ag1, B >,< Ag4, E >,<
Ag1, F >>. Winner of the dialogue is Ag1 whose last move (F ) results
in A being labelled out. The dialogue along with the correspondingly
extended RG1 is shown in Figure 7.4.
In relation to the concurrently instantiated weight values, notice for ex-






This is because even though argument D has appeared in 2 dialogues so
far, it participates in 3 disputes within those dialogues: once in D1 in
which it is followed by nothing (i.e. it is followed by the null argument),
and; twice in D1 followed respectively by arguments M and S.
Dialogue 4: Ag1 vs Ag5, on the grounded acceptability of B. Argu-
ments are moved in the following order: D4 =<< Ag1, B >,< Ag5, E >
,< Ag1, F >,< Ag5, H >,< Ag1, R >,< Ag5, V >,< Ag1, G >,<
Ag5, O >,< Ag1, T >,< Ag5, J >,< Ag1,M >,< Ag5, N >>. Winner
of the dialogue is Ag5 whose last move (N) results in B being labelled
out. The dialogue along with the correspondingly extended RG1 is shown
in Figure 7.5.







































































Figure 7.6: a) Dialogue D5, b) the correspondingly extended RG1
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Figure 7.7: a) Dialogue D6, b) the correspondingly extended RG1
ments are moved in the following order: D5 =<< Ag2, A >,< Ag1, B >
,< Ag2, E >,< Ag1, F >,< Ag2, H >,< Ag1, G >,< Ag2, O >,<
Ag1, U >,< Ag2,W >,< Ag1, X >,< Ag2, Z >,< Ag1, X >>. Winner
of the dialogue is Ag1 whose last move (X which is repeated) results in A
being labelled out. The dialogue along with the correspondingly extended
RG1 is shown in Figure 7.6.
Dialogue 6: Ag3 vs Ag1, on the grounded acceptability of A. Arguments
are moved in the following order: D6 =<< Ag3, A >,< Ag1, C >,<
Ag3, L >,< Ag1, B >,< Ag3, E >,< Ag1, G >,< Ag3, O >,< Ag1, T >
,< Ag3, J >,< Ag1,M >,< Ag3, N >,< Ag1, U >,< Ag3, Q >,<
Ag3, Y >>. Winner of the dialogue is Ag1 whose last move (Y ) results
in A being labelled out. The dialogue along with the correspondingly
extended RG1 is shown in Figure 7.7.
Dialogue 7: Ag4 vs Ag1, on the grounded acceptability of A. Argu-
ments are moved in the following order: D7 =<< Ag4, A >,< Ag1, B >
,< Ag4, E >,< Ag1, F >,< Ag4, H >,< Ag1, R >,< Ag4, V >,<
Ag1, G >,< Ag4, O >,< Ag1, P >,< Ag4, J >,< Ag1,M >,< Ag4, N >


















































Figure 7.8: a) Dialogue D7, b) the correspondingly extended RG1
whose last move (N) results in A being labelled out. The dialogue along
with the correspondingly extended RG1 is shown in Figure 7.8.
Dialogue 8: Ag1 vs Ag2, on the grounded acceptability of A. Argu-
ments are moved in the following order: D8 =<< Ag1, B >,< Ag2, E >
,< Ag1, F >,< Ag2, H >,< Ag1, R >,< Ag2, V >,< Ag1, G >,<
Ag2, O >,< Ag1, T >>. Winner of the dialogue is Ag1 whose last move
(T ) results in B being labelled out. The dialogue along with the corre-
spondingly extended RG1 is shown in Figure 7.9.
Dialogue 9: Ag1 vs Ag4, on the credulous acceptability of U . Argu-
ments are moved in the following order: D9 =<< Ag1, U >,< Ag4,W >
,< Ag1, X >,< Ag4, Z >,< Ag1, X >,< Ag4, Q >,< Ag1, Y >>. Win-
ner of the dialogue is Ag1 whose last move (Y ) results in U being labelled
in. The dialogue along with the correspondingly extended RG1 is shown
in Figure 7.10.
Dialogue 10: Ag1 vs Ag3, on the grounded acceptability of E. Argu-

















































































































































Figure 7.11: a) Dialogue D10, b) the correspondingly extended RG1
, < Ag3, H >,< Ag1, R >,< Ag3, V >,< Ag1, G >,< Ag3, O >,<
Ag1, P >>. Winner of the dialogue is Ag1 whose last move (P ) results
in E being labelled out. The dialogue along with the correspondingly
extended RG1 is shown in Figure 7.11.
Step 2: A dialogue between agents Ag1 and Ag6:
Dialogue 11: Ag6 vs Ag1, on the grounded acceptability of E. Argu-
ments are moved in the following order: D11 =<< Ag6, A >,< Ag1, B >
,< Ag6, E >,< Ag1, F >,< Ag6, H >,< Ag1, D >,< Ag6, J >,<
Ag1, U >,< Ag6,W >,< Ag1, Y >>. Winner of the dialogue is Ag1
whose last move (Y ) results in A being labelled out. The concerned
dialogue appears in Figure 7.12.
Step 3: Initial Opponent Model production:
Based on the moves introduced into D11, Ag1 is able to construct an
initial form of the OM of Ag6 expressed as the set of arguments A(1,6) =






Figure 7.12: Dialogue 11, between agents Ag6 (Pr) and Ag1 (Op), on the
































































































































Figure 7.14: a) The projection of A(1,6) into RG1, b) The neighbouring nodes to
the initial opponent model to be incorporated into A(1,6)
Step 4: The Augmentation Process:
Given the initial opponent model A(1,6), and RG1, the modeller, Ag1, can
map the first into the second (i.e. project the initial OM, Figure 7.13a,
into RG1, Figure 7.13b), and attempt to augment it with neighbours that
satisfy a likelihood augmentation threshold greater or equal to 0.5.
As in this case the in-bound edges for all the neighbouring arguments
NA = {V,O,K,N, Z,Q, L} of set A(1,6) = {A,E,H, J,W} is equal to 1,
i.e. all neighbouring arguments of the yellow sub-graph are each of them
connected to it with just one edge, it is obvious that the Monte-Carlo sim-
ulation would produce augmentation likelihoods for each of the elements
of NA with approximate numbers to the weight values on the arcs which
link them to the elements of A(1,6) (i.e. approximations of the weight
values of the out-bound edges of the yellow sub-graph in Figure 7.14a).
Take for example the neighbouring argument N . N is connected to the
OM (to the yellow nodes) with just one arc, rJN . Therefore the prob-
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ability/likelihood of including N , Pr(N), is equal to wJN . If however,
argument C was also in the OM, i.e. if C ∈ A(1,6), then Pr(N) would
be equal to the probability of including rJN which is equal to wJN , plus
the probability of including rCN which is equal to wCN , minus their in-
tersection, i.e:
Pr(N) = wJN + wCN − wJN · wCN
which is obviously a lot more complex to solve (we refer the reader to
Example 7 for a more detailed analysis). Since in this case no more than
one edges connect each neighbouring argument to the OM, performing the
simulation is redundant.
In this respect, it can be easily seen that the arguments which satisfy the
augmentation threshold are {V,O,N, Z} as illustrated in Figure 7.14b
which will be used to augment A(1,6), and produce the new set of argu-
ments:
A′(1,6) = A(1,6) ∪ {V,O,N, Z} = {A,E,H, J,W, V,O,N, Z}
assumed to be known to Ag6.
Step 5: Accuracy comparison:
Provided Ag6’s actual knowledge A(6,6) (Figure 7.15a), then, the correctness









































Figure 7.15: a) The set of arguments A(6,6), b) The augmented OM A
′
(1,6), c)
Their accuracy: green nodes are matching arguments; red nodes are arguments
with no match.















In a similar sense, the correctness of the initial opponent model A(1,6) =
{A,E,H,W, J}, which is not augmented and relies only on the direct
collection of information from the dialogues’ commitment stores, to the















while A(1,6)’s accuracy to A(6,6), is equal to:










Finally, if this was a case study, a comparison between the two accuracy
metrics αˆ′(1,6) and αˆ(1,6), would reveal that the augmented opponent model
is more valid than the non-augmented one since:
αˆ′(1,6) > αˆ(1,6)
The above example illustrates a comparative evaluation, where an OM con-
structed based on conventional approaches, i.e. through information collection
solely from an opponent’s commitment store (in this case A(1,6)), is compared
with its augmented version (A′(1,6)) in terms of which one is the most accurate, to
the opponent’s actual knowledge (A(6,6)). In relation to the typifications, which
appear in Section 7.2, set A(1,6) can be characterised as Contained as opposed to
set A′(1,6) which is Partial.
In this example we assumed a high level approach focussing on comparing
the accuracy of the instantiated arguments of an opponent’s sub-theory (S(i,j)).
However, one could focus on the sets of premises K and rules R of a sub-theory





and its augmented version:
















one may produce and compare the accuracies of:
K(1,6) to K(6,6) with K
′
(1,6) to K(6,6), and;
R(1,6) to R(6,6) with R
′
(1,6) to R(6,6)
Generally, provided an incrementally constructed RG, built from a series of
actual dialogue games, iterations of these comparisons may be performed based
on dialogue interactions of the modeller with various opponents. In addition, one
may perform a series of distinct tests to evaluate the added value of augmentation
in cases where nothing is known about its opponent’s (i.e. the initial opponent
model is empty like in the case of our example) and in cases where an OM already
contains some information.
Furthermore, relying on the results of such tests one may compare the effec-
tiveness of producing valid OMs based on each of the different interrelatedness
factors used for the construction of RGs. In other words, to compare augmenta-
tions based on: support RGs; common-attack-targets RGs, and; based on both.
In addition, the added value of producing support-RGs with θt > 1 could also
be investigated. Finally, the evolution of the validity of a constantly augmented
OM could also be investigated. In other words, researching whether a constantly
augmented OM will eventually converge or deviate from the actual opponent
knowledge.
7.4 Further Evaluations - A Discussion
Example 11 is concerned with an off-line evaluation approach, according to which
the accuracy of an augmented OM to the opponent’s actual knowledge is mea-
sured and compared with the conventional non-augmented OM, at the end of the
dialogue process. However, one could attempt such an evaluation on the fly, i.e.
during a dialogue process, through which, apart from measuring the accuracy
of the incrementally constructed OM, the impact of augmenting an OM on the
effectiveness of strategising could be put to the test.
For example, let us re-examine how dialogue D11 could evolve if the modeller

















































Figure 7.16: a) Ag1’s actual knowledge, b) Ag1’s relationships graph RG1
Ag6, at the same time. Let us assume that Ag1’s actual knowledge represented
as abstract arguments, A(1,1), along with their binary attack relationships, is as
it appears in Figure 7.16a. Note that the graph of Figure 7.16a is a sub-graph
of the OG that appears in Figure 7.1. Let us also assume that Ag1 is aware of
the relationships graph RG1, constructed earlier through a series of 10 dialogues
with other agents (Figure 7.16b).
Let these two agents engage in a dialogue for the grounded acceptability of
argument A where Ag6 is the proponent and Ag1 the opponent. As soon as
argument A is introduced into the game, Ag1 is found at a strategic point where
a choice has to be made between its possible options: arguments B,C,D and U
(Figure 7.17a). Since no information is known so far about Ag6’s knowledge, Ag1
can rely on the statistical information provided in RG1 to simulate the forest of
the possible dialogue trees that could take place, and to instantiate a game tree
from them, in order to decide on the next move.
Based on RG1 and given that A is obviously part of Ag6’s knowledge, Ag1
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Figure 7.17: a) The omni-graph in which the possible attacks against A are
highlighted in blue, b) The RG1 in which A’s neighbouring edges appear in red.
of 5/13, with J and with a likelihood of 4/13, and with either L,Q,K or W with
a likelihood of 1/13 (Figure 7.17b). This likelihoods can be passed as confidence
values for their respective opponent arguments in the dialogue tree. Respectively,
arguments E, J, L,Q,K and W are attacked themselves by moves known to the
proponent (Ag1): E is attacked by F and G, J by M , K by N , Q by Y , and
W by X and Y . However, progressing to the next levels of the possible dialogue
trees, solely based on the fact that A is the only argument certainty known to
the opponent, requires that propagated likelihood values are computed for the
arguments which could possibly follow after Ag1’s moves, accounting for their
distance from A in RG1. For example, the probability, and respectively the
confidence value, of getting to argument H from A depends on first getting to
argument E and would therefore be equal to:










Obviously these values will keep on diminishing as one moves further and
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further away fromA in RG1. However, what we are stressing through this example
is that even in the case where an agent knows nothing about its opponent he may
rely on the RG in order to strategise against him. In other words, to simulate
the forest of the possible dialogues based on which the actual dialogue could
evolve, even through relying on propagated probability values. In this respect,
one could evaluate the impact of augmentation on the effectiveness of strategising
by performing numerous tests, where agents engage in dialogues against unknown
opponents, differentiating between agents that use, and agents that do not use,
RGs, and comparing their dialogue outcomes.
7.5 Summary & Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was the provision of a methodology towards evaluat-
ing the augmentation approach proposed in Chapter 4 used for the incorporation
of additional information in an OM. We presented a summarising review of the
current status-quo of argument-based benchmarking, which is only now being es-
tablished through approaches such as Probo, Tweety, TOAST and DGEP, focussing
on those that are able to account for structural argumentation frameworks and
dialogues.
We provided two evaluation metrics concerned with the correctness and the
completeness of an OM in an attempt to quantify the level of accuracy with
which an OM may be characterised. The first concerns the level at which the
information contained in a OM is also contained in the opponent’s actual knowl-
edge (correctness), while the second concerns the level at which the information
contained in an opponent’s actual knowledge is also contained in the OM (com-
pleteness). Of course, for the purpose of such an evaluation it is necessary that
the an opponent’s actual knowledge is known in advance.
In order to show how these metrics may be used for evaluation purposes we
provided an extended evaluation example, through which a RG was instantiated
by a certain agent against multiple other agents, and which was later used against
a certain opponent to augment knowledge acquired directly from a single dialogue
against him. At the end of the example, the accuracy of the augmented OM was
compared with that of the non-augmented one, in order to test the impact of the
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augmentation in increasing its accuracy.
We finally presented a discussion where we elaborated on how a RG can
be used on the fly for dialogue simulation and strategising purposes, suggesting
another approach to evaluating augmentation; one that is concerned with its
impact in producing a more effective strategising.
The evaluation of our approach is certainly an important part of our research,
as it is for every research. And this is not just so that our research approach
can be deemed successful or not, through appropriate testing, but also because
evaluations often reveal aspects of modelling, or the impact of accounted factors
through revealing their consequences, in ways and that were often not anticipated.
This information can lead to the optimisation of our approach as well as to the
investigation of other issues related with opponent modelling, such as accounting
for domain or context related information, the perception of general knowledge
and group-only accessed knowledge, in combination with the properties of the
relationship graphs produced in each case etc., and it is thus our immediate
future research objective.
Furthermore, as, apart from the interrelatedness of information, linking of
arguments could to some extent rely on how groups of agents in a multi-agent
environment share common information, leading to certain arguments following
more often against a certain group of agents but not against others, an interesting
direction would be to extend the dialogue framework proposed in this thesis
in order incorporate additional information accounted by social argumentation
frameworkss (SAF s) (Leite and Martins [2011]) that we currently ignore. We
anticipate that the added information will very likely lead to an even better
quantification of the likelihood relationships between opponent arguments in a
RG and we thus intend to also put this assumption to the test in our future work.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions & Future Work
In this final chapter we summarise our work listing the research gaps that we
have addressed as well as our corresponding contributions. In addition we list
the limitations in our work and offer a number of open problems for investigation
towards which we intend to turn in our future work.
8.1 Summary of Work & Contributions
In this thesis we addressed a number of research questions defined in Section 1.2.
For the purpose of exploring the impact of the underlying logic in dialogues
and the development of an dialogue framework for structured arguments (ques-
tions 1 & 2) we developed an ASPIC+-based framework for persuasion dialogue.
ASPIC+ has been shown to satisfy Caminada’s [2007] rationality postulates, it
explicitly models the logical content and structure of arguments, while it accom-
modates many existing logical approaches to argumentation. The latter allows
us to claim a similar level of generality for our dialogical framework.
Relying on this framework, we showed that it is possible that new arguments
are instantiated from the logical information introduced through the exchanged
arguments in a dialogue. This fact impacts both strategy development in di-
alogues as well as argument evaluation protocols in dialogue frameworks that
guarantee soundness and completeness.
Particularly in relation to strategic considerations, we further illustrated how
287
in combination with the existence of an OM, the possible instantiation of ar-
guments, not just from within the exchanged information, but also partly from
the opponent’s possible knowledge is also something that should be taken into
account. If one is rational, revealing information to an opponent that would al-
low her to construct arguments which could reinstate the opponent’s position is
something that should be avoided.
In relation to the 3rd question:
• How will the employment of a structured argumentation system add to the
expressiveness of dialogues produced in this framework, allowing for the
introduction of a participant’s preferences as a means of justifying their
rational with respect to a defeat relationship?
Within the context of the ASPIC+-based framework, we were able to allow agents
to introduce preferences against arguments under two forms of attacks: preference
attack, which concerns the attack of a preference on an argument, and; preference-
rebut attacks which concerns the attack of preference against another preference.
This way we allowed participants to maintain their individual preferences in a
game, as well as to use them in order to argue about their rational on the defeat
relationship between contradictory arguments.
In relation to the 4th and the 5th question:
• How can we evaluate the dialogue outcomes produced by our framework
with respect to the acceptability of a disputed argument?
• With what restrictions should protocols developed for our dialogue frame-
work be characterised with, so as to guarantee the soundness of a dialogue’s
result with respect to those semantics?
We developed two protocols, drawing from the work of Modgil and Caminada
[2009] for the credulous preferred semantics as well as for the grounded semantics.
For dialogues characterised by these protocols we were able to provided soundness
and fairness results, in the case where the dialogues were satisfying conditions
concerned with logical (Prakken and Vreeswijk [2002]) and protocol completeness.
In simple words, the first requires that at a given point in a dialogue all moves
that could be instantiated from the accumulated knowledge implicitly constructed
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from the exchange of arguments have been moved into the game. The second
requires that all arguments that could have been repeated in the game have been
repeated. These results prove a correspondence between the production of a
justified argument in dialogues that satisfy certain properties in our system, with
the participation of an argument in an extension of the AF implicitly constructed
from those dialogues.
We also offered a preference conflict resolution method, concerned with the
set of the accumulated preferences introduced into a game, in a way that reflected
the employed semantics in each game.
In relation to the 6th question:
• What are the main mechanisms based on which one may build, update and
maintain an OM?
We provided a modelling framework for building, updating and maintaining an
OM, which assumes a structured representation of knowledge in the form of logical
constituents for argument instantiation. The framework allows the modeller to
differentiate between 3 ways of opponent information acquisition, those of: direct
collection of information through an opponent’s commitment store; collection
from third parties, and; augmentation.
In relation to the 7th and the 8th question:
• What factors affect the credibility of acquired opponent information?
• Can we formalise an opponent modelling process based on which one could
account for these factors in a way that could possibly increase the effective-
ness of a strategy?
We identified factors related to trust issues in the case of third party provided
information, while in the case of augmentation these factors concern the frequency
in which an argument appears in dialogues with other arguments and with respect
to some interrelatedness between the presumably related arguments. We were
able to quantify the impact of these factors in the form of confidence values
and associate acquired information with such values based on their information
acquisition method. We also showed how these values can be used for utility
evaluation purposes, assuming the application of the minimax algorithm.
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In relation to the 9th question:
• Can we develop a modelling mechanism for inducing and augmenting an
OM based on a modeller’s general experience in dialogues?
We proposed an augmentation process, and developed a corresponding mecha-
nism which allows a modeller to incorporate additional information (external to
a current OM) from its general experience, into an OM, after relating it with
information already in the model, thus utilising its experience in a multifaceted
way. Specifically, the mechanism relies on the interrelatedness of information,
captured by notions of support and that of common attack targets between the
arguments, for instantiating a relationships graph (RG). We showed that one
can then augment an OM by mapping the arguments instantiated from it in the
RG to include neighbouring arguments (their logical constituents) into the model
contingent on satisfaction of some likelihood threshold.
In relation to the 10th question:
• If the proposed modelling process is not tractable, resulting in making
strategy development processes also intractable, how can we increase its
tractability?
The process we proposed was shown to have a high complexity with respect to
the computation of the likelihoods of the possible augmentations of an OM. In
order to allow for it to be used in dialogues on the fly for strategising purposes, we
developed a Monte-Carlo simulation for the approximate computation of those
likelihoods. We evaluated our approach using randomly generated graphs, show-
ing the rate of convergence of our sampling to the theoretical values, while we
proved that our approach converges after a constant number of steps.
Finally, in relation to the 11th question:
• How can we evaluate the effectiveness of an opponent modelling mechanism
in increasing a model’s validity and consequently its credibility?
We defined two metrics respectively related to the correctness and the complete-
ness of an OM, which are essentially concerned with the correspondence be-
tween an opponent’s OM and the opponent’s actual knowledge. Given the lack
290
of argument-based benchmarks for dialogues we provided a methodology towards
evaluating our approach, and left the actual evaluation to future work.
8.2 Limitations & Future work
Through our work, we were able to identify a number of limitations. We list these
limitations in this section as open problem for future investigation.
1. Update of an Agent’s own Knowledge:
An issue left unexplored in this thesis is how agents may update their own
knowledge S(i,i) after the acquisition of new information from the dialogue
process. For the purpose of this thesis we simply assume that regardless
of whether new information is introduced in an agent’s theory, no informa-
tion is retracted but rather conflicts are resolved through evaluation of the
justified arguments under acceptability semantics.
However, apart from how agents update their own knowledge in dialogues,
one has to also wonder about whether an agent’s own knowledge should also
contain the knowledge assumed to be known to all its opponents. As Rien-
stra et al. [2013] explain it is not reasonable for a modeller to believe that a
certain opponent is aware of an argument without the modeller being aware
of the argument himself. They refer to this as “awareness restriction”.
On the same topic, we also do not account for how agents may update their
own preferences in dialogues nor we account for how priority-orderings may
be formed. We simply assume that agents use generic principles to do so
such as the specificity principle, and the temporal principle which orders
newly acquired knowledge over older knowledge.
2. Modelling Goals:
Another issue left implicit in our work is the modelling of goals. Goals are
first introduced in this thesis in the general dialogue framework of Chap-
ter 3, where a general strategy function is also introduced. Although the
concept of goals is not used here, any concrete implementation of the theo-
retical concepts discussed in this thesis will require reference to an agent’s
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goals, and thus accounting for goals in our framework was imperative, at
least for the sake of theoretical completeness.
There are many objectives that an agent may be pursuing at any given time
in a dialogue. Agents may decide to commit to their dialogical objectives
corresponding to their roles in dialogues, or aim towards maximising their
personal utility, which implies that they may have to deviate from those
roles. Apart from listing a possible set of objectives that may characterise
an agent’s goals, we also intend to research how one may develop ways of
modelling strategies that correspond to those goals, e.g. as an automaton
(Carmel and Markovitch [1998]), as well as mechanisms used to anticipate
the use of such strategies by an opponent in a dialogue. One can then rely
on these mechanism for counter-strategising purposes.
3. Additional Factors that may Affect the Quantification of likely
Related Arguments in a RG:
Though in our work we essentially account for the frequency of appearance
of pairs of arguments related in different ways in a history of dialogues for
deducing the relationship likelihood between them, other factors could be
taken into account as well. Such factors may concern issues related with
the context of the game, or the assumed background of the participants, or
even whether the participants are members of communities with access to
shared knowledge.
Specifically in relation to the latter, an idea could be to instantiate a network
of agents, with agents being linked and with those links being strengthened
with weights, every time those agents use the same arguments. One may
then apply a community detection algorithm for deducing communities of
agents, in a multi-agent environment which could share the same arguments.
Furthermore, an interesting issue worth exploring is the extent to which
the proposed quantification methods are susceptible to manipulation. For
instance, in the case of thw weighting mechanism proposed in Definition 52,
in order to diminish the significance of two related arguments A→ B in a
RG a player may invoke A many times, leaving a player anxious to maintain
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the weighting wAB only with the option of responding B every time A
appears. Of course, this stance would require that one commits to only
responding with B sacrificing the use of alternatives which may possibly
lead to outcomes with higher utility. This and other such issues will be
part of our future work.
4. Modelling of a logical constituents RG:
Another future research objective is concerned with attempting a more
analytic approach of an instantiated RG, where the logical constituents of
arguments could be linked instead of the arguments they compose.
This objective derives from a limitation concerned with the possible ways
of calculating the confidence value of a constructed argument, discussed
in Section 4.5.2 of Chapter 4. To recap, we proposed three possible ways
of doing so: through propagating the confidence values of the argument’s
constituents; computing their average, or; choosing amongst them the one
with the smallest value to pass to the constructed argument. As explained,
in the case of propagation we were faced with an asymmetry issue. Namely,
if confidence values are assigned to the constituents of arguments prior to
their incorporation into an OM, then the reconstructed confidence value of
that argument after it has been re-instantiated from an OM, should match
its original value. However this is not the case if propagation is used. This
asymmetry does not appeal to intuition.
This problem results from treating the arguments, and particularly the pos-
sibility of their awareness by a certain opponent, as random events instead
of doing so for their constituents. After all, instantiation of an argument
is dependent on whether the logical constituents that compose that argu-
ment are known to a certain opponent. So, when a modeller enquires as to
whether an opponent knows a certain argument, the actual question should
be “is that opponent capable of constructing that argument?” or “what is
the likelihood of that opponent to be aware of certain constituents which
make the construction of a certain argument possible?” (this approach
relates to work by Riveret et al. [2007]).
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B : r; r ⇒ ¬q C : s; s⇒ ¬p
F : s; s⇒ r G : y; y ⇒ s
A : p; p⇒ q





r r ⇒ ¬q
s s⇒ r
y y ⇒ s
(c)
Figure 8.1: a) A dialogue tree T, b) The resulting RG, c) A relationships graph
of the related constituents
In other words, from the scope of probability theory, the random events
should be the likelihood of an opponent to be aware of the constituents of
certain arguments, while arguments should simply be characterised by the
result of their propagation.
For doing so it is required that we provide a way for modelling relationships
between constituents in a logical RG, rather than using an abstract one
which relies on relationships between arguments. The notion of support
can still serve as a connection component. However, instead of connecting
arguments we will be connecting their constituents. This idea is illustrated
in Figure 8.1.
If we adhere to the support relationship conditions imposed by Definition 51
then the resulting RG for the opponent arguments used, would be the one
that appears in Figure 8.1b based on which one could deduce a structural
instantiation of it which appears in Figure 8.1c. The added expressiveness
of this graph could possibly better reflect relationships between arguments
not captured by an ‘abstract’ RG.
5. Development of benchmarks for dialogues, to test the proposed
modelling implementation:
The augmentation mechanism proposed in this thesis, relies on features con-
cerned with the interrelatedness of information and draws from the structure
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of dialogues to statistically infer possible opponent knowledge. Though it
intuitively appears to be a reasonable way of anticipating opponent infor-
mation and exploiting a modeller’s general dialogue experience, it remains
untested.
As discussed in Chapter 7 this is because of the lack dialogue-based argu-
mentation benchmarks. Even now, at the time this thesis is written, most
argument-based benchmarks are concerned argument evaluation (Snaith
and Reed. [2012]; Thimm [2014]), and to the best of our knowledge there is
very little work on the development of argument-based dialogue benchmarks
(Bex et al. [2014]).
Another problem is that anticipating possible opponent knowledge based
on statistical inference in a sense reflects how information is distributed
amongst the members of a studied group. In other words, for the purpose of
practically evaluating our approach, actual knowledge needs to be collected
and represented in the form of argument graphs, in order to guarantee
unbiased results. This process is referred to as argument mining and it
is only now gaining research interest as a new challenge in corpus-based
discourse analysis.
However, simulating such knowledge in the form of argument graphs for
evaluation purposes is still feasible. That is, as long as it satisfies certain
structural properties that argument graphs are expected to have (Hunter
and Woltran [2013]). The evaluation methodology presented in Chapter 7
relies on such graphs, and the methodology proposed relies on a scenario ac-
cording to which an augmented opponent model is compared against the op-
ponent’s actual knowledge, to test whether a better match has been created.
Our immediate research direction is to develop similar dialogue scenarios,
which are theoretically mapped out in terms of agents’ knowledge evolving
and how the augmentation would work, which will become a benchmark to





Proposition 2 Let T be a dialogue tree and DM0 be T’s root move, if DM0 is
labelled in then it is not necessary that ∃T′ ∈ T.
Proof Figure A.1 presents a counter example which serves as proof, for a cred-















Figure A.1: a) A dialogue tree T (Grey moves by Pr), b) The AF induced from
T.
The example is based on the AF presented in [Modgil and Caminada, 2009, p.
125] which deals with the exact same problem but in the concept of arguments
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games. In an analogous way, the concerned AF (A.1b) can be induced from the
terminated credulous dialogue presented in Figure A.1a. Notice that:
1. The root argument A is labelled in, since the end notes in both disputes
are Pr arguments.
2. As Op cannot repeat its moves in the credulous game, Pr is the winner of
this game.
3. However, the induced AF presented in A.1b reveals a rebut attack relation-
ship between arguments G and D, both of which are moved by Pr.
4. 3 implies that the set of arguments moved by Pr is not conflict free.
A.2 Nested Opponent Models
Definition 71 (Agent Theory with nested OMs) Let {Ag1, . . . , Agν} be a
set of agents. For i = 1 . . . ν, the theory of Agi is a tuple AgTi =< S(i,1), . . . , S(i,ν) >
such that:
For j = 1 . . . ν, each sub-theory S(i,j) = 〈AT(i,j),G(i,j), S
′
(j,i)〉 where:
• AT(i,j) is what Agi believes is the argumentation theory (AS(i,j), KB(i,j), p(i,j))
of Agj;
• G(i,j) is what Agi believes are the goals of Agj;






(i,j)〉 is what Agi believes is Agj’s OM of Agi;
• If j = i, then AT(i,j) and G(i,j) are respectively Agi’s own argumentation
theory and goals, while S ′(i,j) = ∅ (null tuple);
Then for i, j, k,m = 1 . . . n, let:
S(i,j) = 〈AT(i,j),G(i,j), S
′
(j,i)〉, and S(k,m) = 〈AT(k,m),G(k,m), S
′
(m,k)〉
be any two distinct sub-theories, where:
AT(i,j) = (AS(i,j), KB(i,j), p(i,j)), and AT(k,m) = (AS(k,m), KB(k,m), p(k,m))
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1 2 3 4 5 6
K ≤′ R ≤ G S ′(j,i)
1 S(i,1) K(i,1) ≤
′
(i,1) R(i,1) ≤(i,1) G(i,1) S
′
1i
2 S(i,2) K(i,2) ≤
′
(i,2) R(i,2) ≤(i,2) G(i,2) S
′
(2,i)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i S(i,i) K(i,i) ≤
′
(i,i) R(i,i) ≤(i,i) G(i,i) ∅
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ν S(i,ν) K(i,ν) ≤
′
(i,ν) R(i,ν) ≤(i,ν) G(i,ν) S
′
(ν,i)
Table A.1: The distinct sets of logical elements found in each sub-theory of a
single agent theory (AgTi) extended to include nested OMs
as explained in Section 3.1.1, we then assume that:
• p(i,j) = p(k,m), where p(i,j) and p(k,m) are the preference functions (used for
defining an ordering over the set of all arguments that can be constructed
from a KB in an AS) in AT(i,j) and AT(k,m) respectively;




(k,m), where L(i,j) (
−
(i,j)) and L(k,m) (
−
(k,m)) are the
languages (contrary relations) in AS(i,j) and AS(k,m) respectively.
We should note that in the case where the modelling framework presented in
chapter 4, was extended so as to account for nested OMs it is easy to see that an
agent Agi may simply assume the role of its opponent Agj, and that relying on
the same mechanism, described in Definition 44, Agj will also update its model of
Agi based on Agi’s commitment store (CSi) and so on. In any case, this does not
mean that Agi’s nested OM will accurately reflect its opponent’s OM, since Agi
cannot be aware of additional information that may be provided, for example, to
Agj by an external source (a third party agent).
Table A.1 illustrates the sets of logical elements found in each sub-theory of
a single agent theory, with the additional inclusion of nested OMs expressed as
S ′(j,i). Essentially S
′
(j,i) is what Agi believes Agj believes about Agi. Obviously
this recursive modelling allows for numerous levels of opponent modelling. We
differentiate between different levels of recursive modelling in a similar sense to
how this is done by Carmel and Markovitch [1996], i.e.:
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• a 0 level model concerns a sub-theory where S(i,j) = 〈AT(i,j),G(i,j),∅〉;
• a 1 level model concerns a sub-theory where S(i,j) = 〈AT(i,j),G(i,j), S
′
(j,i)〉







• a n-level model concerns a sub-theory where S(i,j) = 〈AT(i,j),G(i,j), S
′
(j,i)〉,
where S ′(j,i) is a n-1 level recursive model.
A.3 Trust Network & Propagated Trust Com-
putation
Definition 72 (Trust Network) Let Ags = {Ag1, . . . , Agν} be a set of agents
in a multi-agent environment, then a trust network is a pair:
TN = {Ags, τ}
where {τ} is the set of pairwise trust relations over the agents in Ags so that if
(Agi, Agj) ∈ τ then {Agi, Agj} is a directed arc in TN .
Definition 73 (Computation of trust) Let p(Agi, Agj) =< Agi, Agi+1, . . . ,
Agj−1, Agj > be a path between agents Agi and Agj such that:
p(Agi, Agj) = τ(Agi, Agi+1), τ(Agi+1, Agi+2), . . . , τ(Agj−1, Agj)
and where the trust values between the agents is provided by a function tr such
that:
• tr[0,1] : Ags× Ags 7→ [0, 1]
• tr(Agi, Agi) = 1
• tr(Agi, Agj) 6= 0⇔ (Agi, Agj) ∈ τ
• tr(Agi, Agj) = 0⇔ (Agi, Agj) /∈ τ
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then, Agi trust in Agj is computed as follows:
tr(Agi, Agj) = tr(Agi, Agi+1)⊗
tr tr(Agi+1, Agi+2)⊗
tr · · · ⊗tr tr(Agj−1, Agj)
for some function ⊗tr.
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